Lattimore Story - John T. Flynn

1. The Plot to Turn Asia Red.

There is an element in the story of Owen Lattimore which makes it difficult to tell, because to an American it is unbelievable. It involves a set of activities, dispositions, states of mind and attitudes with which the normal American has no familiarity in real life. He can be intrigued and amused by such stories if they are in a work of fiction, particularly if they are presented in a purely Oriental setting or, better still, in a novel about some Balkan revolution. But they have no logical relation to the American scene. Here we are confronted with an alien web of intrigue, artifice and deceit carried out, not by criminals and characters in the underworld, but by high-ranking officials and agents of our own government who present the appearance of gentlemen and scholars and patriots —a web financed and supported by eminent educators and business organizations, in a time of war—and all suddenly exposed to our view in our own American setting. It beggars belief.

I can understand our own native brand of American socialists. No one knows better than I the dark spots in our own society. There were many people with soft hearts and generous dispositions who had to see or even live close to these dark spots of our great cities, where they saw injustice, poverty and graft. These conditions touched the hearts of many men and women and led them, not too logically, into supposing that all would be well if we could get rid of things like Business, Profit, Capitalists, Bosses, Private Wealth and Luxuries.

I can also understand the wave of human sympathy that flowed over the hearts of Americans when the Russian Revolution broke on the world in 1917, ending the long era of tyranny under the Czars. Sympathy for the Russian leaders, most of whom were old-fashioned socialists, was warm. But I cannot understand the state of mind of Americans who were converted to communism after the rise of Stalinism, the massacre of the kulaks, the heartless liquidation of the old socialist idealists and the long succession of outrages under the tyranny of Stalin during the last twenty years. When, therefore, I see an American holding up the hand of Stalin, promoting his aims and ambitions here or anywhere, and doing so after the advent of the Hitler-Stalin Pact which plunged Europe into war, the spectacle baffles me. But when I see an American—an educated American—becoming an instrument for promoting the policies of Stalin in the United States and against the United States throughout the world, I say I am staggered. Always my first reaction to these revelations or charges when they were first made was to refuse to believe them.

I would not believe the Lattimore story if the evidence to support it, now before us at long last, were not overwhelming. It is because of this I observe at the outset that the story is difficult to relate. A year and a half ago I attempted to outline in a small volume While You Slept, the forces which were responsible for the Korean War and, back of that, our disastrous adventure in China. Since then a vast mass of evidence has come to light which now furnishes the complete and definitive proof of the betrayal which caused our defeat in Asia. At that time an American professor and journalist named Owen Lattimore was being widely criticized as one of the leading figures in the promotion of Russia's aims in China and Korea. However, any American journalist or political leader who dared to suggest this idea was immediately subjected to the most violent abuse. Senator Joseph McCarthy was not the only one who had drawn public attention to the China betrayal. But, being a newcomer to the techniques of Communist disputation here, as everywhere, he assumed that Americans would believe the criticisms he made because they were reasonable and plausible and because most of the proof was there.

Communist controversy, however, is not conducted in open debate and logical discussion. Its first weapon always is the smear—abuse and character assassination. Its other weapon is to use the strange power Communist leaders in America attained (which is another unbelievable story) to liquidate writers, publicists, critics and journalists who dared to defend some victim marked by the Communists for liquidation. I think it is a fair assumption that Senator McCarthy, a normal American, a newcomer at the time into the field of controversy with the Reds, must have been astounded at the blows that were immediately dealt him, not by the Communist Party openly, but by the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, various conservative magazines and finally such respectable men in the Senate as Senator Millard Tydings and Senator William Benton. Benton he might have understood, had he known more of his career of association with various aggressive left-wing elements.

Instead of the Communists and pro-Communists involved in our Asiatic disaster being investigated, McCarthy was investigated by a Senate committee. Owen Lattimore was vindicated and petted. But fortunately the Senate Judiciary Committee, through its Sub-Committee on Internal Security, later undertook an investigation into the whole subject—not merely the charges made by McCarthy but the criticisms made by a number of reputable journalists of the whole China episode and in particular of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That investigation was made by five senators—three Democrats and two Republicans. Other senators sat in at times. They held hearings from July 1951 to August 1952. The testimony makes up 14 volumes of over 5,000 pages. Public testimony was taken from 66 witnesses—all of the criticized persons being given the fullest opportunity to present their own cases. The committee staff examined over 20,000 documents. Every person who wished to be heard was given the opportunity. I followed this investigation with continuing attention. I have read every line of the testimony and all of the important exhibits. What is more, I sought the advice of men and women who are experts in Asiatic affairs.

The investigation by the Senate Sub-Committee was conducted by a professional staff completely familiar with Communist conspiratorial techniques. The senators who supervised the investigation and presided over the committee's hearings, as well as the counsel of the committee, proceeded with a sense of responsibility and with a degree of courtesy and consideration toward all the witnesses, including those who were accused or suspected, which I have never seen excelled in a congressional investigation. What is more, the Internal Security Sub-Committee's performance was in striking contrast to the vicious, angry circus put on by the so-called Tydings Committee, which had no intention of seeking the truth but which was interested merely in persecuting and discrediting Senator McCarthy. Senator McCarthy himself had no part in the investigation by the Subcommittee on Internal Security to which I am now referring.

As a result of this exhaustive study, the whole truth about China and the Korean War is known. I should add that the hearings of the Joint Senate Committees on the Armed Forces and Foreign Relations, following the removal of General MacArthur and the attempt to discredit him, produced some additional material of the greatest importance. I feel that any honest journalist can now say with complete assurance that the truth about China, Korea, the Institute of Pacific Relations, Owen Lattimore and the whole movement to turn Asia over to communism is known. It is upon these evidences that I base the story of Owen Lattimore which follows, and which I again repeat is difficult to credit. It is necessary, however, before introducing the reader to this weird operation, to set the stage upon which the tragedy was enacted.

2. Russian Designs on Asia

World War II can be looked at in two widely separated sectors. Hitler had invaded Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States in Eastern Europe, and later Russia. In that war the United States fought as the ally of Russia, along with Britain, France, Belgium and the other victims of Nazi aggression. There we may say Russia and the United States were allies.

But in Asia we fought the war practically alone. We did get some aid from Britain, but the great weight of the Japanese war was borne by us. There Russia was never an ally. Russia did not enter that war. All during our war years, Russia remained on friendly terms with Japan, maintained an embassy in Tokyo and a vast espionage system. Japan kept her embassy in Moscow. From December 7, 1941, to August 9, 1945, Russia took no part in the war on Japan. On August 9, when Japan's defeat was already complete and surrender was only a matter of days, Russia declared war on Japan, marched into Manchuria and Northern China and other Japanese strongholds and into Northern Korea. Japan surrendered on August 14—five days later. Thus, without striking a single effective blow and with only five days of fighting, Russia, with the complete consent of our government, took all the fruits of the war—she communized China, now holds Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, three provinces comprising one-third of China, as Russian satellite states, dominates the rest of China through the Communist regime, and involved us in a war in Korea.

We must understand that the story of the war in the Pacific embraced two wars. One was the war waged against Japan by the United States. The other was the war against China waged by Russia. In China, Russia did not use her armies. She used the Chinese Communist armies. This war had been going on before World War II began. It was a revolutionary war by the Reds to take over China. Russia used the Chinese Communist armies for this purpose. And, once the United States became involved in the Pacific, Russia used every means in her power to give the war in the Pacific such a direction that she would achieve her aim without striking a blow. Her objectives were (1) a victory for the Communist revolutionary armies in China; (2) the acquisition of the Kurile Islands, (3) of Sakhalin, (4) of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang—the northern part of China; (5) the conquest of Korea, and (6) to share with the United States the occupation of Japan.

The United States had no other objective in the Pacific but to defeat Japan, to release the Philippines from her grasp, to drive her out of all the Pacific islands she had conquered and to force her to abandon China and bring peace to that unhappy country. In addition, the United States proposed to make Japan pay for the damage she had done and to render her incapable of renewing her ambitions in the Pacific.

We fought the war and paid all the costs. We did succeed in liberating the Philippines and in forcing Japan to surrender. But Russia, after only five days of fighting after Japan was ready to surrender, walked off with every one of her objectives but one. She got all of Northern China and a Communist government in the rest of China. She got the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Northern Korea, and she pinned us in a crazy war for South Korea which was fought, as is usual, not by Russians but by North Koreans and Chinese Reds. She failed only in her attempt to share with General MacArthur the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan.

These were indeed vast and audacious ambitions on Russia's part. It is difficult to believe that she had any hope of winning any of them, save the defeat of Japan by the United States. It is perfectly obvious that Russia could not, when we won the war, accomplish any of her aims by military power. The only way in which she could achieve all her other objectives would be to sit tight and let the United States defeat Japan and then induce the United States to deliver to Russia all the other objects of her dreams—China, Korea, the Kuriles, Sakhalin and so on. But could any man in his senses suppose that we would expend four years of frightful war to free the Pacific from the Japanese and then hand it over to the Russian Communists; that we would engage Japan's powerful forces throughout the Pacific—challenging her navies all over that ocean and her armies in a hundred widely separated islands—at the sacrifice of 260,000 American casualties, the loss of much of our navy and air force and the expenditure of billions of dollars, and then turn the fruits of all this fighting over to the ruthless tyranny of Russia?

Yet, Stalin set out to accomplish precisely this. But Stalin knew clearly that he could gain our government's consent to this incredible surrender in only one way. He would have to find means of influencing the decisions of the American government, chiefly our State Department. There was only one way in which he could do this. There must be men and women inside the American State Department—and in any other places they could be inserted—even in the White House—who would work for Russia's plans. By this I do not mean that Stalin must have Russians in our government. Obviously, no Russian could perform this task. It was not mere spies he wanted—that is, agents who would keep him informed of America's plans and purposes. That is not difficult. It is an old trick; America swarmed with spies.

Stalin had to have people who would take an influential part—indeed a decisive part—in making America's own decisions. And these had to be Americans. No others in any effective measure could get into those innermost spots where great decisions on the war and on postwar policy would be made. He must have Americans in our State Department of such importance that they could take part in the secret discussion of American policy and exercise a powerful influence in shaping the decisions. They must be Americans, because no others could get into such secret and sensitive spots. And that is why I say that any normal man will declare this was impossible—and hence this whole story is impossible. But it wasn't impossible. For this is exactly what Russia succeeded in doing. And that is the unbelievable story we will now see acted out to the end.

3. Institute of Pacific Relations

It is now merely necessary to recall how all this worked out. In August 1945 the Japanese government surrendered. Keep in mind that Russia had an embassy in Tokyo and that she had also had an extensive spy ring in Japan. Russia therefore knew that Japan was defeated and was merely interested in getting the best possible terms from the United States. Japan's desperate condition was also fully known in our State Department and to the Soviet agents and friends there. And so, when Japan was utterly defeated, and only five days before she actually surrendered, Russia declared war on her. Stalin then sent his armies—1,250,000 strong, armed by President Roosevelt —into Manchuria and other Japanese-held strongholds and into Northern Korea. The Russian army was able to arm the Chinese Communists in North China, enabling them to take over a much larger part of China than they had previously held and to continue with increased vigor their war upon the Nationalist government of China under Chiang Kai-shek.

From this time on—August 1945—the Communists, armed by Russia, waged a continuous war against the Chinese Republic. While the Chinese Reds were armed by Russia, Chiang Kai-shek's armies were disarmed by the United States on orders of General George Marshall. This strange war between the Chinese Communists, armed by Russia—much of the arms having been provided by us—and the Chinese government, disarmed by us, dragged on for four years. In the end our State Department made two clear decisions:

1. To recognize the Chinese Communist government in China and to transfer arms intended for Chiang Kai-shek to the Red leaders—a plan in which they were, fortunately, blocked.

2. To withdraw our troops from Southern Korea, as a result of which the Korean Communists, backed by Red China and Red Russia, struck at the Southern Korean Republic, thus launching the disastrous Korean War.

Who were the Americans in the State and other departments responsible for this appalling betrayal of our allies, the Chinese and the Koreans? It was not merely a betrayal of China and Korea, but of America as well. What sort of men were these? What interest did they serve? What strange allegiance was in their hearts, what weird philosophy in their minds that could draw them to so base an enterprise?

First of all, these men could not do their job in the State Department unless there was in existence some organized force with sufficient funds and power to manage the job. This force had to be outside the government, equipped to keep up a steady flow of persuasive propaganda upon the public mind in order to create an attitude of tolerance for such a policy. Obviously this could be done only through those instruments of news and opinion from which the public receives its knowledge of public affairs. And as there was a war in progress it could be done only if there was a hospitable attitude for their purposes somewhere inside the government.

In the case of Asia, this operation was far simpler than one might suppose. It had to be done by persons belonging to that group vaguely defined as publicists—writers, journalists, lecturers, professors, diplomats—because it was largely a writing job. Furthermore, this was an adventure which, to put it mildly, skirted the edges of disloyalty. But the men and women answering to these requirements were at hand, ready and eager for their task. They would have to influence the opinions of editors and commentators and journalists to form the opinions of newspaper and magazine readers and of radio listeners. They had to produce books and a flood of magazine articles to color the opinions of editorial writers and commentators. They had to get their ideas into screen plays and on the radio in soap operas.

In America we had writers, journalists, politicians in abundance with a wide knowledge of American public affairs and the problems of Western Europe. The number of persons who could qualify as experts on the affairs of the Far East was, however, comparatively small. And it happened that the greater number of them were sympathizers with the dreams of Russia in Asia and with the ambitions of the Chinese Communist leaders. The vast eruption of revolution and war in Asia was a dramatic subject in which we had become involved. The demand of the public for news and information about it made a hungry market for books, pictures, radio news and newspaper articles. This peculiar situation in turn sent magazines, newspaper editors and the government—particularly the State Department—in hot pursuit of all the Far East experts and pretended experts in the country. And it so happened that almost all of them were gathered together under the wings of one important, richly endowed and apparently highly respectable organization. This was known as the INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, one of the moving spirits of which was Owen Lattimore. It is generally referred to as the IPR—the strange, even weird history of which, when it is too late, is now thoroughly known.

The propaganda line promoted by the IPR was (1) that Russia was not a dictatorship but a democracy and one of the "peace-loving nations"; (2) that Japan was an essentially evil thing and must be disarmed, her colonies taken from her and rendered helpless (hence a mark for Russian ambitions) for a generation; (3) that the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in China was fascist, corrupt, dominated by big industrialists, bankers and landlords; (4) that Chiang Kai-shek refused to fight the Japanese and turned his arms against the "democratic factions" (the Communists) and that he must be forced to take the Reds with their army into his government; (5) that these so-called Communists were not Communists at all but just agrarian reformers, like our old-fashioned progressive farm leaders.

This propaganda campaign revolved around a group of books written about China's revolution and her relations with Russia. I have made a collection of 29 books published during and after the war on this subject of China. Of these, 22 were strongly pro-Communist; seven were not. All of the 22 pro-Communist books were highly praised and recommended in all the leading literary reviews, including the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the New Republic, The Nation and the Saturday Review of Literature. Thus sponsored, these books became the source of all the information Americans were getting about China and Russia and their relationships in Asia. The anti-Communist books on this same subject were roundly condemned. In the leading magazines the same men and women who wrote the books were also writing an endless flood of articles which were pure propaganda for the Communists in China, while over the radio and in the movies the same mendacious propaganda was diffused. Americans heard little else on this subject. (For a full account of the propaganda activities carried on in books, magazines, radio and motion pictures, see Chapters VIII through XIII of While You Slept.)

At the center of all this propaganda was the Institute of Pacific Relations. It managed the whole job. Its members, officials, researchers, staff members wrote most of the books, most of the magazine articles and most of the reviews in the leading literary journals.

However, it was necessary to translate this propaganda into action. And this same Institute of Pacific Relations was the apparatus used for this purpose. Books and magazine articles might create opinion. But the decisions of the government on policy would be shaped in the State Department. It can be said with complete assurance now that the policies of our State Department in China and Asia were molded generally by the agents or allies of the IPR.

4. IPR Files Discovered

The IPR was not formed originally for this purpose. It was organized in 1925 by a group of educators and businessmen interested in the social, economic and commercial problems of the Far East. There was a central body called the Pacific Council, which directed IPR's over-all policies. Grouped around it was a number of national councils representing the United States, France, England, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Russia. The Pacific Council was located in New York. The American Council was also in New York and the other national councils in their respective countries. The Pacific Council and the American Council occupied the same building and, working closely together, became the chief operating units.

The original purpose was sound—to create an agency to study the problems of the Pacific. But in time the Pacific and American Councils fell under the influence of men who sympathized with Red Russia and the Red Chinese. This is difficult to credit when one notes the names of those on the boards of trustees. Ray Lyman Wilbur, former President of Stanford University, was board chairman of the American Council. He was succeeded by Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California. On the board was a group of eminent Americans which included Admiral Yamell, Henry R. Luce, Juan Trippe and others as well known. An IPR booklet celebrating its respectability listed 26 great American business concerns as contributors, among them the Chase National Bank, Firestone Rubber Company, Standard Oil of California, Studebaker Corporation and others of the same caliber. The chief financial angels, however, were the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. It can be said as a matter of fact that this costly operation against the peace and security of the United States was financed with funds provided by these two great foundations. For a public man seeking information about the Far East, where better could he go than to the organization behind this facade of rich and conservative sponsors?

However strange it might appear, while these eminent names were flaunted from the masthead of the vessel, down on the deck as well as on the bridge where the actual job of running the vessel was done, were a captain, mates and a crew utterly different from the eminent dupes whose names served as decoration and as decoy for the editors, politicians and officials who went to the IPR for information and counsel.

The executive director of this enterprise was eminently suited for his role. Dr. Edward C. Carter graduated from Harvard in 1900, enlisted in the YMCA secretariat and became chief of its operations in Europe in World War I. He joined forces with the IPR in 1926, first as assistant secretary of the Pacific Council and, after 1933, as executive director. The post called for a distinguished appearance, a scholarly make-up, and an imposing air of rectitude and benevolence. Carter had all these qualities and, in a high degree, that talent requisite above all—the ability to extract large contributions from rich men and women. He possessed not only the flair for dealing with his wealthy sponsors upon an exalted human plane, but also a highly developed capacity for intrigue which enabled him to inspire and direct that strange collection of writers in the corps of revolutionists under his command. He was above all—as was his corps of wandering apostles of mischief and change—a professional social remodeler. Under his calm, smiling, benevolent facade was a keen, resolute and industrious mind. His appearance on the witness stand before the McCarran Committee was a theatrical performance of the highest order—a masterpiece of evasion and amused tolerance, in striking contrast to the explosive ill-temper of the desperate Owen Lattimore as he felt the trap closing slowly around him.

We go back now to a moment in the excitement following the Korean invasion when Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin stirred up a hornet's nest by his attack on Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Owen Lattimore and the IPR. This brought down on his head a stream of abuse of almost unprecedented violence. A Senate committee headed by former Senator Millard Tydings launched a so-called investigation of Senator McCarthy's charges. However, it investigated, not the McCarthy charges, but McCarthy himself, and ended by giving to Lattimore a clean bill of health and a severe denunciation of McCarthy. McCarthy in his first attack had called Lattimore a top Communist agent. He promptly withdrew that charge and said that Lattimore was a pro-Communist propagandist who had sought to promote Communist objectives in China.

It is possible that the full and complete proof of McCarthy's charge could never have been made but for an interesting incident. A young man in Massachusetts, who had followed the McCarthy controversy, wrote a letter to the Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security (the McCarran Committee), telling of an immense cache of IPR files hidden away in an old barn on the estate of Dr. Carter, IPR director. Armed with the necessary legal warrants, the McCarran Committee seized these files. Its staff spent months examining them, after which Dr. Carter and most of his IPR staff members were summoned and confronted with the incriminating evidence in these files. Their testimony, together with the exhibits from the impounded files, is now available in the reports of the Senate committee. Here, then, is a mass of evidence unavailable when the Tydings Committee made its whitewash of Lattimore and the IPR.

These documents, along with the testimony of various witnesses, make it possible now to reveal completely the machinations of Carter, Lattimore and nearly two score members of the IPR staff and the associates of these persons. Their purpose was nothing less than an ambitious design, which succeeded beyond their fondest expectations, to deliver China and Korea into the hands of the Communist revolutionaries in China as a prelude to turning Asia into a Red continent. It is difficult to believe, but the evidence now leaves no doubt about the soundness of the charges.

5. Communist Leaders of the IPR

"[NOTE: The page numbers appearing in parentheses in this and succeeding sections refer to the Hearings before the Internal Security Sub-Committee (known as the McCarran Committee) of the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 25, 1951, to July 2, 1952, on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Page numbers accompanied by the word "Report" refer to the report of that Sub-Committee.]

Let us now see how this job was done. Of course, the highly reputable members of the IPR board served merely as window dressing. The actual work was done by the staffs under the direction of Dr. Carter. Their work consisted in producing a steady flow of pro-Communist propaganda for general consumption and in infiltrating sensitive agencies of government charged with formulating policy in the Far East. We will be concerned here chiefly with the two bodies—the American Council and the Pacific Council—which actually worked in close harmony with each other. The administrative head of the American Council was its executive secretary who directed the office staff.

The first executive secretary was Joseph F. Barnes. He served from 1931 to 1934. Whittaker Chambers testified that Joseph Barnes was a member of an underground unit of the Communist Party, which met in the house of the Communist Frederick V. Field's mother (p. 490). Louis Budenz testified under oath that Barnes was a member of the Communist Party and that official reports of the Politburo in New York disclosed that he rendered great service to the party (p. 543). Hede Massing, former Communist secret agent, testified that she saw Barnes playing tennis in a closely guarded compound in Moscow where only secret Red agents were admitted. The Soviet agent in charge assured her Barnes was all right (p. 244). Barnes has denied that he was a Communist, but his wife, also on the IPR staff, when asked on the witness stand if she was a member of the Party refused to answer on the ground that her answer might incriminate her (p. 2601). Barnes's own writings, however, testify against him. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly for January 1937 he defended Communist leader Earl Browder's use of The Battle Hymn of the Republic. He wrote:

"Every crackpot third party may appropriate for its own purposes the word 'American' and the song 'The Battle Hymn of the Republic.' But in Mr. Browder's campaign some of the fighting words were not mere borrowings; they were already a part of the Communist vocabulary. Even in the maze of Marxist rhetoric these words may be made for many Americans to sing with something of an older throbbing rhetoric" (italics added).

He wrote that young Americans had found two new ponderable changes

". . . which have made the whole equation new. The first is Soviet Russia . . . the second is Marxism". And he was thrilled by the rooted American origins of William Z. Foster, Robert Minor and Earl Browder (Communist leaders)—they are pressing forward 'a new experiment with the American dream.'"

Of course, the intrusion of one Communist or pro-Communist could happen in any organization unaware of Communist methods. But let us see further. Barnes's assistant was Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a notorious Communist, and when Barnes left to take his pink dreams over to the staff of the New York Herald Tribune, the Communist Frederick V. Field succeeded him as executive secretary. He served from 1934 to 1940, when he resigned as secretary but remained as an active member of the inner council.

Field is known as the "millionaire Communist" and he has given his name, his energies and his money freely to numerous Communist causes. He headed the notorious bail bond outfit which provided bail for Communists under indictment and thus enabled some of them to escape from this country when released. When asked by the Senate committee if he was a Communist he refused to answer on the ground that he might incriminate himself (p. 75). He was a member of 26 separate pro-Communist organizations. He has written for years for all sorts of Red publications—54 articles for the Communist Daily Worker, for which he became a columnist, 37 articles for the New Masses. He had a long-standing interest in China. In Political Affairs, an official Red journal, he wrote:

"Special responsibility devolves on American Communists. The China issue presents a signal responsibility to strike a mighty blow at the fortress of world reaction"—by which he meant America. He added: "The opportunity and the power exists to smash American imperialist plans for China. Under the leadership of the great Communist Party of China and its renowned chairman, Mao Tse-tung, the heroic Chinese people are discharging their duties with honor" (p. 119).

Field was not merely the office manager of the IPR. He was a financial angel as well. The McCarran Committee produced a letter written by Edward C. Carter, head of the IPR, in 1940 in which he said: "I think it is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficits. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected two years ago." Under oath. Field admitted he provided $60,000 for these deficits (pp. 7, 8).

In 1940-1941, Hitler and Stalin were partners in the war on Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries. There was a feverish movement here to hurry America into the war. There was also a powerful movement to keep her out. But the reasons which inspired the anti-war groups were varied. The Communists here opposed our entry into the war because we would be fighting Russia. They organized a movement called the American Peace Mobilization. The House Un-American Activities Committee branded this movement "the most notorious Red front in America." It was also the most impudent. Part of its plan was to picket the White House against entering the war against Germany and Russia.

Field resigned as secretary of the American Council of the IPR to become executive secretary of this infamous Peace Mobilization. Philip C. Jessup, Acheson's American delegate to the United Nations, was chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Council of the IPR. He urged Field to remain as executive secretary of the IPR. He introduced a resolution in the Council "praising the leadership which Field has given the Council" and urging that he "remain as secretary and exercise a maximum amount of guidance in determining policy." Dr. Carter added his entreaties. But Field was adamant. He resigned, and the minutes of the IPR contain a tribute to "the distinguished service" which he had rendered for 11 years to the council and express the hope that when his new task—an undisguised Communist operation—was completed "it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council" (pp. 122-124). Will anyone suppose that Dr. Carter and Dr. Jessup did not know of Barnes's and Field's Communist connections and that the American Peace Mobilization was a Russian front? Its White House pickets disappeared the day Hitler marched into Russia.

Field was succeeded in the secretaryship by Dr. William W. Lockwood, who served until 1943 but remained as a trustee along with Field until 1946. Lockwood had been employed on the research staff under Field since 1935. He asks us to believe that he was actually attracted to the Institute by his aversion to communism, yet never suspected the Communist leanings of either Barnes or Field (p. 3874). The notorious antics of the Peace Mobilization, widely described in the newspapers, meant nothing to him. Nor did the presence in an adjoining office with an open communicating door to the IPR of the infamous Amerasia (which we will examine later) inspire any suspicions in his trusting soul. The Communist tinge of almost the entire staff did not impress him.

When Lockwood resigned as secretary after three years and was succeeded by a Communist apologist as secretary—Harriet L. Moore—he asks us to believe that he was not in the least disturbed. He was preceded by two Communist apologists and succeeded by another without having his suspicions aroused. Miss Moore was associated with a number of notorious Communist-front organizations. The former Communist Elizabeth Bentley testified that Miss Moore was identified to her as a Communist by her Communist superior Golos, after which she knew Miss Moore as a Party comrade (p. 438).

Dr. Goodwin Watson, of the Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service, inquired of Dr. Carter about Miss Moore. Carter wrote him: "I have no hesitation in testifying to her unimpeachable loyalty and high character. She is an American of Americans." This statement was a falsehood and Dr. Carter could not help knowing it. He told Dr. Watson that he had "known Miss Moore to criticize manuscripts that were pro-Soviet and thus not effective" and that she was critical of the American Peace Mobilization (p. 2565).

As a matter of fact, Miss Moore was connected with Russian War Relief, a Communist front almost as notorious as the Peace Mobilization, and it is curious that Dr. Carter should consider criticism of the Peace Mobilization a virtue when he himself showered praise on Field when he left the IPR to lead it. Then he told Dr. Watson that criticism in certain high quarters of Miss Moore "derived from a case of mistaken identity. She is confused with another Miss Harriet Moore who is said to be one of the founders of the Communist Party" (p. 2565).

These statements were also false. Miss Moore herself has said she had no recollection of criticizing these Red manuscripts referred to by Dr. Carter. The story about the mistaken identity through which she was confused with another Miss Moore is even worse. David Dubinsky, of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, refused to contribute to Russian War Relief, which was headed by Dr. Carter, because Harriet Moore was its secretary. Carter told him the story of the mistaken identity and swore on the witness stand that Dubinsky had conceded this. Dubinsky in reply to this wrote the McCarran Committee that he never made any such concession. On the contrary, he refused to contribute until he was informed by Carter that Miss Moore had resigned. After that, the Dubinsky organization made a large contribution. But Dubinsky wrote the committee that:

"Later we learned that Dr. Carter, although complying technically with his promise to us as head of the organization, in typical Communist fashion placed Miss Moore in another equally important position in Russian War Relief. Now I learn that Carter is using my name to alibi himself and Miss Moore in the proceedings before you" (p. 293).

Later, Miss Moore resigned from Russian War Relief and worked with a far more notorious outfit—the American-Russian Institute, of which this same Dr. Carter, the executive director of the IPR, was also a director. On the witness stand before the McCarran Committee, Miss Moore, when asked if she was a Communist, refused to answer on the ground that her answer might incriminate her (p. 2559).

Miss Moore was succeeded as secretary of the American Council by Raymond Dennett, who was clearly not a Communist and who became very quickly disturbed at what he saw. He swore he soon came "not to trust the staff 7 (p. 939). It was loaded with Reds and Pinks. Its members belonged to the Office and Professional Workers Union, Local 36, which had been expelled from the leftist CIO because of its Communist activities. Dennett concluded that it was impossible to get unbiased research from such a staff. He got out in disgust at the end of 1945, after a brief tenure. Shortly after this, Dr. Carter retired as active executive director of the IPR and was succeeded by William L. Holland, who seems to have looked after the American Council as well. However, Maxwell Stewart testified that his wife, Marguerite Stewart, served as secretary of the American Council during 1946-1947. She was probably serving as Acting Secretary until the appointment of Clayton Lane in 1948.

Here was a succession of executive secretaries of the American Council from 1931 to 1948—Joseph Barnes, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Harriet L. Moore, Mrs. Marguerite Stewart—all strongly pro-Communist and deeply biased toward Russia. One, Mr. Dennett, became quickly disillusioned and disgusted and quickly got out. If there were no other evidence of the pro-Communist bias of the IPR than this, the case would be complete. Apologists for the IPR point to the names of the eminent conservatives who appeared on its boards. But this is meaningless. This show was run by the professional staff. It is certain that the businessmen whose names appeared on its literature knew little or nothing of what the staff was doing. They provided the protective, conservative coloration behind which the staff was able to operate with safety and effectiveness. These gullible sponsors dealt chiefly with the impressive and scholarly-looking Dr. Carter, who bore no resemblance to that utterly mythical figure—the Communist of the imagination and the cartoon.

6. Roosevelt Cedes Asia

Having reviewed the secretarial staff of the IPR, we must now see it at work and follow its members in their long, sustained and successful design of promoting inside our government and in our organs of opinion the policies of Russia in China and Asia generally. At the outset, we must be clear what these designs were. Russia did not declare war on Japan until five days before the American army and navy had brought about Japan's complete defeat, and only when Russia was already apprized by the Japanese government that she was ready to capitulate. By this last minute entry into the war, Stalin plotted to get as much out of our victory in Asia as possible. His aims in Asia, as we have already seen, were:

  1. To get control of Manchuria, Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and the rich Northern provinces of China, and to form them into Russian satellite states.
  2. To promote the cause of the Chinese revolutionary movement in China. Knowing she could not have the means of doing this by violent intervention, Russia adopted a policy which she labeled "Unity in China," which meant that Chiang Kai-shek should be induced by the United States to take the Chinese Communists into his government with their army intact, after which they might gradually overthrow the Nationalist regime.
  3. To secure the return to her of the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin and Northern Korea when the surrender of Japan became a fact.
  4. To ensure the achievement of this ambitious program, Russia sought to induce the United States to agree to her belated entry into the Pacific war and, to make this possible, induce the American government to provide the necessary arms for her army of 1,250,000 men on the Manchurian border.

Already, at Yalta, in early February 1945, Stalin had persuaded Roosevelt to agree that Russia (1) should enter the Japanese war at the precise moment she desired, (2) should recover Sakhalin, the Kuriles and a foothold in Manchuria, and (3) should have the right to occupy the northern half of Korea above the 38th Parallel. Roosevelt did this on the advice of General Marshall and against the protests of General MacArthur, Admiral Leahy and other military and naval leaders.

Every consideration of American security cried out against any such surrender to Stalin's plans. He had remained out of the Pacific war. He had continued in friendly relations with Japan throughout the war and had permitted the United States, at frightful cost, to carry the dreadful burden of defeating Japan. Now, as the defeat of Japan became imminent, he proposed to enter the contest and run off, if possible, with the spoils. It is difficult to believe that Stalin felt any great confidence in this scheme. He must have asked himself: "Could Roosevelt be so naive?" Yet the attempt, fantastic as it was, seemed worth trying.

Edward Stettinius, then Secretary of State, has written that he "knew the immense pressure put on Roosevelt by our military leaders to bring Russia into the Far Eastern War." Who were these leaders? Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt's personal professional war adviser, writes in his memoirs:

"I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where I was convinced her defeat was only a matter of time. Therefore we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific."

Then he added that "The army did not agree with me and therefore Roosevelt was prepared to bargain with Stalin." This was in July 1944, seven months before Stalin pressed for this concession. Leahy wrote:

"A large part of the Japanese Navy was already at the bottom of the sea. The same was true of Japanese merchant shipping. There was every indication that our Navy would soon have the rest of Tokyo's warships sunk or out of action. The combined Navy surface and air force action . . . had forced Japan into a position that made her early surrender inevitable."

And this even without the atomic bomb. It was not Admiral Leahy who urged Roosevelt to yield to Stalin—Leahy, who a year before the surrender saw the inevitable defeat of the Japanese.

Who in the army urged Roosevelt to comply with this demand of Stalin? Not MacArthur. Shortly after Roosevelt's nomination in 1944, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, at a conference with him in Hawaii, told the President that when the American forces succeeded in taking the Philippines and the Marianas, Japan would be hopelessly cut off from her supplies and that she would have to surrender. This had already been accomplished before Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's demand. It was not, therefore, Leahy, MacArthur nor Nimitz. Admiral King, in a letter to a Senate committee, said he believed Japan could and should have been defeated without an invasion of the home islands. He added: "When the President asked me about making concessions to Premier Stalin to get him to play ball, I replied that I would concede him half the Island of Sakhalin, and that as a sop." In the end, however, King agreed to the invasion by Russia, but he was induced to do so by General Marshall—Admiral Nimitz says that King did it against his better judgment merely to please Marshall.

Actually, two days before Roosevelt left for Yalta—and seven months before the final surrender of Japan—he received from General MacArthur a 40-page memorandum. It contained an unofficial but authoritative offer of peace from the Japanese on precisely the terms on which we finally settled the Pacific War. MacArthur urged that negotiations be opened on the basis of these overtures. Roosevelt did not take the memorandum to Yalta. It reposed in the files of the high command and became the basis of the final American demand for Japanese surrender 7 months later —after the holocausts of Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the atom bomb. Roosevelt dismissed the report at the time with the remark that "MacArthur is our greatest general and our poorest politician."

Thus we see that MacArthur, Nimitz and King—the top military and naval commanders in the Pacific—and Leahy, the President's adviser, all opposed agreeing to let Stalin come into the Pacific war. Who, then, sold Roosevelt this bill of goods? The insistence on this fatal blunder came from General Marshall, who was the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of the mysteries of the war is the manner in which at every turn some influence could reach Marshall's mind to induce him to comply with the precise schemes being nurtured in the Institute of Pacific Relations. No one, of course, supposes that Marshall was moved by any trace of disloyalty. The only explanation is that he was a naive man, always eager to detect the wishes of the Big Boss and to comply with them.

But where did this dangerous policy originate? Edward Stettinius says that the pressure for it began as early as 1943, and that Harry Hopkins, who was certainly Roosevelt's evil genius, appeared at Cairo bringing a memorandum from "the military" urging that Russia be brought into the Pacific war. Every consideration of peace in the Pacific after the war required that Russia be kept out of the war. Some military support for the idea might have been reasonable in 1943. But by 1944 it was preposterous. By 1945, when Roosevelt made the agreement, it was sheer madness.

But, strangest of all, this agreement was made at Yalta by Roosevelt in a secret meeting with Stalin. Even Secretary of State Stettinius, who was at Yalta, was not permitted to be present, and later, when he asked Roosevelt what had been done there, Roosevelt put him off. Only the Communist Alger Hiss was permitted to attend Roosevelt—Hiss, the secret Soviet espionage agent and then high-ranking political adviser of the State Department and member of the IPR.

Roosevelt agreed not only to let Stalin send his army into the Asiatic war after Russia should defeat Germany, but also to provide arms for a Russian army of 1,250,000 men, then in Siberia on the Manchurian border, thus enabling them to enter the China war. Even James F. Byrnes, who was present at Yalta as Roosevelt's top adviser and who later became Secretary of State, was never told of these agreements, and President Truman did not know of them when he entered the White House. But Hiss, of the IPR—a Communist agent in the State Department—knew.

By this means Stalin was able to invade Manchuria, which Russia holds, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, which were conceded to him at Yalta by Roosevelt, and under this same agreement he moved into Northern Korea. He was also enabled to make contact with the Chinese Communist armies in North China and begin to arm them adequately, for the most part with the arms surrendered by the Japanese to the Russians.

It is at this point—after the war in the Pacific had ended as a result of our arms—that the real operation got under way in Washington to bring about the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and to deliver China and Korea to the Communists. And it is at this point that we are now able to behold the Institute of Pacific Relations, aided by its agents and allies in the State Department, in its highly intelligent and successful conspiracy to bring about the complete victory of communism in China and lay the groundwork for the abandonment of Korea and the delivery of Asia, ultimately, to Josef Stalin. The sheer wickedness of this is so appalling that it is difficult to credit.

Chapter 7. Communist Talking Points

It is also at this point that we may now begin to observe the activities of Owen Lattimore. The war is over in Europe and Asia. An American army is in China under the command of General Albert Wedemeyer. A Russian army is in Manchuria and North Korea and the other lands ceded to Russia by Roosevelt. The American army is occupying Japan under General MacArthur. The American people naturally assumed that now the Chinese government would be assisted by us to establish itself in authority, that sooner or later a stable government would be erected in Korea and that General MacArthur would proceed to carry out whatever policy should be determined on for Japan.

But Russia had her plans for all this. She was determined to bring about a successful Communist revolution in China, to attach Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang to her own Red empire by making them into Russian satellite states, and to make all of Korea into a Communist state. This enterprise involved the liquidation of Chiang Kai-shek's government. And this, Russia's agents launched with a clear-cut propaganda line. They set out to sell to American politicians, American newspapers and magazines and to every organism of information and opinion the following propositions about China:

  • That Chiang Kai-shek represented the dying feudalism of old China and was an enemy of democracy.
  • That his government was corrupt and would squander any aid received from us.
  • That, on the other hand, the so-called Chinese Communists (a) were not really Communists but agrarian reformers like our farmer-labor groups in the West, and (b) were really democrats while Chiang was a fascist.
  • That our hope for a permanent peace in Asia lay in recognizing Stalin's legitimate claims in Asia and in doing business with him.
  • And, as the first stage in the liquidation of Chiang, they demanded that he be compelled to admit the Communists into his government with their army.

The malignant cleverness of this is seen in that they did not demand that China be turned over to the Reds—merely that Chiang take them into his government. We know now what a mere handful of Reds did in our American government. What would a whole horde do if they were taken in, accompanied by a huge army?

This was the collection of ideas which the Institute of Pacific Relations set out to sell to the American people and to the American government. This was way back in the war years, when Russia was our "noble ally" and when even the informed American knew very little about the arts of Red propaganda and still less about the political structure of China. There was nothing in all this which involved acceptance of Communist political philosophy. The American public, including its editors and publishers and, above all, its political leaders, was profoundly ignorant of Asia and of the shrewd techniques of Communist thought control. But the men and women in the IPR were not ignorant—they were deeply versed in this art. They were recruited by the IPR because they were specialists on Asia and because they were trained in Communist methods.

With the scene in Asia thus set, we are able now to look at the IPR's pro-Communist apparatus at work.

8. IPR Propaganda: Books and Journals

The Institute of Pacific Relations operated on various levels. First, it published magazines, pamphlets and books carrying its propaganda line. It inserted its agents into various sensitive departments and agencies of government where policy could be influenced. And it organized and managed various propaganda operations to publicize and promote its objectives.

It published two journals. The organ of the Pacific Council—which was the central or parent council—was Pacific Affairs. It was edited for many years by Owen Lattimore. This was the sounding board which originated and proclaimed with great deftness at times the general policy of the IPR, which was the same as Russia's policy in Asia. The organ of the American Council was the Far Eastern Survey, which was edited by Lawrence Salisbury, whose extreme pro-Communist views cannot be doubted, as we shall see. Salisbury was a clever fellow. But Lattimore's career as a pro-Communist propagandist beggars belief. And when Lattimore left the editorship of Pacific Affairs for other IPR activities, he installed Michael Greenberg as his successor. Greenberg has been shown to have collaborated with a Soviet espionage ring here (Report, pp. 148149).

The American Council supported a school department providing pamphlets for spreading the IPR's special Far Eastern bias among teachers in the schools. This was headed by Marguerite Stewart, who served for more than a year as executive secretary. She was the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart, who headed another IPR department which published pamphlets on Far Eastern matters. Stewart denied he was ever a member of the Communist Party. That is unimportant. The question is—did he in these pamphlets promote the Communist line? The answer is that he did.

The two journals— Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs— printed much material concerned with trade, economics and other matters not involving the Communist issue. But wherever this issue entered their pages, they were heavily loaded on the side of the Reds. Mr. William L. Holland, the present head of the IPR, undertook before the McCarran Committee to refute the charge of Communist bias in these journals (p. 1222). He told the committee that 47 writers well known for their active opposition to communism contributed articles to both publications. That is true. Mr. Richard L. Walker, assistant professor of History at Yale and a specialist in Far Eastern affairs, has made an examination (New Leader, March 31, 1952) of the material in Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey which is very illuminating. Here is what he found.

First, let us look at Pacific Affairs from 1934 to 1941, while Owen Lattimore was editor. Mr. Walker found contributions by 13 of the anti-Communist writers and 18 from the pro-Communist writers. But the contributions of the anti-Communists filled 196 pages while those of the pro-Communists filled 729 pages. After Lattimore resigned and Michael Greenberg became editor—from 1941 to 1947-there were contributions from 14 anti-Communists and 14 pro-Communists. But the anti-Communists filled 146 pages while the pro-Communists filled 354 pages. It may be added that the writings of the anti-Communist authors did not to any great extent deal with the subject of communism.

In the Far Eastern Survey, organ of the American Council, the story was much the same. From 1934 to 1947, there were contributions from eight anti-Communists which filled 196 pages, while the contributions from 16 pro-Communists filled 354 pages. All the pamphlets were written by pro-Communists.

The most voluminous contributor to Pacific Affairs was its editor, Owen Lattimore, whose pro-Communist record we will examine soon, and who wrote almost as many pages as the 13 anti-Communists all put together. Second to him was Lawrence K. Rosinger, of the same ideological coloration. Besides this, Lattimore introduced a department called Comment and Opinion, where he was able to press his own peculiar views. Moreover, he reviewed books. Mr. Walker found that while Lattimore was editor he reviewed 21 books, thus adding to his share of the magazine's contents. I made a survey of the articles which appeared in Far Eastern Survey from 1944 to 1948. It advised its readers what books to examine on China. These consisted of the pro-Communist books of Lattimore, Edgar Snow, Guenther Stein, Harrison Forman and Rosinger. Lin Yutang's books are suggested, but with a warning against their anti-Communist bias. There were no warnings about bias in the pro-Communist books.

In issue after issue of Far Eastern Survey the whole Red Chinese line is urged. Lattimore praises the fine policy of Russia toward minority groups (August 23, 1944). Eleanor Lattimore, his wife, tells what a fine job Russia is doing in Sinkiang (April 11, 1945) and she defends Russia's role in Manchuria and Sinkiang (May 3, 1944). Guenther Stein, member of the famous Soviet spy ring of Richard Sorge in Tokyo, writes that China must have the reforms suggested by all save the Kuomintang (March 12, 1947). John K. Fairbank tells how efforts "to foster in China an illusory capitalist American way of life will delay the creation of China's new way of life"—that is, the collectivist system which is her only salvation (July 2, 1947).

These are just samples. Incessantly, the editor introduces his own editorial contributions. The Chinese Communists, Salisbury writes, are not real Communists —they "are primarily agrarian reformers intent on driving the Japanese out of China"—and "conditions in Communist China are better than in Kuomintang China" (November 15, 1944). He resents calling the Chinese Reds undemocratic.

The Council published books and sponsored others published by established firms. These books became widely accepted handbooks about China and the Far East. There were 22 books favorable to the Chinese Reds. Fourteen of these were written by members or staff writers of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The importance of these books cannot be underestimated.

Suddenly China and the little-understood polities of Asia became of vital interest to the American people. Statesmen, journalists, editorial writers had to understand the background of that Asia in which so much was happening. And it was necessarily to these books, written by people connected with this seemingly responsible Institute of Pacific Relations, that they turned. These books became a pool of poison which distorted all the available evidence on the struggle in Asia. This was particularly true when, for some reason difficult to explain, these poisonous books were reviewed by the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune, as well as by other reputable review journals, and given glowing approval. At the same time only seven books favorable to the regime of the Chinese government appeared, and every one of these was blasted in these same review journals by these same IPR representatives, functioning as literary critics.

Here is a list of the 14 books published in these critical years and written by IPR members:

  • Unfinished Revolution in China by Israel Epstein
  • United States and China by John K. Fairbank
  • Report from Red China by Harrison Forman
  • Journey from the East by Mark Gayn
  • New Frontiers in Asia by Philip J. Jaffe
  • Solution in Asia by Owen Lattimore
  • Making of Modern China by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore
  • Situation in Asia by Owen Lattimore
  • Chinas Wartime Politics by Lawrence K. Rosinger
  • Chinas Crisis by Lawrence K. Rosinger
  • Battle Hymn of China by Agnes Smedley
  • Challenge of Red China by Guenther Stein
  • Chinese Conquer China by Anna Louise Strong
  • The Phoenix and the Dwarfs, a play by George E. Taylor

There is no space here to outline the contents of these books, save to say that in varying degrees they promoted the whole line of those who favored the objectives of Russia in Asia, explaining that the so-called Chinese Communists were not really Communists and that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was the instrument of the corrupt and venal interests of old China. Indeed, the most damning feature of these books, as well as of the authors of the books, was the manner in which the accounts changed as Russia's propaganda plans changed. For instance, when Russia was blasting Chiang as the tool of the reactionaries, the propaganda line here followed that lead. A time came when the Soviet altered its propaganda and began to advocate, not the liquidation of Chiang, but a policy called "Unity in China," under which they urged that Chiang should take the Chinese Reds, along with their army, into his government. At this point the propaganda shifted to praise of Chiang—they urged that all Chinese should unite against the common enemy, knowing well that you cannot unite with Communists. Now, some of these writers, in attempting to defend themselves, try to use their approval of Chiang to refute these criticisms. In America we have seen what a very small number of Reds in our government could do without an army. When that Russian line was adopted, the American IPR propagandists went along with it and abandoned it when it changed again.

It is merely necessary to add that, as fast as these books appeared—written by IPR members or associates —they were given immediate and high acclaim in leading journals in reviews written by other IPR staff members. When, for instance, IPR member Agnes Smedley wrote a book, IPR member Mark Gayn hailed it as an earthy, honest, powerful book by an honest woman. When IPR member Lawrence K. Rosinger wrote a book, it was reviewed glowingly by Agnes Smedley and this same Mark Gayn. And when IPR member Rosinger wrote another book, it was given a boost by IPR editor, writer and trustee Owen Lattimore, and when Lattimore turned out a book, it got a lively plug from IPR editor Maxwell Stewart as a reviewer, who also recommended highly in another review a very bad book by one of the worst of the Communist spies—IPR member Guenther Stein. Lattimore also gave this a generous boost for good measure. Thus the IPR members turned out this mass of pro-Communist books, and these books were in turn highly recommended to the public by other IPR members in literary journals.

The gravity of this enterprise in mind control cannot be overestimated. At this time, editors, editorial writers, publicists, teachers, political commentators were rushing to the new books for the facts about this Asiatic world into which we had been suddenly plunged. And it was to these books, as well as to articles in various top American magazines—many written by these same IPR staff writers and their companions—that American editors and writers turned for professional information about China and Asia generally.

The whole episode reveals the possibilities of propaganda and thought control of a high order. The operators were expert and organized and had mastered the strategy of inserting their poison into some central and unsuspected pool of information. The lies and half-truths in these books and in a few professional magazines began to color the news and the opinions in the American press and in pulpits, classrooms and political organizations all over the country. And the central agency which carried on this extraordinary experiment of mass poisoning was the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It is a startling fact that the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security was able to list 46 men and women associated with the IPR in one way or another as staff workers or writers or officers who were identified in testimony before the committee under oath as Communist Party members. They were (Report, pp. 148-149):

  1. Solomon Adler*
  2. James S. Allen
  3. Asiaticus
  4. Hilda Austem
  5. Kathleen Barnes
  6. Joseph F. Barnes*
  7. T. A. Bisson
  8. Evans F. Carlson
  9. Abraham Chapman
  10. Chen Han-seng
  11. Ch'ao-ting Chi (Hansu Chan)
  12. Harriet Levine Chi
  13. Frank V. Coe*
  14. Len DeCaux
  15. Israel Epstein*
  16. John K. Fairbank
  17. Frederick V. Field*
  18. Julian R. Friedman
  19. Talitha Gerlach
  20. Alger Hiss*
  21. Philip Jaffe
  22. Anthony Jenkinson
  23. Corliss Lamont
  24. Olga Lang
  25. Owen Lattimore*
  26. William M. Mandel
  27. Kate Mitchell
  28. E. Herbert Norman
  29. Harriet L. Moore
  30. Hozumi Ozaki*
  31. Mildred Price
  32. Lee Pressman*
  33. Lawrence K. Rosinger
  34. Andrew Roth
  35. Helen Schneider
  36. Agnes Smedley*
  37. Nym Wales
  38. Andrew Steiger
  39. Ilona R. Sues
  40. Maxwell S. Stewart
  41. Anna Louise Strong*
  42. Daniel Thomer
  43. Mary Van Kleeck
  44. Ella Winter
  45. Kumar Goshal
  46. John Carter Vincent

While nine of these (Austern, Joseph Barnes, Fairbank, Friedman, Lamont, Owen Lattimore, Mitchell, Stewart and Vincent) denied Communist Party connections, there is little doubt they were all apologists for the Communist cause in China. In addition, the following with IPR connections (as well as those starred* above) were named as having collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus: Lauchlin Currie, Laurence Duggan, Michael Greenberg, Fred Poland, Guenther Stein, Harry Dexter White, Victor A. Yakhontoff (Report, pp. 148-149).

The list includes IPR executive committee members, executive secretaries, editors of IPR journals and pamphlets and books, research workers and writers. Will any intelligent man, interested in the truth, in the presence of these facts refuse to recognize the power of such an organization for mischief in the critical years in which it functioned? Will he close his eyes to the significance of this collection of operators, who ran the show and directed its propaganda, and permit himself to be blinded by the list of eminent businessmen and educators whose names furnished the protective screen on the letterheads behind which these others worked?

Before we get down to details on Owen Lattimore, it is necessary that the reader have a clear picture of the powerful and ingenious apparatus with which he worked and of which he was one of the moving spirits and most influential operators. This brings us to an appraisal of some of the enterprises operated or sponsored by the IPR. Most revealing is the case of Amerasia, a magazine launched in 1937,

9. Amerasia Spies Go Free

In February 1945 the security officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) read a copy of Amerasia. One article contained a paragraph taken verbatim from a secret OSS document. A visit to the offices of Amerasia revealed that this magazine was directed by Philip Jaffe and Frederick V. Field, both IPR officials and both of whom were known to the agents as Communists. The case was turned over to Frank Bielaski, OSS Director of Investigations. Bielaski visited the Amerasia offices after midnight—admitted by the building superintendent. To his amazement he found stacks of government documents, most of them marked "secret" and "top secret." He found the desks of Jaffe, the editor, and of Kate Mitchell, his assistant, littered with secret documents from Army and Naval Intelligence, the OSS and the State Department. Bielaski was impressed particularly by one document marked "top secret." It dealt with something called "A-bomb." He supposed it referred to some new piece of ordnance. Yet here was a secret document dealing with the atomic bomb, still unexploded—the most highly guarded secret of the war—lying in the offices of a group of Communists connected with the IPR.

Bielaski reported these disturbing discoveries to General William Donovan, chief of OSS. The officers felt they had walked into a "large going wholesale business in secret government documents." Amerasia had a small circulation—about 2,000 at the time—yet it had large offices provided with every mechanism for reproducing documents. The case was promptly reported to the State Department and the FBI, which put 75 operatives on the trail of Amerasia and kept them there for two months. They found a steady flow of documents from the State Department to Amerasia and back. The documents originated in Army and Naval Intelligence and the OSS, but they were routed to Amerasia through State.

D. Milton Ladd, Assistant Director of the FBI, said some of these documents contained such closely guarded secrets as to cause the greatest alarm. One of them revealed one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war. After two months' preparation, the FBI arrested Philip Jaffe, editor, Kate Louise Mitchell, assistant editor, John Stewart Service, a State Department research officer, Andrew Roth, a lieutenant in Naval Intelligence, Emanuel Larsen, a State Department employee, and Mark Gayn, a left-wing journalist. Roth had been a research worker for Amerasia before he went to Naval Intelligence. Although he was reported to be a Communist, Naval Intelligence ruled this could not be held against him, and he was assigned as liaison officer between Naval Intelligence and the State Department, where he could do the most harm. The entire story was given to a grand jury which indicted Jaffe, Larsen and Roth. Service, Mitchell and Gayn were not indicted.

The chief relevance of all this to our present narrative is that all those involved were connected with the IPR. In fact, Amerasia was planned and launched by the IPR. In 1937, Frederick V. Field, Communist and secretary of the IPR, discussed the subject with his associates on the executive committee. He has testified that he told them "one of the best ways to ensure that the Institute remain in the research field and avoid becoming political was to establish an organization where it could blow off steam outside the organization" (p. 115). That is, the Institute could remain in appearance a research organization but could use a separate organization to employ that research for propaganda purposes. This proposal, he testified, carried great weight with his IPR associates. They established Amerasia as a separate corporate organization, but set up shop on the same floor with the American Council of IPR—in fact in adjoining offices with communicating doors. Field said it had the blessing of the IPR managers. In fact, it was an IPR satellite.

Amerasia was financed by Field and Jaffe. Field owned 50 percent of the stock and Jaffe 49 percent. Field, executive secretary of the IPR, was chairman of the board of Amerasia and Jaffe was editor. Others connected with Amerasia on its board were T. A. Bisson, Benjamin Kizer, Kate Louise Mitchell, Harriet L. Moore —all pro-Communists and all active in IPR. It included Owen Lattimore and that insouciant secretary of IPR, William W. Lockwood, who testified under oath that he never knew any Communists in the IPR. Amerasia, as a periodical journal, became, as anyone may see clearly from its contents, an out-and-out Communist organ.

The most extraordinary feature of this strange case was the trial and disposition of the charges. Mark Gayn, John Stewart Service and Kate Louise Mitchell were not indicted. Roth was indicted but never tried and the charge against him was dropped. Jaffe and Larsen were indicted, but the indictments were dismissed and an ordinary charge of simple larceny was substituted.

Gayn said he got the material from Jaffe in typewritten form—he saw no government documents—despite the testimony of an FBI agent that he found Gayn's fingerprints on original documents. Service had been detected by the FBI visiting Jaffe's hotel room and turning over documents to Jaffe which Service warned him were secret. Service admitted he had made copies of his own secret documents and given them to Jaffe. Miss Mitchell was not indicted, although 18 envelopes of secret documents were found on her desk. On one occasion the FBI trailed Miss Mitchell and Jaffe to the home of a Mrs. Blumenthal in the Bronx. Jaffe went in alone and returned with a large envelope. The car then returned to the Amerasia offices, where Miss Mitchell got out with the envelope. Mrs. Blumenthal testified she had made typed copies of the original government secret documents for Jaffe. Despite all this, no action was taken against Gayn, Mitchell and Service. Most astonishing, Service was reinstated in his State Department job. It was not until five years later that his dismissal was forced on the State Department by the Loyalty Board when it declared him a poor security risk.

The charge of larceny against Jaffe and Larsen was tried on a quiet Saturday morning. The government prosecutor explained to the court this was merely a case of excessive professional zeal. The defendants were journalists, the judge was told, a bit too industrious in their profession, and passing out secret documents to journalists was a common practice—which was a falsehood. The statement was made that the documents were unimportant. This was in 1945, when the honeymoon with Russia was over. The prosecutor insisted he did not know Jaffe was a Communist, yet the FBI had trailed him to a conference in Earl Browder's office. Jaffe was fined $2500 and Larsen $500, which Jaffe paid.

What was not made clear at the time was that Amerasia was a propaganda arm of the American Council of IPR. The arrests had produced a state of consternation in the IPR offices. But, despite the fact that the personnel were all IPR officers or agents and that they occupied adjoining and communicating offices, the connection was never revealed by the government.

10. A Gallery if Communist Front Groups

We have already noted the character of Frederick V. Field, the Communist described by Dr. Jessup as the man "who gave leadership to the American Council." We must now turn to two other men who, with Field, made up the brains and energy of the IPR. These were Dr. Edward C. Carter and Owen Lattimore. There is plenty of evidence to show that Carter was much under the influence of Lattimore. Lattimore was the master intriguer—Carter the impressive manager. And the shadows of these two men are found over many of the enterprises of the pro-Red groups in America.

There was a batch of other organizations especially devoted to the interests of Russia and the Russian people. One of these was Russian War Relief, Inc. The pro-Communist Harriet L. Moore, who had served as an interim secretary of the American Council of the IPR, was secretary of Russian War Relief. The International Workers Order was also a Communist front. It held a mass meeting in Carnegie Hall in July 1944, and among the speakers were Earl Browder and Dr. Edward C. Carter.

The American-Russian Institute was another such pro-Communist front. On this board were the IPR staff members Maxwell S. Stewart and Harriet L. Moore—and Dr. Edward C. Carter. His wife was a sponsor of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, headed by the well-known Communist apologist Corliss Lamont (also an IPR member) as chairman, and Arthur Upham Pope, another Communist apologist, as vice-chairman. There was another unit organized by the American League for Peace and Democracy—a notorious Communist front—called the China Aid Council. Mrs. Edward C. Carter was its chairman. Dr. Carter was a contributor to the magazine Soviet Russia Today and wrote in that journal a defense of the infamous Communist purge trials of the 'thirties.

When confronted by critics of the IPR, Dr. Carter always referred to the eminent conservatives like Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur and others who adorned its board. But these men did not operate the Institute nor write its propaganda. They were just the fringe on top. If this country needs anything, it is some sort of ideological Bradstreet to which corporation executives and bank presidents and college presidents can go for reports on the precise character of the councils, leagues, institutes and foundations to which they are asked to lend the weight of their names and the support of their checkbooks.

Carter understood thoroughly what he was doing. He was asked by the McCarran Committee: "Did you not know that Field was a Communist?" He replied: "My testimony is that he was aiding the Communist cause." He admitted Field was someone to be watched. Yet this did not prevent him from hailing Field for "leadership" of the American Council of the IPR or for begging Field to return as secretary of the American Council after he had organized the American Peace Mobilization. He knew Field was on the editorial board of the Communist New Masses and a columnist for the Daily Worker. And he finally admitted he knew Field was "behaving like a Communist" and that "he was playing the Communist line" (pp. 9-11).

Americans now are shocked at the evidence of so many Communists in our government during the war. The method of penetration is easily understood when we behold the eminent Dr. Carter, backed by a host of respectable sponsors, seeking to install Communist Field in, of all places, the Intelligence Service of the Air Corps during the war. He wrote Field: "I want your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency." What gifts? At first, Carter grudgingly admitted to the Senate investigators that he had merely written a letter for Field. When confronted with the facts, he conceded he had gone further, even after he had been informed there were serious objections to Field's admission to such a place (pp. 33-35). Field testified that he had been endorsed for this post by Carter and Lattimore (pp. 107-109).

In 1938, Mr. Brooke Claxton asked Carter to suggest speakers for a meeting in Canada at the Canadian Club. Carter suggested Earl Browder, Communist Party head. He wrote:

"Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration either from the point of view of its internal or its foreign policy. He is really very well informed, and, contrary to public view, is one hundred percent American." (p. 175; italics added).

In 1937, Carter visited Moscow. He wrote Mr. Holland, now head of the Institute:

"The Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow." And he added that the "Soviet IPR is prepared to supplement its contribution to the Pacific Council [of the IPR] by helping to meet the ruble needs of staff members like Miss Moore and Lattimore when they travel . . . in the USSR" (p. 3483; italics added).

Carter's eagerness to defend the Soviet Union is revealed in an incident in 1940, after Russia had made its savage assault on little Finland. Stalin and Hitler were then pals. Stalin was being scourged in this country for his shocking assault on a small nation which enjoyed a special respect by the American people. On April 26, 1940, Carter wrote Lattimore:

"Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing statement as to the USSR's justification for the Finnish campaign?" (P. 3423.)

Lattimore passed the letter on to Fred Field, who sent a memorandum on good sources, and he especially recommended a 130-page booklet issued by Soviet Russia Today (p. 3425). Lattimore wrote Carter he thought the Soviet made a blunder, but he added that it was no worse than what the French and British had done in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia, and that:

"The Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers . . . if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between the first to start an aggression and committing what might be called an act of 'self-protective aggression' after the general scramble had begun" (p. 3431).

What could be more eloquent in convicting these men than this effort to find a defense of Russia for her rape of Finland?

And this brings us fairly around to Lattimore, Dr. Carter's shrewd and industrious collaborator in all these costly operations. In 1945, Max Eastman, with J. B. Powell, wrote an article in the Readers Digest in defense of Chiang Kai-shek. Powell was a peculiarly appealing figure who died a heroic death after his treatment at the hands of the Japanese.

The Eastman-Powell defense of Chiang did not please the ever-alert Lattimore. He wrote a letter replying to this Digest article. But he suggested that Dr. Carter get the late Thomas W. Lamont, of the House of Morgan, to sign the letter and send it to the New York Times. Here was a pro-Communist project managed by Lattimore which was to be served up under the highly influential name of a Morgan partner and printed in the Times. Carter called on Lamont's son, Corliss—a long-time pro-Communist—and asked him to persuade his father to comply. The younger Lamont suggested that Carter approach the elder Lamont directly, which he did. But the elder Lamont refused the bait. He wrote Carter that he had examined the piece in the Digest and that in effect Carter was asking him to urge the President to approve a plan to make arms available to the Chinese Communists in China. Lamont took Carter severely to task. He wrote that:

"Chiang Kai-shek is justified in feeling that the meagre supplies furnished for China should be for his army and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang Kai-shek only. If that is true why is not that an additional reason for us to do the same?" (pp. 169-170).

Of course, at that moment Russia was sending no supplies to Chiang. Carter and Lattimore were deliberately trying to deceive Lamont.

In 1947, Israel Epstein wrote a book called Unfinished Revolution in China. Epstein was a Communist. The book was published by Little, Brown and Company, whose editor at that time was a Party member. It argued for precisely the kind of settlement as that by which China was eventually abandoned. Carter read it and was delighted. He wrote the publishers:

"It is of the utmost importance that he get it read . . . by Secretary of State Marshall, Senators Vandenberg and Morse, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent [head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department]." He added: "Lattimore was asked by the New York Times to review the book. I hope other publishers will make as wise a choice" (p. 452).

Here is the IPR at work. One of its men, Epstein, a Communist, writes a book defending the Chinese Reds, published by an old and well-known American publishing house with a Communist editor. The head of the IPR writes the publishers to send copies to senators concerned with the issue. The Times asks Owen Lattimore, of the IPR, to review it, which he did. He wrote that Epstein, the author, "establishes himself in the distinguished company of Edgar Snow and Theodore White" (N. Y. Times, June 22, 1947)—a well-marked pair of pro-Communist apologists. The New York Herald Tribune, the Daily Worker and the New Masses agreed heartily with Lattimore's review in the Times.

11. Lattimore and Pacific Affairs

Now for a closer look at Lattimore himself. Lattimore was born in the United States but educated in England, and he has spent most of his life as a journalist and writer in the Far East. He has headed a school of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and has been connected for many years with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was for a number of years editor of Pacific Affairs, has served continuously as a member of the executive committee and was for four years a member of the editorial board of Amerasia. He cannot qualify as a well-meaning do-gooder who was deceived by the sly Communist conspirators. He was certainly one man in the IPR who knew precisely what he was doing. After the onset of the war, he worked closely with the State Department and other agencies of the government interested in the Far East. But always he was busy translating his views about the Far East into official government policy. He was denounced by Senator McCarthy as a Communist agent, after which the Senator revised his statement, saying he worked for Communist causes here and in Asia. There is now not the slightest doubt about that.

After all, what is a Communist? A member of the Party is clearly a Communist. But there are Communists who are not members of the Party. People like Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley and others were members of espionage cells. But such people were not permitted to be Party members. They were always able to deny truthfully they were members of the Communist Party. There are also many who believe in the principles of communism but who were never members of the Communist Party or of espionage outfits. So that when one declares indignantly he is not a member of the Communist Party or of a Communist apparatus, he may be telling the truth, although he is a Communist in the sense that he believes in the Communist philosophy.

Then, of course, there is that penumbra of fuzzy-minded persons who are not actually Communists, who really do not know what communism is, but are captivated by the gaudy promises of the good life or fascinated by the exciting drama of revolution. In the case of any individual it is not always easy to put him into his proper compartment. All indulged in praise of the same heroes and denunciation of the same enemies, so that it is not always a simple matter to put the right label on any given individual—whether he be a Party member, an espionage agent, an ideological ally or just a plain fuzzy-minded dupe. All are equally dangerous.

As for Lattimore, one thing is now certain, and that is, whenever Far Eastern affairs have called for critical decisions, the shadow of Lattimore has fallen across some agency of opinion and decision on the side of the Asiatic Communist objectives. He has been the subject of two investigations—the Tydings Committee investigation, which exonerated him, and the McCarran Committee investigation, which unanimously denounced him as a liar.

Which was the dominant figure in this costly partnership of Carter and Lattimore is a matter of conjecture. Carter—large, venerable, suave—is clearly the better front man. Lattimore is the more devious, fertile in contriving stratagems. Carter is the imposing visible leader; Lattimore the cagey schemer, pursuing his schemes with infinite persistence. The Senate committee pointed out that he seemed to have a special fondness for the word "cagey."

In 1938, the Rockefeller Foundation made a grant to the IPR of $90,000 for a Far East study project. Carter named on the group three Communists—Chen Hanseng, Ch'ao-ting Chi and a third—a German—named Hans Muller but known as Asiaticus. Han-seng and Ch'ao-ting Chi are now in Red China. Chi was a former associate of Lattimore at the Walter Hines Page School in Baltimore. The study for which these three were named by Carter was supposed to be an impartial inquiry under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Lattimore wrote to Carter:

"I think you were pretty cagey to turn over so much of the China section to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do so with the right touch" (italics added).

Lattimore meant they would bring out the Red angle, but would do it slyly and effectively, without revealing the Red tinge. And he was expressing his admiration of Carter for Carter's "cageyness." Carter was forced to admit on the witness stand that Lattimore was asking him to stress the Communist line. In this same letter, Lattimore used an even more striking sentence. He suggested to Carter that "the good scoring position differed with different countries" and added, "My hunch is that it would pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position." Little did Lattimore dream that Carter's old barn would open its wooden jaws and emit these damning letters. Lattimore wrote further that he wanted the British Liberals scored—why is not made clear—

"But as for the USSR—back up their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anyone else the impression of subservience" (pp. 39-41; italics added).

Despite his accustomed cageyness, Lattimore could be somewhat headlong at times. The naturally cagey Carter had to curb him. In 1939, Lattimore wrote a correspondent in Australia:

"I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter, so that he can reprove me whenever I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman."

Propagandist for what? In 1936, Carter, Harriet Moore and Lattimore visited Moscow. Voitinsky, a member of the Comintern and of the Russian Council of IPR, told Lattimore that he thought Pacific Affairs should have a more definite line. A minute of this meeting shows that Lattimore said "he would like to meet the Soviet suggestion as far as possible as to having a more definite fine expressed in P.A." (p. 3173). A year later, Lattimore wrote an article while traveling, and some alterations got into the printed text which he apparently thought did not conform with the "line" and might not sit well with Moscow. He wrote to Motylev, head of the Soviet IPR and an official of the Russian government:

"If I am to convert Pacific Affairs from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which has a recognizable position and general point of view I must really rely very considerably on you. If I could have from you an article in each number and if these articles were planned to succeed each other in such a manner as to create a recognizable line of thought it would be much easier to get other contributors to converge on this line" (p. 3241; italics added).

This single paragraph is absolutely definitive in its revelation. Lattimore wants Pacific Affairs to have a recognizable position and point of view. What is to be this position? He tells Motylev in Moscow he "must rely very considerably on you" to define that line. How is this to be done? Each month he wants an article from the Russians in Moscow, and these ought to be planned so as to create "a recognizable line of thought." Then it will be easier to get contributors "to converge on this line."

Here is a complete confession that Lattimore was not merely willing to get, but actually begged Moscow to provide him each month with, the line Pacific Affairs ought to follow. He wanted Moscow to provide the central theme of each number in an article around which all other articles would be grouped, and which all other contributors would be expected to see and on which their own line of thought would converge.

Lattimore told the McCarran Committee that he did print pieces by anti-Soviet writers. After a recess he was able to recollect three examples—'William Henry Chamberlin, L. E. Hubbard and Harold Isaacs. These were unfortunate examples. They drew attention to the fact that Motylev had complained that the Chamberlin piece—a review of Stalin's book—"did not show proper respect for Stalin's person." Lattimore apologized, saying he did not realize Chamberlin's position, and he promptly canceled another piece he had ordered by Chamberlin. As for Isaacs, Lattimore had to admit that he was not anti-Communist—he was a Trotskyite. Fred Field insisted there should be a reply to the Isaacs article, and he suggested that Lattimore reprint a piece from China Today written by an active Communist named Hansu Chan, who was also a member of the IPR. Lattimore published excerpts from it as an answer to the Isaacs article. As for the Hubbard article, Lattimore actually sent it to Moscow for approval. Moscow was slow with its reply, so Lattimore published it. But he wrote an explanation to Motylev that he just had to publish some such articles, otherwise the IPR will be called "an organ of Soviet propaganda." Then he added this incredibly revealing sentence:

"Whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article we must make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true value of the same situation."

And he ends by admitting that Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. The Hubbard article had been printed, but with footnotes explaining away the more objectionable statements, while a reply was printed in the same issue and Harriet Moore was asked by the IPR to write with Andrew Gradjanzev "the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can be produced" (pp. 3435-3454).

In 1938, the Soviet brought out a World Atlas, hailed as an important contribution to Communist propaganda. Documents found in the IPR files indicated that its aim was to give a "Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world"—to present the contrast between the capitalist and the Communist world. It was compiled under the direction of Motylev, director of the Communist Academy and head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow. For some reason there was tremendous excitement about this Atlas. A memo in the IPR files signed by Carter read:

"This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has arrived . . . Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one to me" (p. 2705).

Lattimore reviewed it in Pacific Affairs. He wrote:

"The historical message in short of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arriving at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (p. 2703; italics added).

The year 1945 was the critical one for Soviet plans in the Far East. It was clear that Germany was approaching defeat, and when this occurred the full weight of American naval and military power would be brought to bear upon the Pacific and the days of Japanese resistance would be numbered. The moment was approaching when the victors would have to agree upon the terms of surrender and on the disposition of the fruits of victory. Before this, Stalin had a commitment from Roosevelt to arm with American munitions a huge force of Russian soldiers in time to participate in the final subjugation of Japan. The invasion by Russia of Manchuria and Northern Korea was agreed on, as we have seen. The great provinces of Northern China—Manchuria, inkiang and Outer Mongoha—were within Russia's grasp. The first stage of the delivery of China to the Communists was at hand—namely, the drive to force Chiang Kai-shek to unite with the Chinese Communists.

As for Japan, Stalin hoped to persuade the American government to impose upon Japan a Carthaginian peace, to liquidate the Emperor and reduce Japan to the condition of an agrarian economy which would enfeeble her population and make her an easy victim for the Communist world.

12. Lattimore's 'Solution in Asia'

As 1945 opened, the pro-Communist operatives in the IPR and their allies in the State Department were stimulated to a kind of frantic energy. Inside the top levels of the War, Navy and State Departments it was known that the handwriting presaging Japanese defeat was on the wide wall of the Pacific. General MacArthur occupied the Philippines at the end of 1944. This was a fatal blow to the whole supply system of Japan, which depended for raw materials of war on an immense and far-flung collection of Pacific islands and bases.

With Japan's loss of the Philippines not merely as a source of supply but as a base, MacArthur knew that it was merely a matter of months when Japan must toy seriously with the problem of finding the best exit from the war. He so advised President Roosevelt at the end of 1944. It was also known that the defeat of Germany was only a matter of months and that then the whole massive might of the American war and naval machine could be concentrated on Japan. This was known in the State Department, and what was known there Owen Lattimore knew and every top-level idea huckster in the Institute of Pacific Relations knew. And it was this important information which made it clear to the friends of Russia in America that the definitive instant for shaping the peace in the Pacific was approaching rapidly. There was no time to lose. And at this strategic moment Owen Lattimore, as usual, led the way.

Lattimore brought out a book called Solution in Asia, which outlined the whole Communist Asiatic policy. Parts of it had been prepared earlier, but it was now revised and expanded to fit the current situation. It deprecated the Communist label for the Chinese Communists, saying it was more convenient than accurate because Chinese communism is different from Marxist theory and Russian practice. He went so far as to make the fantastic suggestion that the Russian system was a form of individualism.

Russian expansion, he said, need not worry us. It will turn out for the best. He praised the Russian system of incorporating alien peoples within its organism. The Russian system "spreads control through a loyal population rather than exercising it over them." He sneers at Western leadership. But Russial She "is the only nation in the modem world that is young enough to have men of destiny." She creates her own men of destiny—Lenin and Stalin. Speaking of the Eastern people, he says that for them;

"The Russians and the Soviet Union have a great power of attraction. In their eyes . . . the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity and democracy: a powerful combination" (Solution in Asia, p. 139).

He criticizes labor unionists who say Russian trade unions are not free. At the bottom of it all was his insistence on cooperating with Russia and China and Japan and Korea on a solution in Asia which he called unity. Unity meant forcing Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his government. This book was promptly praised by the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, The Nation, the New Republic and the Saturday Review of Literature.

The rhapsodical reviews in these journals were written by T. A. Bisson in the Saturday Review of Literature and Maxwell Stewart in the Nation, both classed by the Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security as pro-Communists and both members of the IPR; by Edgar Snow in the New York Times— Snow, who had written books and numerous articles in support of Communist China and whose wife, Nym Wales, was a member of the IPR; by Richard Watts in the New Republic, where he said, "There are none whose words are more worth listening to." The New York Herald Tribune review was most significant. The reviewer, A. T. Steele, observed: "This is a book that belongs in the brief case of every diplomat and general concerned with the reshaping of Asia and its billion under-privileged inhabitants" (February 25,1945). That is precisely the purpose for which the book was written, as we shall see.

This sort of propaganda was a well-known project with Lattimore. As far back as 1936 he had called on American Ambassador Bullitt in Moscow. He wanted to talk about "the most inspiring thing that has happened," namely, that the Mongols had acquired their independence. He tried to hurry Bullitt into wiring the American government to hurry its recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic. Bullitt testified that this was an extraordinary statement, because at that very moment Mongolia was a part of China and ruled by the Chinese government. Moreover, on March 12, 1936, the Mongolian People's Republic had signed a protocol of mutual assistance with Russia. The Chinese government made a vigorous protest against this protocol. Yet at this moment Lattimore was trying to press the American Ambassador in Russia to urge his government to recognize Mongolia as a separate state. Bullitt was amazed at Lattimore's impudence (pp. 4523-4524).

In 1945, in Solution in Asia, Lattimore was peddling this same line about Outer Mongolia—that it was a satellite of Russia "in a good sense." He laid down the Russian propaganda line on Japan. The Japanese Emperor should be liquidated (Solution in Asia, p. 189). In China we should build on the forward-looking men, by which were meant the men in Yenan, the Red capital. Early in 1945, Lattimore planned to go to Russia. This required an invitation from the Red Ambassador, Gromyko. Carter wrote Mrs. Lattimore that he hoped he might aid Owen in his project. He told her he wanted to get a dozen copies of Solution in Asia, which would "fit right into the build-up." He asked Mrs. Lattimore to get them to him. He wrote Lattimore: "As soon as possible after receipt of copies I am going to descend upon Gromyko and lay plans for exploring the possibility of your recent proposal" (p. 3312).

These dozen copies were sent to Litvinov, Voitinsky, Gromyko and other Soviet officials in Moscow (p. 3313). The purpose of this, of course, could only be to let the Red leaders know what Lattimore was doing to promote the Red line in America and facilitate his proposed trip to Moscow. He could not possibly be trying to sell the Russians their own line. However, the trip did not materialize.

13. The Surrender of Japan

About the same time a dramatic piece of information reached the American State Department. In March or April, Colonel Dana Johnson, Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, after interviewing numerous Japanese prisoners, reported to the State Department that Japan was ready to surrender, but that talk about liquidating the Emperor hindered capitulation. Then, on April 17, the Japanese government fell and Admiral Suzuki, chamberlain to the Emperor, became premier. He was a moderate, and Johnson reported he took this as a clear sign the Japanese were ready to quit. Moreover, the Department had intercepted messages between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow indicating the Japanese were eager to surrender if the Emperor was not molested (pp. 727728).

At this time the State Department became an instrument of great importance. Edward Stettinius was Secretary of State, but was giving little attention to the office. Joseph Grew, Under Secretary, was functioning as Acting Secretary of State. Eugene Dooman was head of the Far Eastern Division, which had immediate concern with China and Japan. Both were top experts in Far Eastern affairs, and of unquestioned loyalty. But there was a wide cleavage in the Department. Dean Acheson was First Assistant Secretary under Grew. Alger Hiss, a Communist spy, was chief of the Department of Political Affairs, and an IPR member. John Carter Vincent, also of the IPR, was head of the China Division. He has recently been suspended by the Loyalty Review Board as a security risk.* Acheson headed this faction, which was restive under the leadership of Grew. John Carter Vincent had as his economic adviser in the China Division a pro-Communist named Julian Friedman, also connected with the IPR.

Vincent began circulating a petition in the Department to bring Owen Lattimore, also of the IPR, into the Department as an adviser. This bold movement, tinged with impudence, came to the notice of Eugene Dooman, who notified Grew. Grew ordered the circulation of the petition stopped. But this did not check the insurgents, who put great faith in the master-minding of Lattimore. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, then president of Johns Hopkins and Lattimore's superior at that university, called on President Truman to intervene in Lattimore's favor (p. 707).

Lattimore and his confederates were playing for high stakes. The Japanese surrender was imminent. The IPR crowd knew that. It was the strategic hour for dictating the surrender terms—namely, the liquidation of the Emperor and the imposition of a savage peace upon Japan such as had already rendered Germany impotent. All else failing, on June 10, 1945, Lattimore took the desperate course of appealing directly to the President. He wrote Truman asking for a personal interview, which was granted him on July 3, 1945. In that interview and in the letter he wrote he pressed the following points.

He complained to the President that the State Department under Grew and Dooman was abandoning the policy of "unity in China." It was abandoning its plan of supporting no party in China and giving its aid to Chiang Kai-shek. (It must be kept in mind that Chiang's government was the government of our ally China and the Communists were an armed revolutionary force.) Lattimore said this would precipitate rivalry between ourselves and Russia. He begged the President to have our policy in China reviewed by impartial advisers not connected with the formulation of policy there. He was asking the President to displace Grew and Dooman, top State Department officials, at this critical juncture and seek the advice of the Lattimore clique. Could we ask for more fantastic impudence?

As for Japan, he insisted that Japan planned a comeback as leader of an Asiatic coalition with the battle cry of "Down with the White Man." China, he said, is the key to this policy. Japan wishes to promote disunity in China. She wants revolutions in China while Japan recovers. America therefore must work for unity in China—that is, force Chiang to take in the Reds. He alleged Japan hopes America will wink at big business in Japan through fear of Russia. But big business is militarist. There are two alternatives: (1) Division of the country between Chiang and the Communists; (2) unification of China. This means a settlement with the Reds, who would accept a minority position "at the start." But Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government. Here was the whole Communist line put down in writing in Lattimores letter to Truman. And he insisted that Washington and Moscow unite to force Chiang's agreement (pp. 3387-3389).

At this very moment the National Board of the Communist Political Association here was pressing the same plan. In June 1945 it stated:

"It is the reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington . . . is pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East" (p. 3414).

Thus we see that in the desperate haste now stimulated by the approaching collapse of Japan, Lattimore was frantically pressing for the objectives of the Communist leaders here.

Not many hours after the Lattimore meeting, President Truman left for the Potsdam Conference. On July 3, James F. Byrnes had been sworn in as Secretary of State to succeed Stettinius, and three days later he left for Potsdam. He had little time to gather up the many tangled strings of our foreign policy. Time was running swiftly, Germany had surrendered. The appointed time for Russia to enter the war in the Far East was approaching. The collapse of Japan was imminent. Stalin knew this because the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had approached Stalin on the subject of acting as an intermediary. Stalin never divulged this to our government.

The President and Secretary Byrnes returned from Potsdam August 7. The day before they arrived home the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. On August 9, Russia declared war on defeated Japan and marched 25 miles into Manchuria. Next day she penetrated 100 miles more. On the same day the Swiss legation received a notice from the Japanese government that Japan wished to surrender, "with the understanding that the declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler." Admiral Leahy urged acceptance. Byrnes insisted on unconditional surrender for its moral effect, but ended with the declaration that "the form of government of Japan will be established by the freely expressed will of the people"; this was what the Japanese wanted and they surrendered. Thus the first of the demands promoted by the IPR clique in Washington was frustrated. Their program called for liquidation of the Emperor and impoverishment of Japan. The fortunate intervention of Leahy and Byrnes at this critical moment defeated their plans. But there remained their objectives in China, and on this front the pro-Soviet clique in the IPR and the State Department had a signal and appalling success

14. Changes at the State Department

The IPR efforts on the Chinese front went into high gear as soon as Secretary Byrnes reached home on August 7. They had to work fast. Byrnes, stepping hurriedly into this complex mess, deeply occupied with other areas of the war problems, like most outsiders knew little of the subversive streams running in the State Department. He had not yet spent a day in the Department and knew nothing of the cabal in the Far Eastern Division. Grew was Acting Secretary and Dooman head of the Far Eastern Division, with John Carter Vincent heading the China Section under Dooman—Vincent, the man who tried to get Lattimore into the Department and who was a member of the IPR and was for the liquidation of the Emperor and a savage peace. The position of Grew and Dooman became impossible.

What force operated at this point is not known, but there can be little doubt that the conspirators got to the mind of President Truman—for from that day to this he has been the most ferocious defender of all these events. In any case, shortly after Truman returned home Dean Acheson resigned as Assistant Secretary, saying he wished to return to his law practice. Two days later Grew resigned as Under Secretary and Dooman as head of the Far Eastern Division. Immediately Acheson returned, now as Under Secretary, replacing Grew. John Carter Vincent (only recently suspended as a security risk) was made head of the Far Eastern Division to replace Dooman. John Stewart Service was named head of the Information Service—Service, who had been arrested in the infamous Amerasia case shortly before and who had been detected by the FBI visiting the room of the Communist Jaffe and turning over to him information which Service warned Jaffe was secret. Ultimately Service was dismissed, but against Acheson's judgment, by the Loyalty Review Board, but of course after all the mischief had been accomplished.

With the departure of Grew and Dooman, the Department was now rid of the two men who could be relied on to support a rational anti-Communist policy. It had men in the Far Eastern Division who could be relied on to adopt the IPR line on Asia.

Once Acheson was installed in power, Lattimore's position was secure. In 1946, the Department sent Edwin W. Pauley as Reparations Commissioner to Japan to make a survey of Japanese potentials and needs. Lattimore went along with Pauley as his adviser. Pauley made a report on his return and Lattimore admitted that he (Lattimore) drafted the report. It was his old line, recommending pastoralization of Japan based on fishing, agriculture and small industries, as had been urged by Vincent. Lattimore has admitted he was on the State Department payroll in that mission (pp. 3488-3489).

15. The Campaign for Chinese 'Unity'

This dangerous cabal failed in Japan, but its efforts on the Chinese front achieved an appalling success—and began as soon as Japan surrendered. At this point the Chinese Red Army occupied only a small sector of China. Chiang's government occupied the rest. A military victory for the Communists was impossible. The only hope of the Reds was to insert themselves into the Chinese government. This was promoted under the old slogan of "unity in China." It was made to seem plausible by creating the impression that China had a number of political parties, the two largest being the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party led by Mao Tse-tung. We were told that all the Communist Party was asking for was unity —that is, to be allowed, as a party, to share in the responsibilities of political life. This was a sheer fraud.

The Reds were in no sense a political party as we understand that term. They were an armed revolutionary rebellion. They were not asking the right to contest for control in an election. They wanted to be admitted to a share of the government, coming in with their military forces armed to the teeth. After that they would depend on the well-tried Communist divisive and disruptive tactics to extend and complete their control. We do not recognize this kind of "unity" here. We would be amused if the Communist Party suggested that it be admitted to the government with its own army.

Reds penetrated our government in merely limited numbers with the most appalling results. We now throw them out of government as soon as we can identify them. We throw them into jail. We regard them as the natural enemies of liberty and order. And that is what they were in China. Yet our government was insisting that the Chinese government take in a horde armed to the teeth.

Of course, Chiang's government was not perfect. There were elements in it which could not be defended and which Chiang himself did not defend. After all, Chiang was trying to lead a vast nation, most of it in the grip of an age-old feudalism, toward a measure of republican government. The choice for us was between Chiang's government, which was friendly to the United States, and Mao Tse-tung's Red revolutionary army, which was a puppet of Stalin. With all its inevitable frailties, Chiang's government was infinitely to be preferred to that of the Stalin stooges. Chiang's government was Chinese—not a satellite of another state. It ruled over four-fifths of China. Chiang himself was and is a man of high character with a noble ambition to lead his country not toward a new and more terrible form of Oriental despotism but toward freedom modeled on American ideals. Aside from this, every interest in America cried out—as every sane man now knows—for aid to Chiang. Every interest of Stalin was wrapped up in Red China and the project of forcing Chiang to take the Reds into his government.

However, the whole left-wing cabal here went into eruption in 1945 for "unity in China," and the IPR became the task force entrusted with that operation. The first victory, as we have seen, was the ousting of Grew and Dooman, and the installation of Acheson. Then Lattimore found a use for the gullible Henry Wallace. He was induced to write a pamphlet on China. The IPR commissioned Mrs. Lattimore to write that pamphlet and Wallace, after a few interviews, approved it. It was published with the title "Our Job in the Pacific" by Henry Wallace (pp. 950-951). Immediately all the leftwing journals went into action. The New Republic (May 28, 1945) got out a special Far Eastern edition. Of course Owen Lattimore, of IPR, wrote the lead piece. He wrote that there was an important "freedom bloc in Asia"—China, the Philippines, Korea, etc.

"On this stage walks Russia. Americans think her undemocratic, but Asiatics think her democratic." He asks, "which group is going to govern? The one that lifts up its eyes to Russia or the one that looks down its nose at Russia?" He warns us against a cooling-off period in our own liberalism while the "Russians take command of moderate, soberly progressive liberalism."

In another article Richard Watts, pro-Russian reviewer of the Nation, in this same New Republic supplement wrote that:

"The official observer groups of the State Department were so clearly impressed by what they saw [in Yenan, the Red capital] . . . that there was reason to believe the reports would cause the American government to use its influence to bring about . . . a coalition government." He said all newspaper correspondents were convinced the Communists were not "trying to collectivize China," they are just "building a progressive, democratic, non-feudal, unified nation. . ." with much more of the same.

William Mandel, of the IPR, who refused to deny under oath that he was a Communist, declared that Russia "proposed to apply to Asia those policies which in the words of Henry Wallace have resulted in ethnic democracy in the USSR" (italics added). Another IPR writer, T. A. Bisson, made his contribution and Agnes Smedley, the Communist agent and an IPR member, compared the Kuomintang in China to the Nazis in Germany.

There is no space here to quote all the numerous contributions all through 1944 and 1945 promoting the line set by Lattimore. Edgar Snow (Nation, Feb. 17, 1945) praised Lattimore's book "Solution in Asia" and quoted the nice things Lattimore said about the Communists. The Nation (May 26,1945) urged that we lend Russia six billion dollars to rebuild. In the midst of all this the arrests in the Amerasia case were being blasted as an enterprise of Dooman, Grew and the Scripps-Howard newspapers. I have taken merely a few quotes from the leftist magazines to illustrate the extent, the vigor and, at times, the furious hurry of the drive to install the Reds in the Chinese government.

16. Lattimore's Communist Associates

As we view Lattimore in the framework of the IPR, the case against him becomes overwhelming. Consider these facts: Three of the executive secretaries of the American Council of the IPR over a period of 13 critical years have been identified as Communists—Barnes, Field and Harriet Moore. And one other secretary resigned because he became suspicious of the staff. The two official journals of the IPR—Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey—were vigilant promoters of Communist objectives in China. Lattimore was editor of Pacific Affairs and was succeeded by Michael Greenberg, a Communist agent who later became an assistant to a Presidential secretary.

I have already given a list of 46 persons identified with the work of the IPR, all of whom were either Communist Party members or actively engaged in defending the Communist aims in China. However, the McCarran Committee has made a voluminous study of the IPR and has compiled a list of 90 men and women with Communist affiliations who have functioned in connection with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Of these, 46 have been identified by witnesses under oath as Communists. Fourteen of these persons, given an opportunity to testify in their own behalf, have refused under oath to deny they were Communists. Six of the fist are dead, but they are persons about whose Red connections there can be no question. Nineteen on the list are out of the country and hence could not be questioned, but all of them are persons whose Communist affiliations have been notorious. A full list of all these persons, with the data indicating their Communist affiliations, will be found beginning on page 144 of the elaborate Report on the IPR issued by the Sub-Committee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee (July 2, 1952).

I have traced in the testimony on which the above report is based the connections of these IPR staff members, writers and associates and their activities within our government. Twelve of them were employed in the State Department—eleven in responsible positions and some of them in high administrative posts. Thirty-four of them were in government positions during the war—mostly in responsible policy-making posts. One was head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, which shaped American policy in the Far East. Another was head of the Information Service of the State Department. Another was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (and a Communist agent). Another—Hiss—who was in one of the very highest positions in the State Department, is now in jail. Still another headed the Latin Division of the State Department and after being accused of being a Communist committed suicide.

Owen Lattimore was head of the Pacific Division of the OWI (Office of War Information) and served as a consultant of the State Department. It was this group of men and women who wrote most of the books, and reviewed them, which the American public read during those critical years.

As for Lattimore himself, there is no doubt that he and Carter were the dominating figures in this galaxy of meddlers. Whether any individual member of the IPR was a Communist Party member is not essential to this inquiry. The main thesis is that Carter and Lattimore and their associates in the IPR carried on relentlessly, before, during and after the war years, a drive to promote the strategic plans of Russia in Asia—the liquidation of Chiang Kai-shek, the installation of the Communists in power in China, the bringing of Russia into the war in the East, the enfeeblement of Japan by reducing her to the state of an agrarian economy, the promotion of revolution there by uprooting her whole cultural and social system, and the delivery of Korea into the hands of the Reds. Would not any reasonable person, without any other evidence, observing these operations, conclude that these people were working in the interest of the Soviet and the Chinese Communists? Would it not be a reasonable assumption that they were either Communists or supporters of the Communist regimes in Asia? All the evidence which has been patiently reviewed in these pages leaves no room for doubt on these points. However, this record is not wanting in direct testimony on the Communist relationships of Owen Lattimore.

One witness, former Soviet General Alexander Barmine, who had renounced communism and fled from Russia, testified that in 1933 the Soviet was scheming to get possession of Sinkiang, then a part of China. Barmine was then in the Soviet Military Intelligence and he was ordered to open an office in China which would operate as an automobile importing and exporting agency. This was actually a cover for an enterprise for shipping arms and ammunition into Sinkiang. Barmine asked about the personnel available for this. General Berzin, his superior, mentioned several men he might detail. Two of them were Americans—Joseph Barnes, former IPR secretary, and Owen Lattimore. He referred to them as "our men" (pp. 198-201). Later he decided they could not be spared.

Barmine, when he testified, had become an American citizen after serving in our armed forces and as chief of the Russian unit in the State Department's 'Voice of America'. He testified further that General Krivitsky, his chief in Russia, had told him and other high intelligence officers in Moscow that the IPR was a Soviet "cover shop" (p. 208). Taken against the background of Lattimore's behavior in this country, this testimony becomes highly important and credible.

Another witness, Louis Budenz, former Communist, testified under oath: "He [Lattimore] was specifically mentioned as a member of the Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of his name". Budenz swore that Lattimore's "position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one" (pp. 521-522). Jack Stachel, one of the most important American Communists, in constant touch with Moscow, had informed Budenz that Lattimore was a Communist. Budenz was given orders to treat Lattimore in the Daily Worker as one under Communist discipline, and he explained that Communists under discipline are ordered not to have any evidence of membership about them, except in special cases where the Politburo ordered otherwise (p. 554). Budenz testified that Earl Browder, then Communist chief, said Lattimore was performing a great service by bringing Communist writers into Pacific Affairs (p. 550).

Budenz testified that as the war neared its end, the Party line was to work for a hard peace in Japan, aimed chiefly at the Zaibatsu (industrialists). In the midst of this drive, Lattimore gave an interview to the United Press attacking the Zaibatsu. This was reprinted in the Daily Worker and was considered so important that extra copies were run off and given widest circulation among labor unions, youth groups, etc. (p. 556). This was at the very time when Lattimore took the bold step of seeking a personal interview with the President to press this same point.

Dr. William M. McGovern, professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, was a specialist for years in China and Japan. He testified that he knew Lattimore and met him a number of times in Peking. He "saw a good deal of him" and discussed Chinese affairs with him ten or fifteen times. Lattimore, he said, "showed his warm admiration for the Chinese Communists—[said] they were the future of China and represented the real people." Then Lattimore said they were not Communists. Dr. McGovern, who is an expert on this subject, testified that he had read extensively Lattimore's writings and that he was convinced Lattimore was what he called "a popular-front man," either using or being used by the Communists, and that he definitely followed the Stalinist line (p. 1011).

Professor Kenneth Colegrove, also of Northwestern University and a specialist in Far Eastern affairs, testified that he had been a member of the Amerasia board when it started, but left because it seemed to be promoting the Communist line despite some objective articles. Later he learned that Lattimore during the war was head of the Pacific Division of the Office of War Information (OWI), after which Lattimore offered Colegrove charge of the Japanese Desk. Colegrove refused. The question of China came up, and when Dr. Colegrove spoke of the Chinese Communists, Lattimore angrily asserted that the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were not Communists but agrarian reformers, real democrats, and had no connection with Russia (pp. 912-913). Yet, under oath before the Tydings Committee, Lattimore declared he had never said that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers (Tydings Hearings, p. 445).

Still another expert in Asiatic and Communist affairs testified against Lattimore. Dr. Karl Wittfogel, now a professor at Columbia University, became a Communist in Europe but renounced the Party in 1932. He talked with Lattimore in China in 1944 and discussed Korea with him. Lattimore told him:

"For Korea the best solution would be . . . for the Soviet Union to take over the country. He urged also the liquidation of the Mikado in Japan."

In 1947, Wittfogel wrote Lattimore, making reference to this suggestion of his that Korea be taken over by Russia. Lattimore replied:

"I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that Korea might be advantageously taken over by Soviet Russia . . .. As for the removal of the Mikado I have never argued that America might remove him; my position has always been that America should not be committed to the support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a Japanese demand for his removal."

To this, Wittfogel replied:

"It is your word against mine. As to the Mikado you are on record in 'Solution in Asia'" (where Lattimore clearly supported the proposal). Wittfogel testified: "He denied what he had said before two witnesses and what he said in his book. I felt this was a brazen attitude and a complete lack of responsibility. I decided never to touch that man again."

Wittfogel saw him shortly after this at Princeton. Lattimore said to him: "You are probably pleased that you caught me with that one about the Mikado." Wittfogel replied: "I was ashamed rather than delighted" (pp. 328-341).

Lattimore was one of the first outside journalists to be admitted to Yenan, the Chinese Red capital. He went there with Philip Jaffe and T. A. Bisson, both IPR members and both identified as Communists. They were joined by Agnes Smedley, a Communist agent who, when she died, left her estate to Chu Teh, the Red Army commander, and was given a state funeral by the Communist rulers of China. At the end of that visit Jaffe wrote in the New Masses; "Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge meeting addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore and myself" (p. 657). Later Agnes Smedley wrote Jaffe:

"I want to tell you, you left behind remarkable friends. I did not recognize the effect of the meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in . . .. The meeting and your speech in particular had a colossal effect on all people" (p. 658).

Despite this, Lattimore swore before the Tydings Committee that he did not associate with Communists, and went so far as to say he did not know that such notorious Reds as Frederick V. Field and Philip Jaffe were Communists. Yet in his book "Ordeal by Slander" (p. 114) he writes of Field: "He strikes me as an individualist who has gone over so far to the left there is nobody else there except the Communists." The truth is that Lattimore had a peculiar affinity for Communists and found a powerful attraction in their society. He was associated with scores of Communists in the IPR and other organizations. Indeed, these Soviet intimacies went quite far.

In June 1941, Soviet Russia was still Germany's partner in the assault on Eastern Europe—that criminal alliance under which Stalin and Hitler invaded Poland and the Baltic States and thus launched World War II. The name of Stalin was loathed in America—not merely hated as Hitler's was, but despised as the tool of Hitler. This vicious alliance was terminated not by Stalin but by Hitler, when he invaded Russia in late June 1941. Before this break between the two arch criminals of Europe, Lattimore had just been named by President Roosevelt as a special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and was about to depart on that mission to China, where he would be in a powerful position to suggest and urge upon Chiang Russia's pet schemes.

The fact that Lattimore would be going to China as an American adviser to Chiang was information of the first importance to Russia. Even before there was any public announcement of the appointment, Lattimore lost no time in delivering that information to Stalin. On June 18, 1941, shortly before Hitler turned on Russia, Lattimore and Dr. Carter went into a secret meeting in Washington with the Russian Ambassador Oumansky. When confronted with this fact at the Senate hearing, he replied—under oath—that this was after the dissolution of the Hitler-Stalin Pact—a falsehood which the Committee records promptly disproved (pp. 3262-3267). As the editor of Pacific Affairs he had printed the effusions of innumerable Communist writers, in connection with which he had exhibited his subservience to Moscow. His personal friendships and relationships among Communists were extensive.

In 1949, he bought a half interest in a home in Bethel, Vermont. His partner in the purchase was Vilhjalmur Stefansson, a member of numerous notorious Communist-front organizations. The property nestled in a rustic neighborhood which was in fact a Communist colony. His neighbors were such well-known Red agents as John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Marion Bachrach and others. When he sold his half interest it was to Ordway Southard, who ran for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket while his wife ran for the State Senate on the same ticket. Lattimore denied that he knew Southard. Nevertheless he sold his half interest without any down payment—generous terms for a stranger. He actually told the McCarran Committee that he did not sell it, that he had empowered Stefansson to sell it for him, implying that he did not know who bought it. However, when confronted with the deed signed by him personally, he had to admit his signature (pp. 3560-3565).

Lattimore became head of the Pacific Division of OWI during the war. Joseph Barnes was made head of the New York Division. Lattimore wrote Barnes, telling him to get rid of all Chinese in the bureau save Dr. Kung C. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong. The secret loyalty files showed that these two were considered Communists by the Loyalty Board. Chew Hong was tagged as a member of the Communist Party and hence ineligible for government service. Chi was put down as at least a fellow traveler. Lattimore insisted that Chew Hong's Communist rating be changed. He also instructed Barnes to recruit a new force from the New China Daily News. The Loyalty files showed that the New China Daily News "is a publication for and by the Chinese Communists and is described by some as the Chinese equivalent of the Daily Worker."

The New China Daily News wrote editorials urging Chinese in America to send money to Mao Tse-tung, the Red leader. The president and former editor of the paper have been indicted for running a Communist racket, "embracing murder, extortion, torture and in general, commerce in human misery . . . a racket which is designed to further the aid of the Chinese Communist government" (N. Y. Times, April 29, 1952),

17. The Betrayal of China

Here it is necessary to describe the final act of betrayal, because it illustrates the extent to which the State Department was dominated in its decisions by its Communist and pro-Communist personnel and by the IPR. By October 1949, the pro-Communist cabal had decided that the time was ripe to abandon China, Formosa and Korea to the Reds. The decision doubtless had already been made, but to give it the appearance of an objective judgment a conference to discuss policy was called within the State Department for October 6, 7, and 8, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek, unarmed and abandoned by us, had been forced to retreat to the southern portions of China, but he still held four large provinces with forty percent of China's population. A week before, Congress had passed a bill allotting $1,300,000,000 aid to Chiang. This, however, did not deter the State Department from pushing its own plans to destroy him.

The sponsor of this October meeting was the State Department. But it was in fact an IPR enterprise. It was presided over by Ambassador-at-large Philip C. Jessup, who was a long-time member of the IPR and chairman of the executive committee meeting which received with regret Fred V. Field's resignation as executive secretary of the American Council and hoped he would return to the Council after leading a notorious and public Communist demonstration. There were 25 other persons at the conference. Owen Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger, IPR leaders, took the most active part in the discussions. William L. Holland, secretary of the IPR at the time, admitted that 17 of the 25 present at the conference had been active one way or another in the IPR (p. 1144). Governor Harold Stassen, then president of the University of Pennsylvania, was asked to attend because he had been making some very pointed inquiries in the State Department about the general state of affairs in China. Governor Stassen, Dr. Colegrove and Dr. McGovern all testified that Lattimore dominated the conference (pp. 921, 1044, 1278). Lattimore and Rosinger (the latter refused to tell the Senate committee if he was a Communist) presented a series of proposals, as follows;

  1. That Asia should be treated as a long-term problem. Russia was concentrating on Europe and the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.
  2. No aid to Asia should be started without long and careful study.
  3. The Russian Communists were not aggressive, as Hitler was, and would not take military action to extend their territory.
  4. The United States should recognize the Chinese Peoples Republic under Mao Tse-tung.
  5. The United States should also encourage Britain and India to recognize the Chinese People's Republic.
  6. It should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communists.
  7. United States policy should not permit the Reds to take Hong Kong if they attempted it (Hong Kong belonged to Britain).
  8. Nehru in India has shown reactionary tendencies and should not be leaned on as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.
  9. The United States should not approve the blockade of the Communist coast by the Chinese Nationalists but should aid in breaking the blockade and should give economic aid to the area under Communist control.
  10. No aid should be sent to non-Communist forces of guerrillas in the South of China or to Chiang Kai-shek, and militant supplies on their way should be cut off.

Lattimore and Rosinger led in supporting this program. Lattimore lectured the conference about the sad state of affairs in Southern Korea. He said it: ". . . is an extremely unsavory police state. The chief power is concentrated in the hands of people who were the collaborators of Japan and therefore Korea represents something which does not exist in Manchuria and North China" (p. 1677) — Communist-held territory. He said:

"Korea is a danger to us in other respects. I think that throughout Asia the potential democracies—people who would like to be democratic if they could—are more numerous and important than the actual democrats. The kind of regime that exists in Southern Korea is a terrible discouragement to would-be democrats in Asia who would like to become democrats by association with the United States. Korea stands as a terrible warning of what can happen" (p. 1677).

This attack was leveled at South Korea, still under American tutelage. It was at that very moment being prepared for the establishment of a republic, modeled more or less on American lines. And here, at this meeting, Lattimore was comparing it unfavorably with those areas in China dominated by the Communists.

Governor Stassen testified before the McCarran Committee that all present at that conference save himself, McGovern, Colegrove and one or two others supported Lattimore's position. During a recess of the conference, Stassen tackled Ambassador-at-large Philip Jessup—who was also a prime mover in the IPR—and expressed to him the hope that the conference would not make the mistake of following the program submitted by Lattimore and his group. Jessup replied that "the greater logic was on that side" (p. 1046).

At this point we run into one of the curious twists in this strange and tragic episode. At every turn we see American policy turning away from American interest in the direction of the material interests of some other country. There can be no doubt now that during these events Great Britain was surveying her own commercial interests in Asia. Britain still held parts and hoped to recover other lost parts of those possessions in Asia which had been occupied by the Japanese. Britain had large commercial interests in China and she was not appraising her policies there in terms of those radiant dreams of the free world we heard so much about at the time.

It has always seemed to me that the key to Dean Acheson's fantastic surrenders was not wholly dictated by his odd tolerance of Russia's socialist world but far more by his deeply rooted devotion to Britain. It has been one of the dark curses of American foreign policy that it has seldom been favored with a Secretary of State who thought wholly in terms of American interests uncolored by some curious devotion to England. These comments are suggested by the evidence, now fairly clear, that our State Department had made a deal with the British Foreign Office to throw Chiang Kaishek to the wolves—partly dictated by the Red cabal in the State Department and partly by the pro-British interest there.

There is evidence of this in what actually occurred. On November 16, shortly following the State Department conference, British Foreign Minister Bevin said in Parliament that Britain was waiting on the United States to announce its decision to recognize Red China. Then, on January 5, 1950, Britain made a formal announcement of her recognition of Red China. Immediately following the State Department conference just described. Ambassador Jessup, who had managed it, went to Tokyo. General Fortier, of MacArthur's staff, testified that Jessup there expressed the view that the United States was about to recognize Communist China in two or three weeks (p. 845). By then, Britain and India had already done so, which was in accordance with Lattimore's proposal to have them lead the way, making it easier for us.

There is further and definitive proof of this deal. On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a speech at the National Press Club in Washington in which, speaking of the Pacific, he made this important announcement:

"Our defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. The significance of this is plain when we see that the line he named eliminated Korea and Formosa, as well as China, from the Pacific area which we were supposed to defend. This was a clear notice to Soviet Russia and Red China that they could help themselves to Korea and to Formosa. The Communists took Acheson at his word and at the strategically proper time invaded Southern Korea.

The final effort of Acheson, Lattimore and Jessup to deliver China and Korea into the arms of the Communist world came on February 9, 1950. That day conference was held in the White House. This was never made public until revealed by Governor Stassen in the fall of 1951. To this conference with Truman, Jessup and Acheson, the Secretary of State made the mistake of inviting the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Vandenberg had made a long leap from his earlier opposition to the administration's foreign policies over to full support of them. Acheson, apparently, banking on that, did not realize that Vandenberg's conversion stopped short of American betrayal.

At that White House meeting, Acheson and Jessup proposed that the supplies that had been loaded at San Francisco and Hawaii for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government—under a Congressional authorization— should be halted as a dramatic gesture revealing our abandonment of the Chinese Nationalist government and as a move toward peace. Part of the plan was actually to blockade Nationalist China. Forty-five ships were on their way to China, belatedly carrying arms and supplies. It was proposed that the ships should be halted; if done with appropriate publicity, this action would be notice to the world that we were out of the Pacific struggle.

Senator Vandenberg protested vigorously against this plan and warned President Truman that if it was attempted he would recruit a majority of the Senate to stop it. This daring, secret cabal to turn Eastern Asia over to the Reds—although plotted in February 1950—was never revealed until Governor Stassen testified as a witness before the McCarran Committee. He stated that Senator Vandenberg had revealed this to him before the Senators death. Immediately Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Jessup denied the story. But fortunately Senator Vandenberg's son, now President Eisenhower's appointments secretary, produced his father's carefully kept diaries where the whole story was recorded at the time and bore the very date of the White House meeting (p. 1276).

18. Perjury or Treason?

When Senator McCarthy first made against Lattimore his charge of being a Soviet agent, all that large collection of newspapers, magazines, organizations and politicians which had been influenced by the Institute of Pacific Relations went into a violent eruption of abuse against McCarthy. Immediately Senator Millard Tydings convoked an investigation, which really turned out to be an investigation not of Lattimore but of McCarthy.

The malignance and volume of the eruption of hate against McCarthy was itself an eloquent testimony to the immensity of the apparatus of propaganda which this crowd had built up. But fortune was at last to turn against them and play them a sorry trick. As we have seen, it took the form of a note to the Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security from a young man in Massachusetts informing it of the presence in an old barn on the estate of IPR leader Edward C. Carter of the secret records of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was from these records (seized under appropriate legal process) that, bit by bit, through long months of study, the whole story of this extraordinary cabal against the security of the United States was pieced together and later confirmed by an immense array of the seized documents, placed in evidence along with the testimony of three score witnesses. Lattimore and all of his IPR confederates were examined and given the fullest opportunity to defend themselves. Besides the fourteen volumes of printed testimony, comprising 5,000 pages, there is an exhaustive critical examination of the evidence in a 244-page Report, which every editor and student interested in this subject ought to have.

Owen Lattimore appeared before the McCarran Committee and was examined in open session over a period of twelve days. No man can read the transcript of his testimony without marveling at the decorum and restraint of the Committee in contrast to the impudence and arrogance of the witness, who flung around his insults with the utmost abandon. But far more significant is the almost incredible exhibition of evasion and circumlocution in which he enveloped his answers often to some of the simplest questions. However, for the first time he was forced, with great difficulty, to answer questions, and he met this test by transforming himself into an angry prosecutor of the Committee and almost all its witnesses. He gave as little evidence as he could and as much abuse as the Committee would tolerate. His conduct was so extraordinary that the Committee felt constrained, when he left the stand, to call public attention to his astounding performance. The statement, unanimously approved by the Committee, noted that

"Few witnesses within the memory of the members of this Committee have been permitted to use language as intemperate, provocative, and abusive of the Committee as Mr. Lattimore used in his prepared statement" (p. 3675).

The Committee stated that the precise extent to which Lattimore gave untruthful testimony will probably never be determined. But "that he has uttered untruths stands clear upon the record. Some of these have been so patent and so flagrant as to merit mention . . . as illustrative of the conduct of the witness" (p. 3677). For instance;

  1. Lattimore had a luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador. To minimize the gravity of this he said it took place after the Soviet Union had abandoned its alliance with Hitler. But the Committee confronted him with the evidence that he had this luncheon conference with Oumansky while Hitler and Stalin were allies.
  2. He testified that he had never read an article by T. A. Bisson which caused controversy within the Institute, and he said the views expressed in the article were contrary to his own. He was confronted with a letter written at the time which revealed that he had not only read the article but agreed with it.
  3. Lattimore testified that he did not know that Field was a Communist until the 1940's. He had to admit he was wrong when shown a letter he received from Field in 1939 clearly showing Communist expressions. Then he was shown to have recommended Field in 1939 for a responsible position in the Defense Advisory Commission. He then reversed his previous testimony.
  4. Lattimore testified that he had certainly never taken care of the mail of Lauchlin Currie at the White House when Currie was away. He was then presented with a letter he had written in 1942 which had in it the statement that "Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he was away" (Witnesses have identified Currie as having cooperated with a Communist espionage cell in Washington.)
  5. He denied he had made any prearrangements with anyone in the Communist Party to get into Communist China in 1937. He was then presented with a copy of an article he wrote in the London Times about this visit, in which he said, "I sent a letter to the Red Capital by ordinary mail and got an answer—a cordial invitation."
  6. Over two years Lattimore swore three times he did not know Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a Communist, and that no one told him or had shown him evidence that he was a Communist. This testimony was directly contradicted by two witnesses—Dr. Karl Wittfogel and E. Newton Stanley.
  7. Lattimore has stated that he did not know Asiaticus was a Communist when that gentleman wrote for Pacific Affairs and Lattimore was editor. Dr. Wittfogel declared that he did tell Lattimore that Asiaticus was a Communist. Besides, Lattimore wrote a letter to Carter congratulating him on putting Asiaticus on a study commission, because Asiaticus would be sure to bring out the essential radical aspects, etc. (Pp. 3676-3679.)

In its final report the Committee unanimously recommended that the Department of Justice submit to a grand jury the question whether perjury had been committed before the Sub-Committee by Owen Lattimore.

At the end of its elaborate and carefully documented report the Committee expressed certain conclusions respecting the IPR and some of its personnel. They may be briefly summarized as follows:

The Institute of Pacific Relations has not maintained the character of an objective research organization; it was considered by American and Russian Communist officials as an instrument of Communist military policy, propaganda and intelligence and disseminated false information emanating from Soviet sources. A small core of officials, who were either Communists or pro-Communists, carried on most of its activities while most of its board members were inactive and without influence.

This was made possible by the contributions of corporations and foundations which were deceived by the effective leadership. The names of eminent individuals were, by design, used as a screen for the activities at the inner core. As for Owen Lattimore, he was from around 1930 "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy." By 1934, the IPR "established and implemented an official connection with G. N. Voitinsky, chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Communist International, and the American Council sought and maintained working relationships with Soviet diplomats and officials" (Report, pp. 214-218).

The Committee further concluded that the IPR officials testified falsely concerning the relationships between the IPR and the Soviet Union; while "Owen Lattimore testified falsely before the sub-committee with reference to at least five separate matters that were relevant to the inquiry and of substantial import" (Report, p. 224; italics added).

The Committee further concluded that the IPR "worked consistently to set up actively cooperative and confidential relationships with persons in government involved in the determination of foreign policy," and that "over a period of years John Carter Vincent (who became head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department) was the principal fulcrum of IPR pressures and influences in the State Department," that the IPR continuously sought "to place persons selected by it in government posts" and, in the State Department particularly, the IPR "possessed close organic relations through interchange of personnel, attendance of State Department officials at IPR conferences, constant exchange of information and social contacts" (Report, p. 224).

The effective leadership of the IPR, said the Committee report, used IPR prestige to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the United States, while a group of persons operating within and about the IPR exerted a substantial influence on United States Far Eastern policy, and a group of persons associated with the IPR attempted between 1941 and 1945 to change United States policy to suit Soviet ends. Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were influential in actually bringing about a change favorable to the Chinese Communists in 1945, and persons in the Institute succeeded in continuing the course favorable to Communist objectives in China from 1945 to 1949.

The report asserts that many of the persons active in and around the IPR, particularly Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, T. A. Bisson, Lawrence K. Rosinger and Maxwell Stewart, "knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles they wrote or edited in an attempt to influence the American public by means of the pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of such writings" (Report, pp. 223-225). I doubt if in the history of Congress so grave an indictment has ever been made against a whole group of Americans.

Following this summation, the Committee voted unanimously to submit to the Justice Department the question of indicting Owen Lattimore for perjury (Report, p. 226).

The findings of the Committee were unanimous and were a blow at the rapidly sinking prestige of the State Department. However, the whole subject was next submitted to a Federal grand jury in Washington, by Mr. Truman's own Attorney General. And after a long and careful examination of the testimony of the witnesses, the grand jury brought in an indictment against Lattimore for perjury—charging he had perjured himself on seven separate essential statements before the McCarran Committee. The grand jury charged that:

  1. He had lied under oath when he told the Committee he had never been a sympathizer or any other kind of promoter of communism or Communist interests.
  2. He lied when he denied he had been told before 1950 that Ch'ao-ting Chi was a Communist when Lattimore recommended him for a sensitive appointment.
  3. He fled when he declared he did not know that a writer named Asiaticus was a Communist.
  4. He lied when he asserted under oath that he had not published any articles written by Communists in the IPR magazine Pacific Affairs which he edited*
  5. He lied when he testified that a meeting he attended with the Russian Ambassador Oumansky was held after Hitler and Stalin had broken their alliance, when as a matter of fact it was held while they were partners.
  6. He lied when he testified that he had not handled any mail for Lauchlin Currie, who was an IPR man and is accused of Red connections and who was in the White House as one of President Roosevelt's confidential secretaries.
  7. He lied when he denied that a 1937 trip to Yenan, the Communist headquarters in China, had been by pre-arrangement with the Communist Party.

Of course certain aspects of this subject will drag through the courts—as, for instance, whether Lattimore lied in several answers he made before the Senate Committee, for which he has been indicted for perjury. That is a mere subsidiary issue. What we have presented is a record of conspiracy to influence the State Department to abandon China and Korea to the Reds. That charge is supported by a mass of testimony and official exhibits. Whether Lattimore is convicted or acquitted on the charge of perjury has no definitive bearing on the central issue.

The proof of what he, along with his IPR comrades, did is overwhelming and conclusive, and the final evidence lies in the grim fact that after defeating Japan our government surrendered China into the hands of the Soviets. Whether Lattimore has lied about four or five instances in the vast array of testimony submitted is, while serious for him, unimportant in the story set out here. A Senate Committee of five and a grand jury of 24 have unanimously branded him a liar. But the case against Lattimore presented here is not based on just his testimony or on the question of whether he lied or not. It is based on an array of testimony and exhibits from scores of witnesses so clear and definitive that there can be no question in any fair mind that Lattimore and his confederates in the IPR and the State Department were responsible for our defeat in China and the victory of Russia.

19. The Betrayal of Korea

Almost any reader will ask how so few Red tools could do so much damage to so many Americans. This, at least, we now know—THEY DID. But it was not so difficult as one might suppose. For one thing, they had to capture the mind of Roosevelt. This we know they did. He could say, "Stalin is just an old-fashioned Democrat who wanted to save his country." They captured Truman's mind at first—until the damage was done—so that he could say after Potsdam, "Old Joe is a good fellow."

But, after all, these Communists and Communist stooges in America were very few. How could so few do so much damage to so many people? Well, that was not so difficult either. We must remember that war—even a little war—is a vast and complicated undertaking. And this was a World War. There were a score of separate operations, each so vast—even appalling—in their complexity as to tax the ablest minds. There were problems of home government, raising armies, building navies, tanks, airplanes, transporting armies, moving supplies, planning battles on land, in the air, on the sea, dealing with allies. The magnitude of each of these formidable enterprises, as well as the many divisions in each one, was enough to absorb the attention of the ablest administrators. Of all these areas of trouble, China was the one that was strangest. Few Americans knew much about this land or about the struggle that had been going on there. There was one spot in America which was crawling with specialists on China and Asia—men and women of education, writers, journalists. What could be simpler than for the members of this organization to move without the slightest resistance into this vacuum? This aggregation of specialists I speak of was in the Institute of Pacific Relations. And obviously the place for them to move into was the State Department, where American policy about China would be formed.

They were almost all Americans, many from old and wealthy families. In the State Department they moved into the proper spot with the ease of water finding an opening. The State Department was bedeviled with problems in every place on the earth. Its relations with China and Japan and Korea were handled by a division called the Far Eastern Division. All that these people had to do was to get into that division and into the agencies of the State Department in China. There were plenty of openings which they filled. Not only that, but gradually they managed even to force loyal Americans out.

At the crucial moment of definitive decisions, they had the Department sewed up. John Carter Vincent, recently suspended as a security risk, was head of the Far Eastern Division. (Mr. Dulles later reversed Board on security charge but held Vincent's conduct fell short of requirements and permitted him to retire.) Julian Friedman, a pro-Communist, was head of the Research division. There were others in lesser positions. The actual master mind in the Office of Political Affairs of the Department was Alger Hiss. The liaison in the White House on Far Eastern Affairs was Lauchlin Currie. All of these men were either outright Communists or pro-Communists, and all were members of the IPR.

Then there was the mind of the great, amorphous mass of citizens, who must be reached through books, magazines, newspapers, radio and movies. I have already shown how the IPR agents, and in some cases Communists who were not IPR members, and in other cases people who were pro-Communists, wrote the books and reviewed the books in the leading review journals and managed to get their articles on China into leading magazines and newspapers. Joseph Barnes of the IPR was foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune. Mark Gayn was the chief writer on China for Colliers and Edgar Snow for the Saturday Evening Post. It was all comparatively easy, because the American mind was as innocent as a babe's of this European art of revolutionary intrigue.

All this, of course, cost a great deal of money. Who supplied it? The Laura Spellman Foundation—a Rockefeller institution—contributed $165,000 to the IPR. The Rockefeller Foundation itself contributed $1,721,546. The Carnegie Endowment gave $724,000. Altogether they gave the IPR $2,600,000. These foundations, so far as their boards as a whole are concerned, might perhaps be excused on the ground that they were as ignorant as the rest of the country and relied on their professional managers. But the active managers knew what they were doing. These foundations enjoy tax exemption as educational and charitable institutions. But it seems appropriate to suggest that Congress consider seriously whether this government is going to give tax freedom to institutions which knowingly or unknowingly dedicate their funds to subversive purposes. Not only did they contribute these great sums but by the very act of financial aid they put the seal of their approval on enterprises which were directed at the peace, the security and the foundations of American social philosophy.

The Institute of Pacific Relations carried its infamous project into China itself. Its staff members managed to turn up, more often than not, as agents of the American State Department in China. There, close to the American Embassy and Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, they were able to promote their pet schemes for China.

General Patrick Hurley, who was sent to China as the personal envoy of President Roosevelt, directed his efforts toward preventing the collapse of the Chinese government. This was in 1945, and he wrote President Truman, after Roosevelt's death, that it was no secret that the policy he was sent to promote in China:

". . . did not have the support of all the career men in the Department. The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communists' armed party and the imperialist block of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the Nationalist government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist army with the Nationalist army unless the Chinese Communists were given control."

Hurley then requested the withdrawal of these career men. The men named by Hurley for return to America were George Acheson, Jr., Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy, John P. Davies, consul and later second secretary, Fulton Freeman and Arthur Ringwalt, secretaries, John Stewart Service, Raymond P. Ludden, Hungerford B. Howard and Philip D. Sprouse. Hurley said when they got back to Washington some of them became his supervisors and others were given promotions.

Pro-Red American journalists swarmed into China and returned to write articles in leading journals blasting Chiang and praising the Reds. The most disgraceful mission, however, was that of Henry Wallace, with Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent going along as his advisers. Wallace was the most pathetic dupe and was an easy mark for the shrewd and resolute Lattimore and Vincent. When he left Russia and China he wrote that "a brilliant new chapter in the historic struggle for the free world has been recorded through the great victories of the glorious Red Army." Wallace told Chiang of "the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States," and he expressed great satisfaction at being exposed to the educational processes of Owen Lattimore.

There is no doubt that the State Department was plotting for a revolution in Japan similar to the one in China. The New York Times reported September 20, 1945, that Secretary Acheson revealed a "decision for a social and economic revolution in Japan" and insisted it would be carried out, and John Carter Vincent, as head of the Far Eastern Division, reprimanded General MacArthur and charged he was anti-Soviet, in defiance of the State Departments directives to use Japan for "building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union."

The steps by which China was betrayed into the hands of the Reds are too complicated to recount here. Briefly, when the Japanese armies withdrew from China, a military struggle began between the Chinese government and the Red revolutionists. At the outset, Chiang Kai-shek's army was far more numerous and occupied the greater part of China. In four years, from 1945 to December 1949, Chiang's government was driven out of China by the Reds.

The one central cause of this defeat was General George Marshalls demand that Chiang take the Reds into his government. When Chiang refused. General Marshall cut off all arms and supplies for Chiang. What shaped Marshall's fatal intrusion? That is a dark chapter which must yet be told. Marshall was a purely military man. In statecraft he was as pathetically helpless as a child. He was used. But the full story is yet to be unfolded. Yet Marshall himself declared that when Chiang refused to yield to the demands of the Communists he—Marshall—disarmed Chiang's government with a stroke of the pen.

But having abandoned China, our IPR operatives set about the task of surrendering Korea into the hands of the Soviet. This story we know in full. It can be sketched in a few words. When Japan surrendered, Russia marched into Northern Korea and our army into Southern Korea. Russia immediately organized a Soviet government in North Korea and created a North Korean Communist army of 150,000 men fully armed. In Southern Korea we prepared to erect a free republic. But we formed no South Korean army—only a military police force of about 15,000 men lightly armed.

Russia kept her own army in the North and we kept ours in the South. Then, in 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer warned in an official report (which was kept secret until several years later) that "American and Soviet forces are approximately equal" in Korea—less than 50,000 men each. But he warned that the Reds had trained and armed a North Korean army of 125,000 men, while we had trained a South Korean constabulary of only 16,000 men. He then predicted that the Soviets would probably withdraw their Russian troops and ask us to withdraw our American troops, and when that happened the North Koreans would successfully invade South Korea. He urged the organization of a powerful South Korean army.

As early as August 31, 1946, Henry J. Noble, in the Saturday Evening Post, sounded a similar warning. After the attack on South Korea, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer testified that by June 1950, when the attack occurred, nothing had been sent to Korea but a few dollars' worth of baling wire.

The signal for withdrawing the Russian and American troops came with an order from the United Nations to both countries to get out. Acheson excused the withdrawal on the ground that it was an order from the United Nations. But he did not even protest it. Owen Lattimore earlier had urged that we "give Korea a parting grant" of $150,000,000 and then "let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."

The betrayal of China and Korea is the most immoral —perhaps the blackest—story in our history. By methods wholly new and strange to the American mind, a collection of some sixty or seventy persons—all men and women of education—banded together in an organization financed by American businessmen and rich foundations, and directed a conspiracy to turn victories of American arms in the Pacific into a Soviet triumph.

They had similar plans for Japan and South Korea. In Japan they were frustrated by the fortunate presence of MacArthur. In Korea they brought their plan almost to the verge of success—checked only by a war involving our own country. The ringleaders in this job were Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter and Frederick V. Field, and in its final stages chiefly Lattimore.

What is the explanation of Lattimore? It is not simple. There is a philosophy with some vogue now that patriotism is no longer a virtue but some sort of social vice. Man must love not his country, but the world. The social philosopher who adopts this doctrine in his decisions about human events must emancipate himself from those seemingly normal human currents which produce in the heart a love of ones own land. His country is the great round globe. This became a pose with persons of the kind that were drawn naturally toward the IPR. It is strange indeed, however, that in withdrawing their affections from their own country they managed to transfer them not so much to the world as to another country—and that country Russia. It may be that in their folly they imagined that Russia—Russia the heartless and Stalin the assassin—had evolved a philosophy of human society which could unite the world in a humane, beautiful and abundant brotherhood.

It may well be there were among the Russians—as among ourselves—that breed of planetary dreamers—vague souls soaring in space far removed from the realities of human existence who nursed this hazy vision. But consider the man of our own breed, the product of our own history, who has some awareness of arithmetic and the laws of gravity, of the frailties of men and the corrosive effect of power, and who has some trace of human sympathy in his heart. How could such a man suppose that the gang in the Kremlin, who had bathed their own land in blood, murdered their own comrades, sacrificed whole hordes of poor peasants to starvation, banishment or the executioner, could by any chance be accepted as the apostles of some new, moral and merciful world order?

Men and women like Owen Lattimore had got caught up in what seemed to them a great and dramatic enterprise, which satisfied their personal appetite for drama and provided them with all the thrills the criminal enjoys, without feeling that they were in any degree surrendering to the criminal impulse. They got the kind of thrill the bank robber enjoys in a highly intelligent, well-planned and well-managed enterprise, while at the same time remaining out in the open currents of social intercourse and, perhaps, in varying degrees, giving to their audacious and dangerous enterprises the appearance of high moral adventure, as it were—enlivening their morals with the excitement of sin.

Here in the IPR were conspiracy, secret missions, intrigue, power on an intercontinental scale and, I must add in all truth, on good pay. There is nothing new about this breed. But there is one thin g about them they do not themselves understand. They are not revolutionists. They are counter-revolutionists. They scheme and fight to turn back the clock of history to the age of the all-powerful State—the oldest villain in history.