Rape of Justice - Eustace Mullins

Lawfare I
Strange Case of the Schizophrenic Driver

In 1979, the war of attrition against me was intensified by furtive officials lurking on my home front. I was arrested and charged with driving 50 mph in a 35 mph zone. At the time, I was driving about 4 mph, trying to locate a side street on which I wished to turn. I was convicted and fined in a local court, as the scene was described in a letter to the local newspaper under the heading "Shades of the Old West."

"Admirers of the code of the Old West and the rough-and-ready six-gun justice administered by such courts as Judge Roy Bean's might not realize that this era has not yet vanished from American life. I had a taste of it when I answered a speeding charge in a local court. Although my case was posted as first on the docket, I sat on the bench for three hours, while every other case was heard. The court was then cleared of 'civilians,' that is, anyone who might later corroborate my version of events. Apparently I am reputed to be very dangerous, as I gave my testimony in an otherwise empty courtroom, surrounded by heavily armed bailiffs. . . The nearest 35 mph sign is 1.1 miles away, but a 55 mph sign is clearly visible where I was stopped. The officer falsely testified that this 55 mph sign was 'out of sight on the other side of the hill.' Judge Roy Bean, where are you?"

I sued the Mayor and the Chief of Police, who then answered under oath that they had no responsibility for the actions of any policeman in the city. They requested a Bill of Particulars, which I filed, stating in part,

"1. As a chief instigator and prosecutor of government officials in the Nuremberg Trials in Nuremberg, Germany, the Federal Government of the United States firmly established as legal precedent the precept that officials such as city mayors and police are wholly responsible, actionable and liable under a law for acts committed by their agents and underlings whether said officials have specifically commissioned and required such acts from said underlings or not, and the Federal Government of the United States convicted said officials and exacted the death penalty although none of the said officials had personally participated in the acts of which they were accused.

The indicated defendants, while not personally present at the scene of the acts of assault against plaintiff, did commission, instruct, uniform and send forth yon arresting officer to commit said acts against plaintiff and defendants, by the precedents established as law at the Nuremberg Trials, and by numerous other legal precedents, are wholly and fully liable for acts committed against plaintiff by their official, commissioned, assigned and instructed uniformed agents. . . According to the Precepts of the Nuremberg Trials, defendants are wholly and legally liable and answerable for impeding plaintiffs progress on a public street, and defendants have no evidence and cannot exhibit any evidence that plaintiff was in violation of any law when his progress was impeded by an armed agent of defendants on a public street."

This case also dragged on for some three years; much of plaintiffs complaint was printed verbatim in the local press. An interesting development occurred when the judge refused to grant a demurrer, (a dismissal as insufficient cause of action) for the city. He was exiled to a remote village where, presumably, he remains today. A "ringer" was brought in on the day of the trial, as a more malleable substitute. He allowed me to testify, and then granted a motion to dismiss by the city attorney. He benignly announced that I now "had had my day in court," a half hour having elapsed since the trial began. I filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment, which was routinely denied.


Now comes plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, as attorney pro se, and respectfully moves the Court to Vacate the judgment of February 11, 1982 in this action, on the following grounds:

1. 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 265. "Courts of record or of general jurisdiction have inherent power to vacate or set aside their own judgments." Pavelka v. Overton, Civ. App. 47 S.W.2d 369.

2. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 139. "A motion to strike evidence is premature if addressed to evidence, the competency or relevancy of which may thereafter be made to appear." Keber v. American Stores Co. 184 A.795, 116 N.J. Law 437. And plaintiff deposes that the competency and relevancy of his testimony would have been corroborated by the testimony and subsequent cross-examination of the defendants in this action, and that the premature motion of the defendant to strike plaintiffs evidence and dismiss this action prevented plaintiff from curing any defects in his evidence. 30 A Corpus Juris Secundum, 262. Equity. "Defects cured by subsequent pleadings, proof or proceedings. Aided by the evidence." Kemp v. Kemp, 63 So. 2d 702, 703, 258 Ala. 570.

3. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 143. "A motion to strike evidence is too broad where a part thereof is admissible and the motion does not point out specifically the particular part objected to." Paparazzo v. Perpel, 84 A.2d 11, 16 N.J. Super 128. And plaintiff deposes that defendant's motion to strike was too broad, and flawed in that it did not specifically cite any part or parts of plaintiffs evidence as grounds for said motion.

4. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 144. "Unless the right to have the evidence stricken clearly appears, the court is not bound to strike it." Scarlett v. Young, 183 A. 129, 170 Md. 358. And plaintiff deposes that defendant's motion to strike, being flawed, the Court was not bound to grant it.

5. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 134. "As a general rule, evidence competent for any purpose and relevant to any issue should not be stricken." Lewes Sand Co. v. Craves, 8 A.2d, 211 Terry 189. "The fact that evidence does not come up to the offer of proof, provided it is material, does not constitute ground for striking it." Smith v. Martin, 106 A. 666, 93 Vt. 111. And plaintiff avers that his evidence was competent and relevant to the issues in this action, and that it was material, and that it should not have been stricken.

6. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 237. "A motion to strike or exclude all the evidence, sanctioned under the practice of some states, is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence and had the effect of such a demurrer in so far as it tests the sufficiency of the evidence." McCaull-Dinsmore Co. v. Stevens. 194 P.243. 59 Mont. 206, 64 C.J.P. 390 note 62. "It must be tested by the same rules as a demurrer to the evidence. " Hawley v. Dawson, 18 P. 592, 16 Or. 344. "A motion to strike all evidence of the plaintiff from the record on the ground that the petition has failed to show a cause of action is not the equivalent of a motion to dismiss, with a statute providing for such a motion after plaintiff has completed presenting of his evidence." Munday v. Austin, 218 S.W. 2d 624, 358 Mo. 959. And plaintiff deposes that defendant had previously submitted a Demurrer on the same grounds and that the Court had on September 14, 1981 denied defendant's Demurrer. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 235. "A demurrer is properly overruled where the petition is sustained by competent evidence." Cargill Commission Co. v. Mowery, 161 P.634, 162 P. 313, 99 Kan. 389. Thus we have a situation where plaintiffs evidence is ruled competent on September 14,1981, and the same evidence is ruled incompetent in the same Court on February 11, 1982.

7. "Demurrers are no favorites of courts of equity." Harlan v. Lee, 9 A. 2d 839, 177 Md. 437. Plaintiff, after defendant's motion to strike his evidence, pointed out to the Court that defendant's motion was in the nature of a demurrer, as cited above in par. 6, and that said demurrer had already been denied by the Court, but the Court took the position that defendant's motion to strike was not in the nature of a demurrer, and plaintiff prays the Court whether its decision of September 14, 1981 denying the demurrer should not take precedure over its decision of February 11, 1982 to grant a motion to strike plaintiffs evidence, said motion being in the nature of a demurrer.

8. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 237. "A motion by defendant to strike plaintiffs evidence should be reserved until plaintiff has rested his case." Burke v. Gale, 67 S.E. 2d 917, 193 Va. 130. And plaintiff did not state that he had rested his case, as plaintiff was expecting to make more of his evidence explicated to the jury during the cross-examination by defendant, which cross-examination was not forthcoming, and by plaintiffs cross-examination of the defendants, and said motion by defendant to strike plaintiffs evidence, which was not complete, constituted denial of due process. 16A Corpus Juris Secundum 591. "Suppression of evidence may be a denial of due process where it is vital evidence, material to the issue of guilt or penalty." Thompson v. People, 102 N.E.2d 315,410 111256.

9. Defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs evidence, and to dismiss this cause, constituted irregular judicial proceedings because plaintiff had no prior notice of defendant's motion or any opportunity to prepare to argue it. Although said motion does not in itself constitute "surprise" in its judicial definition, in this instance it definitely qualified as surprise because plaintiff, having already seen defendant's demurrer denied by this Court, had no occasion to expect or to prepare for a motion to strike plaintiffs evidence which was "in the nature of a demurrer."

10. "The declaration, complaint, or petition, or a count thereof, will be sustained if it is good on any theory." City of Madison v. Drew, 265 N.W. 683, 220 Wis. 511, 104 A.L.R. 1387. And plaintiff avers that he was and is prepared to sustain all counts of his petition before a jury. In his opening statement to the jury, plaintiff stated that the jury would be asked to decide fundamental features of our civil law, including the question of agency, violations of civil rights, involuntary servitude, the right to due process, the right to equal protection of the laws, and a consideration of whether radar, admittedly hearsay, could be accepted as valid evidence. Yet the jury was not allowed to consider or decide any of these questions.

11. Defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs evidence and to dismiss this cause was based on the claim that defendants had no connection with this cause, which in effect denied the entire body of civil law which enunciates the doctrine of agency. "The master made the pledge of his servants. Omnes qui servientes habent." Edward the Confessor, Bract, fol. 124 b. "If I make a deputy, I am always officer, and he performs the office in my right and as my servant." Y.B. 11 Edward IV. 1, pl.l. "The driving of the servant is the driving of the master." Smith v. Shepherd, Cro.Eliz. 710; M. 41 & 42 Eliz. B. R. "Under Charles II it was laid down that the high sheriff and the under sheriff are one officer." Cremer v. Humberston, 2 Keble, 352 (H. 19 & 20 Car. II). "For all civil purposes the act of the sheriffs bailiff is the act of the sheriff." Lord Mansfield. Ackworth v. Kempe, Douglas 40, 42 (M.19 G.HI, 1778). 2A Corpus Juris Secundum 1. "The law of agency is based on the Latin Maxim, 'Qui facit per allum, facit per se.', which may be translated 'One acting by another is acting for himself.' " Gustavson v. Rajkovich, 263 P.2d 540, 96 Aris. 280. 27A Corpus Juris Secundum 4. Agency. "In its broadest sense, it includes every relation in which one person acts for or represents another by his authority." State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission, 14 P.2d, 306, 310, 216 Cal. 351. Yet defendant has this action dismissed on the claim that the Chief of Police of Waynesboro has nothing to do with any activity of the Waynesboro Police Department!

12. 88 Corpus Juris Secundum 136. Trial. "As a general rule, where a party consents to the introduction of evidence or where no objection is made to evidence when offered, or to a question when asked, or no proper or timely objection (Lewis v. Shiffers, Mun. App. 67 A.2d 269) or no proper or timely objection, specifying the grounds thereof, is made (Berry v. Adams, App. 71 S.W. 2d 126, a motion made, after the evidence is admitted or the question answered, to strike may properly be denied." Terwilliger v. Long Island R.R. Co. 136 N.Y.S. 733, 152 App. Div. 168, affirmed 106 N.E. 1114, 209 N.Y. 522. And plaintiff deposes that at no time during plaintiffs opening statement to the jury or his subsequent testimony did the defense offer any proper or timely objection to any of plaintiffs testimony, yet the defense then moved to strike all of plaintiffs testimony in toto, no prior objection having been made to any of it, and to obtain a dismissal of this cause thereby.

13. The decision of the Court to dismiss this action was also partially based on the cited refusal of the plaintiff to appeal his conviction in Waynesboro District Court on July 16,1979, but at that time plaintiff had already filed his Motion for Judgment with the Circuit Court of the City of Waynesboro, which would have heard said appeal, and said Motion for Judgment dealt with the question of plaintiffs guilt or innocence of the speeding charge, and said question was sub judice in the Waynesboro Circuit Court during the entire period when plaintiff supposedly had refused to refer said action to the Waynesboro Circuit Court, thus the Waynesboro Circuit Court dismisses an action for failure to appeal it to the Waynesboro Circuit Court, when the question was before the Waynesboro Circuit Court during the entire period.

14. The decision of the Court to dismiss this action on the grounds that plaintiff had refused to appeal his conviction in Waynesboro District Court to the Waynesboro Circuit Court bases a decision in a civil action on a step in criminal procedure. The Oxford English Dictionary, under "civil," states, "16. Law. Distinguished from criminal. 1611 COTGR. civilizer v. criminal, to change his Indictment into an Action; to turn a criminal into a civil cause. 1764. BURN Poor Laws 289. Civil, implies an offence of a private nature between party and party, and not where the king is party. 1844 H. H. Wilson British India II395. In the administration of civil law, Panchayats were had recourse to, while criminal cases were investigated by the British functionaries in person." Thus the question is raised whether a civil action can properly be decided by the rules of criminal procedure.

15. Although he was appearing as attorney pro se, plaintiff was not properly instructed by the Court at the conclusion of this action of his right to request that the decision be set aside.

16. Corpus Juris Secundum 16. 178. "Statute conferring the police power on municipalities, however, should be construed as not to authorize an unreasonable exercise thereof." Father Basil's Lodge v. City of Chicago, 65 N.E. 2d 805, 393 111. 246. And plaintiff avers that his arrest was a violation which prevented him from engaging in his lawful occupation. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum 224. "One has to carry on his business free from all unlawful interference." Wallace v. Ford, D.C. Tex. 21 F. Supp. 624.

17. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum 199. "The police power must at all times be exercised with scrupulous regard for private rights guaranteed by the Constitution and even then only in the public interest." Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co. 236 P.2d 970, 205 Okla. 255. And plaintiff avers that the police power exercised in his arrest was not in the public interest and violated his private rights.

18. Plaintiff was threatened with imprisonment for debt, in violation of his Constitutional rights. 16 Corpus Juris Secundum 204. "Ordinarily, a debt owed to a governmental unit is no exception to the Constitutional provision." Clark v. City of Cincinnati, Com. PI. 121 N.E. 2d 834.

19. 53 Am. Jur 435. "The courts are generally agreed that an employer may be held accountable for the wrongful act his employee committed while acting in his employer's business and within the scope of his employment, although he had no knowledge." Palmer v. St. Albans, 60 Vt. 427, 13 A 569.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully moves the Court to grant his Motion to Vacate Judgment on the grounds that it is contrary to law and the evidence.

Meanwhile, at a meeting of Freemasons at a local synagogue, other matters were shelved while an agitated discussion took place as to what "could be done about Eustace Mullins." One member stood up and bravely offered that he would "do something." A few days later, while I was driving down a side street, a huge Lincoln came roaring out of a business lot, and crashed into the side of my car. As my complaint later stated,

"3. On Sept. 19, 1979, at about 1 P.M. defendant did feloniously and with great force crash his automobile into the side of the vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff, and did strike plaintiffs vehicle on the right hand front and rear doors, crushing them in, and plaintiff did suffer great bodily harm and property damage thereby."

"7. Plaintiffs vehicle, an Oldsmobile 98 sedan, which was severely damaged, is a rare surviving example of a collector's vehicle known as the Chappaquiddick Special, a model in which a girl met her death during an association with a prominent upstanding figure, and this vehicle could be worth a large sum during a forthcoming political campaign and must be fully restored.

"Defendant stated to plaintiff that defendant was at fault and would assume full responsibility for all damages, but when police were called, defendant stated he did not wish to talk to the police, and as police drove up, defendant fled the scene of the accident."

"Plaintiff remained at the scene of the accident, and gave police full details of the circumstances of the accident, whereupon the investigating officer stated that defendant should be charged with hit and run and leaving the scene of an accident before an investigation was completed."

"Plaintiff was overcome by intense chest pain, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, fainting spells and intense back pain, whereupon plaintiff went directly to the Emergency Room." Powerful fraternal influences immediately went to work for the defendant, who was never subsequently charged with any offense. There were interesting ramifications which I did not learn for several years. First, the driver had been suffering from advanced schizophrenia for years, and under state law, he should have turned in his license. He had avoided this by going to private mental institutions, as state institutions would have required that he turn in his driving license.

Second, at the time of the accident, the defendant had for years been taking a number of powerful drugs, according to his physician, among them Dilantin, Phenobarbital, Tolinase, Dyzazide, and Haldol. His physician later stated in a sworn deposition that "Mr. S. has diabetes mellitus type two, he has a seizure disorder, he has an organic brain syndrome, he has hypertension essential, and he has manic depressive illness and a complication of medication called tardive dyskinesia, resulting in uncontrollable movements."

In short, the defendant's insurance was inapplicable because of these problems. City officials and attorneys now embarked on a weird three year campaign to keep the case from being heard. The result was one of the most amazing legal three ring circuses ever recorded in this nation. The attorneys first sent me a 54 question set of Written Interrogatories, supposing that, as an attorney pro se, I would refuse to answer them, and the case would be dismissed. I answered with eighty pages of single spaced legal size forms, which more than answered their questions.

Their next step was to "discover" a witness to the accident. They "found" an elderly black alcoholic and mental patient, who claimed to have been drinking in an alley near the scene of the accident with some of his buddies. This good citizen was brought in for deposition. The attorney asked him,

Question. "Is this Mr. Mullins here beside you?" Answer. "I don't believe it is. I think he was a taller man. In my opinion, it looked like he was a taller man."

Question. "Do you remember what kind of car it was?" Answer. "Now that, I would not know. It was just an automobile, in my opinion."

Although this witness could neither identify me nor my automobile, he was still listed as the defendant's principal witness. I had the court order his police and mental hospital records, which disclosed that he had been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, that he had been arrested numerous times for being drunk in public, and that he had been sent to the mental institution:

"On detention order from wife for threatening behaviour and abuse of her. Threatened with axe. Drinks cheap wine or whiskey all day. Was convicted of shooting and maiming a woman. Has been on probation since that time."

This pillar of the community remained the defendant's chief witness, until fraternal ties brought in another one. This relative and notorious black sheep of our family came in on deposition to give hearsay testimony that I had told him I ran into a car, and that it was my fault. I had not spoken to him for months. On cross-examination, I asked him what drugs he was on. He refused to answer. I asked him what drugs he had taken that day. He still refused to answer.

By this time, I had filed suit against the attorneys.

"As and for his complaint, plaintiff respectfully alleges that, for the promise of large money, defendants did conspire and act in concert to attack, injure and destroy plaintiff, by speaking, writing and filing false statements and false accusations against plaintiff which are false, defamatory and prejudicial against plaintiff, as follows:

(a) At a Pretrial Conference, defendant did state to the Court that plaintiff, in his pleadings, had repeatedly referred to defendant's client as being "of the Hebrew race" and as "being of the Hebrew religion," and as "that Hebrew," and defendant wished to inform the Court that he resented the references to his client. This allegation, made before six persons, was immediately denied by plaintiff, who truthfully stated that nowhere in his pleadings had he made such statements. . . defendant persisted, stating to the Court, "I know it's in there somewhere," although those present, searching through the file of plaintiffs pleadings, could not find said allegations."

This was typical of the vicious tactics of this outstanding law firm. They immediately filed Demurrer, whereupon plaintiff cited the statute,

"Liability for words used in proceedings concerning conduct. No lawyer, or association or corporation composed of lawyers, shall be held liable in any civil action for words written or spoken in any proceeding. . . unless it be proved by plaintiff that such words were used with actual malice, were false, or were used without any possible or probable cause." I further stated,

"Defendants err in their presumption that a license to practice law is a license to gratuitously attack and injure other persons without cause."

The friendly judge nevertheless granted dismissal to his close associates, whereupon I refiled and forced him to dismiss it again.

Although the judge repeatedly tried to aid his colleagues in their blatant attempts to prevent the case from coming to trial, I forced the motion through. At the trial, the attorneys came up with another miracle witness. They claimed that defendant, who had been alone in the car with his wife, had her sister sitting in the back seat! I later learned she had been in a Hadassah meeting in Norfolk on the day of the accident. The judge had warned me that the strange statutes forbade the mention of "insurance" in an accident trial. The attorneys then announced that their star witness, the black alcoholic, had conveniently been reommitted to the mental institution hours before the trial. I insisted that he be brought in. After a delay of a half hour, he was brought in under heavy armed guard. I then took the stand, where the attorneys tricked me into mentioning the word "insurance." The senior attorney leaped to his feet, screaming, "Mistrial!"

I filed Motion to Vacate Order of Mistrial, which went the way of all of my motions.


Plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, respectfully moves the Court to vacate the Order of Mistrial issued on July 29, 1981 in this action, for the following reasons:

1. The Order of Mistrial requested by the defendant, because of the inadvertent mention of the word "insurance" in the presence of the jury, and apparently in violation of statutes prohibiting same, and which was subsequently granted by the Court on July 29, 1981, has, in effect, added a new party to these proceedings, the entity of insurance, and a party whose interests must be safeguarded by casting over them an impenetrable armor of silence. This insurance entity, whose presence, although known to the parties, and being known to the Court, was not to be made known to the jury, although Virginia statutes, which require compulsory motor vehicle insurance for all residents of the State of Virginia, which the members of the jury qualified to be by reason of their being called to service on this jury, was therefore already known to the members of this jury before plaintiffs inadvertent mention of the compound noun "insurance agent" presumably revealed to the jury a hitherto unknown and unacknowledged presence in the courtroom.

Statutes thus prohibited the mention of an entity which was already known to the Court, to the parties, and to the jurors, a peculiar presence, like Banquo at the feast, haunting the proceedings in the manner described by Paul Valery, in the Cimitiere Marin, as quoted by William Butler Yeats in "A Vision" as "a seaside cemetery, are collection, some commentator explains, of a spot known in childhood. The midday light is the changeless absolute and its reflection in the sea Tes oeuvres purs d'une cause etennelle.' The sea breaks into the ephemeral foam of life; the monuments of the dead take sides as it were with the light and would with their inscriptions and their sculptured angels persuade the poet that he is the light, but he is not persuaded. The worm devours not only the dead, but as self-love, self-hate, or whatever one calls it, devours the living also." Thus plaintiffs cause is devoured by the all-conquering worm of an unseen entity, the entity conjured up by the defense, the entity of insurance.

2. By requesting a mistrial because plaintiff inadvertently used in his giving of evidence the compound noun "insurance agent," the defendant effected a transfer of liability, and was no longer liable because an entity had been conjured who simultaneously relieved defendant of further defense of his liability at this trial, and transferred it to an entity who was not liable at this trial.

3. A statute denying plaintiff the opportunity to give evidence in which the compound noun "insurance agent" is mentioned thus enthrones insurance corporations and their private stockholders and insulates them against paying due awards from their profits, thus granting them a title of nobility and creating a nobility class. The Constitution of the United States, Art.

1. Sec. 10, expressly forbids the establishment of such a nobility class, as follows: "No state shall grant any title of nobility." The establishment of insurance companies as immune from legal mention not only violates the Constitution, but renders plaintiff out of law, or dead in law.

4. A state statute denying plaintiff the opportunity to give evidence in which the compound noun "insurance agent" is mentioned, violates the Constitution of the United States in these several particulars: That it creates an involuntary servitude forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment; That it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; That it denies to the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws; That it denies plaintiff due process of the law. The Fourteenth Amendment says, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed.394, Mr. Justice Field stated, "It is nothing less than the question whether the recent amendments to the Federal constitution protect the citizens of the United States against the deprivation of their common rights by State legislation. In my judgment the 14th amendment does afford such protection, and was so intended by the Congress which framed and the States which adopted it."

5. If such state statutes prevent plaintiff from presenting evidence before a jury, the question is raised as to whether plaintiff should transfer his case to a federal court in which such statute would not apply.

6. It is a well-established precept of trial procedure that if the defendant sees that he is losing the case, any opportunity for a mistrial must be seized upon, as occurred on July 29, 1981. It was defendant's lack of a viable defense which caused plaintiff to file a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 9, 1980.

7. In plaintiffs Reply to Grounds of Defense filed by defendant, plaintiff stated on Nov. 7, 1979, "Defendant had promptly given the name of his insurance agent and the telephone number of said agent to plaintiff but defendant did not request plaintiffs insurance agent as defendant had assumed full responsibility and had no intention of seeking any payment from plaintiffs coverage." It was this evidence, which is crucial to plaintiffs case, which plaintiff attempted to inform the jury as to the issues of fact which were to be determined by them, but plaintiff was prevented from doing so by defendant's motion for mistrial. In future hearings of this action, if statute still prevents plaintiff from informing the jury of the facts of the case, due process will not occur, plaintiff will be out of law, or dead in law, and by not giving said evidence, plaintiff will be guilty of withholding evidence from the jury, and of obstructing justice, even if in so doing, plaintiff is following the express instructions of the Court and is in accordance with statutes prohibiting the mention of insurance in the presence of the jury. 71 Corpus Juris Secundum 4: "What Constitutes Pleadings. It covers all proceedings taken during the progress of the trial. Snelling v. Darrell, 17 Ga. 141.

(a) . 46 Corpus Juris Secundum 1308. "Plaintiff must prove every material allegation or fact in issue. Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. 231 II., app. 439, affirmed 144 N.E. 161, 312 111. 525, 35 A.L.R. 730. Plaintiff alleges that he is prevented from proving the facts in issue.

(b) . 71 Corpus Juris Secundum 525 C. "Matters eliminated from case or admitted. The pleadings on which trial is had are determination of whether evidence is admissible. Pecos R.R. Co. v. Crews, civ. app. 139 S.W. 1049." Plaintiff alleges that said evidence had already been included in his pleadings without objection.

(c) . 71 Corpus Juris Secundum 528. "Generally, any evidence is admissible under the general issue which contradicts, or tends directly to contradict, the allegations which the adverse party must establish to sustain his claim. Sylvis v. Hays, 6 P.2d 1098, 1100, 138 Or. 418. Plaintiff alleges his evidence is thus admissible.

(d). 71 Corpus Juris Secundum 2. Statutory Provisions. "Codes of civil procedure and rules promulgated thereunder are designed to simplify pleading and to eliminate some of the technicalities of pleading at common law; but generally, except as modified by such provisions, the common law rules of pleading are deemed to remain in force. Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Wks, D.C. Del. 53 F.Supp. 864." Plaintiff alleges that his evidence is admissible under common law pleading, and that common law precedent overrides any statute designed to protect insurance entities from legitimate awards.

8. Although plaintiff had filed a Motion to Bar Inadmissible Testimony before the trial was heard, defendant did not file such a motion and thereby indicated no inadmissible testimony was expected from plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Order of Mistrial should be granted.

The judge then intimated to me that the attorneys wished to negotiate a settlement, but they did not wish to negotiate with me because I was not an attorney. He promised that if I hired an attorney, they would settle. I was still naive enough to believe this judge. I inquired around, and hired a young attorney who would frequently break out into strange equine giggles. When we met to negotiate with the defendant's stellar attorneys, he promptly jumped up and ran to the men's room. "What's wrong with him?" I asked a friend who was sitting in with us. "Oh, he just went to throw up," he replied. "It's his first negotiation." When he returned, he promptly agreed that I should pay witness' fees to the sister-in-law, some $400. No other negotiations were concluded. I fired him that afternoon, and sent the following notice to the defendant.


Plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, as attorney pro se, hereby serves notice to the defendant that your position at the pretrial conference of April 11, 1983 was openly and positively and definitely reaffirmed, that you have refused and continue to refuse to negotiate any pretrial agreement or settlement with the plaintiff, a position you have steadfastly maintained for the past three and a half years. You are hereby placed on notice that the mounting legal costs of this action are and have been and continue to be solely due to your refusal to enter into any pretrial negotiations with plaintiff, and that, on recovery of these costs, plaintiff will demand that said legal costs in this action be deemed punitive in assignment and arrogation to defendant, and thus doubled by decree of this Court, because the large costs of this action are and have been and continue to be solely consequent to defendant's refusal to negotiate any pretrial agreement or settlement with plaintiff, and plaintiff reiterates that he has been and continues to be willing to negotiate a pretrial settlement at any time since this action was filed on October 1, 1979, and that any and all legal costs since that date should be attributed, assigned and arrogated to defendant as his liability because of his refusal to enter into any pretrial negotiations with plaintiff.

After months of further deliberations, I succeeded in having the case brought to trial again. The attorneys introduced the deposition from the defendant's physician, stating that defendant was now in a psychiatric hospital and would not be appearing at the trial. The judge then ruled that I could not make any reference to the drugs or schizophrenic and manic depressive condition of the defendant, ruling the entire physician's report "inadmissible."

Two days before the trial, the policeman who was my sole witness died suddenly in a local hospital, of medical treatment. I was warned by my automobile mechanic, a black man well versed in the vagaries of small town existence, that the jury would be stacked. "They got this same list," he said. "Nobody else ever gets on that list."

Without my only witness, and denied any opportunity to present to the jury the evidence that the defendant had been driving illegally, while under the influence of seizure-causing drugs, and suffering from schizophrenia, my case did not take long to present. The judge suggested that I bring my car up so that the jury could examine it. The jury filed out, made a lengthy examination of the two smashed-in side doors, and returned to the jury room to deliberate. Eight minutes later, they returned to find for the defendant. In effect, they had ruled that I had indeed backed my car into the front fender of defendant's car, which, in some manner, defying the laws of physics, crushed in the two side doors!