Rape of Justice - Eustace Mullins

Lawfare II
The Strange Case of the Senile Millionaire

In 1982, the present writer received a telephone call regarding his book on the Federal Reserve System. An elderly gentleman suggested, in a quavering voice, that he would be interested in financing a new edition. I promptly informed him that all previous arrangements regarding this book had been a personal disaster for me, and that I was not interested. He gave me his name, one that I had never heard of. A few evenings later, he called again. He was very persistent, and he informed me that he had resolved to finance the book, with all proceeds to go to me, because of the unfortunate experiences I had had with previous publications. I had researched his name, and found that he was one of the wealthiest men in America. I agreed to meet with him.

I found that he was indeed a very elderly man, and that he had been donating money to some conservative causes for years, although he had never donated to anyone I was acquainted with. One of the recipients of his largesse was a Lebanese lawyer with the improbable name of Dr. Peter Beter. It was Dr. Beter' s thesis that all of the prominent personalities in the world had been shot through the forehead with one bullet, including President Jimmy Carter, and that they had been replaced by robots. Because they had always been robots for the World Order, no one but Dr. Beter had noticed that anything was amiss. It should have been a warning to me that the old gentleman was impressed by this type of fertile imagination, but by that time, I had sold myself on the idea that I was now a writer who had at last found his patron. The fact that the patron was a little loose in the upper story did not concern me. I would write the book, he would have it printed, and turn over all the proceeds to me.

I began work on the book with my usual energy and enthusiasm. Within a few weeks, I had made considerable progress, renewing my trips to the Library of Congress, where I had done my original research almost four decades earlier. It was then that I received a sign, one which should have alerted me to later developments. The old gentleman's chief assistant, a man much younger than myself, suddenly died of a heart attack. I had already seen that my benefactor was extremely demanding on all those who worked for him; this did not bother me, because I always worked at top speed, seven days a week. I ignored a very obvious warning, and plunged ahead with the book. We had made no formal agreement, but he was advancing small sums for my expenses. I completed the manuscript, and at that time, he informed me that his lawyers had drawn up a Joint Venture Agreement. Although I never saw or talked with his lawyers, who were in another state, the agreement contained a very attractive paragraph:

"The publisher (as my partner was referred to throughout the agreement) shall receive five per cent of the gross receipts from the sale of the book and the author shall receive all of the net profits from the sale of the book."

I had been doing my own legal work for years, and the agreement seemed very straightforward. He informed me, rather apologetically, that his lawyers had told him the agreement would not be legal unless he would receive something, hence the five per cent of the gross receipts which he had opted for. He also assured me that he Would never try to collect it. There was another clause in the agreement, which struck me as somewhat odd;

"Upon the death of either party, this agreement shall terminate and all interests herein shall belong to the survivor."

Because he was almost two decades beyond the Biblical limit, and born long before my father, it seemed odd that he would include this clause, but I privately supposed that it would assure my receiving all interests in the book if he should die before me. Here again, I was given another warning, which I failed to heed.

After the book had gone to press, he became even more demanding upon me, setting up meetings with people he thought I should meet, trips I should take, and frequently calling me at home in the evenings and on weekends. His secretary informed me that he constantly did the same with her; she then reminded me of the sudden death of his manager. We began to call each other when we wished to discuss things in the book which he had challenged. She suggested we use the code name, Fagin, to refer to him, which we did henceforth.

The book was published, and because the new edition had been awaited for many years, it began to sell very fast. I banked all of the receipts, without drawing on them, because, according to our agreement, they were all mine anyway. Suddenly he began to demand considerable sums, for "expenses." By this time, I was totally dominated by him, and I wrote the checks and handed them to him. Over several months, I gave him $25,000, most of what had come in, because of his insistence. He seemed to exercise a hypnotic influence over me, and I never balked at anything he demanded. When I arrived at his home, he would now rush into the kitchen and prepare me a cup of coffee, not allowing his housekeeper to do it, as she had done on prior visits. On one occasion, after leaving his home, I passed out at the wheel. I thought it was exhaustion. Other drivers had begun honking wildly, and I came to and regained control of the car. On my next visit, this happened again. I drank the coffee, and on the way home I lost consciousness, and slumped over the wheel, at seventy miles an hour. I came to to find that I was almost touching the side of a car on my left, as I veered towards him. I avoided the accident, but, after I got home, I recalled the strange clause in our agreement that the survivor would receive all interests in the book.

I then received an alarming letter from England, from a financier named Alex Herbage.

"Dear Mr. Mullins:

"I have just read a review in the National Educator of your new book, "The World Order." I assume this is an update of 'The Federal Reserve' and would be most grateful if you would forward me a copy. I have recently had some correspondence with E.D. (my partner, ED.) who led me to believe he controlled the rights over your books, as I could be interested in re-publishing these over here, for distribution in Europe."

Alex Herbage.

The entire picture was now revealed to me. Not only was Fagin determined to finish me off, in order to have sole rights to my Federal Reserve book, but, in anticipation of my early demise, he was already making arrangements to republish all of my books, both in the United States and Europe. Once I was out of the way, who would challenge him?

Shortly thereafter, Alex Herbage was much in the news. The Washington Post headlined "High Society Financier Indicted."

"A British financier with ties to some of the country's top Conservative politicians was indicted yesterday on charges of defrauding 3,000 Americans of $46 million through a mail-order investment scheme. Alex Hermage, a 450-pound figure who has entertained the cream of British society at his million-dollar estate, was charged with falsely promising to invest the Americans' money in gold bullion, commodities and European currencies. Instead, according to an indictment returned in Orlando, Fla., Hermage spent the funds on a 'lavish life style' that included chartered jets, Rolls Royce and Mercedes Benz automobiles, an expensive art collection, the 44 acre estate in England and villas in Scotland, France and the Netherlands."

Herbage, which the Post insisted on spelling "Hermage," (which is pretty close, as critics of the Post will allow), was later sent to prison. Herbage was typical of the swindlers and criminals with whom Fagin was involved. I called his secretary and informed her that I would have to file suit against Fagin, unless he withdrew from our agreement. She said that she had repeatedly told him that I should have some of the proceeds from the book, whereupon he retorted, "There ain't gonna BE any profits!"

I sent Fagin a copy of a standard Termination Agreement, which he refused to sign. I was left with no alternative but to file suit against him. He responded by employing, not one, but two, of the state's most influential and expensive counsels. Obviously he intended that I would have to pay for all this. Both firms were well connected with such agencies as the FBI and the CIA, and could count on these alliances to obtain as much damaging information about me as possible. This did not bother me. I was already planning to publish some 120 pages of my FBI file in my next book.

I charged Fagin with intent to defraud, embezzlement, conspiracy to defraud, violation of copyright, making false statements, and misrepresentation, for starters. Much more would come later. All of my charges were documented. His lawyers responded with the standard tactics intended to trip up and get rid of an attorney pro se. They filed a Decree with the Court, but did not send me a copy. I checked the court file at least once a week, and discovered it. I immediately filed a Motion stating I had not been sent a copy of pleadings. There was never an apology from this highly-esteemed firm, but undoubtedly chagrin that their obvious tactic had failed. I then filed a Motion to Amend Complaint.


Now comes the Plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, appearing for himself, and respectfully moves the Court for permission to amend his Complaint, for the following reasons:

1. Plaintiff has uncovered numerous further violations by said defendant of the statutes which should be heard by the jury in this action.

2. Defendant, as chairman of Co., continues to wage a war of attrition against plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully moves the Court for permission to Amend his Complaint.

The courts will always grant at least one request for amendment of complaint, and sometimes more than one. It is all part of the legal hopper, and keeps the wheels turning.

I filed an amended complaint, and, to protect my life's work, my writings, I filed a Motion for Injunction.

"Now comes plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, as attorney pro se, and moves the Court for an injunction against the defendant, ordering defendant to refrain from assigning or conferring re-publishing rights of any or all of plaintiffs published works, on the following grounds:

1. Defendant, according to correspondence with one Alex Herbage (Exhibit A attached) is claiming the rights to plaintiffs published books, and making arrangements to lease, sell or otherwise convey said rights to others.

2. Defendant, in awarding said rights, is once again dealing with the confidence men, tricksters, and double agents with whom he prefers to deal, and whom plaintiff has repeatedly tried to avoid, despite defendant's repeated orders that plaintiff shall meet with and work with persons of this type."

When Fagin had corresponded with Herbage, he had assumed that by that time I would have been disposed of, by special treats of coffee, or by other means. It was hardly his fault that his plan had gone awry, or that his confidante was now facing a long prison term for embezzlement. Despite my documentation of my motion with copies of Herbage's letter, and the Post article detailing his criminal career, the judge refused to grant my Motion for Injunction, on the incredible excuse that "He hasn't yet actually re-published any of your books, and his attorneys assure me that he will not." This was in the accepted tradition of never granting a motion from an attorney pro se. I was to see it again and again throughout the next three years of this proceeding. An injunction against the defendant would be damaging in the record of the case, and would be prejudicial against him with a jury.

One of the most sadistic actions of Fagin against me occurred shortly after I met him; he persuaded me that rare early editions of my books were unsafe in my home, and that they would be "protected" in his safe deposit box. He was right; they are still there today. Although the books were worth thousands of dollars, I was never able to recover them. One of them was a first edition of "Mullins on the Federal Reserve," which I had inscribed to my father. It was my only memento of him. I pleaded with Fagin to return it, but he ignored me.

Fagin had noted one payment of $12,500 to his personal lawyer for drawing up the Joint Venture Agreement, a standard four page agreement. This was included in some $90,000 which he claimed to have invested in the book; he had actually spent about four thousand dollars in its production, and I had repaid him almost $25,000. He was eventually to cost me more than three hundred thousand dollars on this book alone. During my legal researches, I found that his lawyers had neglected to consult the state statutes, which gave the following requirement under:

"Partnership Certificates: No two or more persons shall carry on business as partners unless they sign and acknowledge a certificate setting forth the full names of each and every person composing the partnership, with their respective post office and residence addresses, the name and style of the firm, the length of time for which it is to continue, and the locality of their place of business, and file the same in the office of the clerk of the court in which deeds are recorded in the county or corporation wherein the business is to be conducted."

No such certificate had ever been drawn up, signed, or recorded. I thereupon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

"Plaintiff, appearing for himself, moves the Court to grant the Plaintiff Summary Judgment against the Defendant, on the grounds that defendant had failed to answer or deny the documentary evidence which Plaintiff submitted with his Complaint."

I had filed photo-stats of the statutes requiring the signing and filing of the Partnership Certificate, a requirement of which Fagin's attorneys were not aware. This should have been a routine judgment in my favor, but the judge denied my motion without comment. At no time did Fagin's attorneys ever try to explain why he had never executed the requisite Partnership Certificate, which rendered the Joint Agreement invalid, and gave me full reason for judgment in my favor.

Fagin's attorneys were now in full cry after me with the usual pre-trial discovery demands for depositions and production of documents. I had countered with my usual Motions for Protective Orders. As always, my motions were denied by the court, and I was ordered to proceed with the depositions and production of documents. I realized that I was trapped in a court in which every decision would be against me, and that this was primarily due to the pernicious Masonic influence which guided the court. It was imperative that I move out of this court. I filed a Motion to Remand to Federal Court, citing the number of federal questions involved in the case, copyright law, interstate fraud, etc. The judge replied to my motion with a personal letter that he would not hear the motion! This was astounding, because the United States Code cites many pages of precedents for remanding to federal court when federal questions are involved. I debated bringing an action against the judge for refusing to hear my motion, but I realized this would be useless, given the state of our legal system. I then filed a Motion for Voluntary Nonsuit; if I could obtain nonsuit, that is, drop my suit in the state court, I could then refile it in federal court. However, I had little hope that this would happen; the court had routinely denied all of my motions.

My dilemma was solved by one of those miraculous events which take place just when it seems that I have nowhere to turn. The day before the hearing on my Motion for Voluntary Nonsuit, a friend called on a radio talk show, mentioning that she knew someone who was due to appear in court the following day, and that he had no chance, because the lawyers and the judge were all Masons. The next morning, when we appeared in chambers, I noticed that the judge's eyes looked like boiled liver. I sat down and waited for the usual decree, Motion Denied. Incredibly, the judge began by saying,

"I am inclined to grant Mr. Mullins' motion." Fagin's lawyers were amazed. "But, Your Honor" one of them exclaimed. "it's too late in the case for that. We have these other matters pending (referring to Discovery)." I thought his point was well-taken, but the judge seized a volume of statutes from the shelf, opened it at random, and pretended to consult it. "No," he said, "it's right here. It's all right. I am granting the Motion for Nonsuit."

I left chambers, jubilant that at last I had had something decided in my favor. My friend, to whom I owed this development, was also smiling. Fagin's lawyers were so angry that they refused to get in the elevator with us. Instead, they stomped down the stairs.

I promptly filed my complaint against Fagin in federal court. More than a year had gone by, with my suit bogged down in a court where I had no chance. Now I could argue the federal questions in my suit. Fagin's lawyers answered the complaint with their usual Motion to Dismiss. I then filed a Motion to Amend Complaint, which was granted. In my amended complaint, I upped my request for damages to $25 million, with an additional $25 million in punitive damages. My complaint documented every item. Fagin's description of his $12,500 payment to his private lawyer stated "Professional services — Tax planning for publishing venture, opinion on joint venture, and drafting joint venture with Eustace C. Mullins."

I pointed out that this read as though I had been in consultation with Fagin's lawyer, when in fact I had never met or talked with him. Fagin had also diverted considerable funds from receipts of the Federal Reserve book to publish one of his personal pamphlets; large sums paid for his personal phone bills, payments to his secretaries, and to his other employees and acquaintances for private work having nothing to do with the joint venture. Fagin also sold one thousand of the books to his personal financial counselor below cost, in order to curry favor with him, despite my strong objections to the transaction. He opened a private bank account with proceeds from his sale of the book. None of this money was ever accounted for.

During hearings in state court, I had filed several Motions for Censure against Fagin's attorneys for their improper actions. We now engaged in more than a year of federal court maneuvers, during which I again repeatedly filed Motions for Censure. One of Fagin's attorneys frequently called me at my home, trying to trap me into agreeing to some procedure or to make a damaging admission. I complained of this in one Motion to Censure, which put a stop to the telephone calls. In each instance, however, the judge would deny my Motion to Censure, trying to laugh it off as a whimsy, instead of a flagrant violation of ethical procedure.

I then came down with a painful kidney stone attack, probably due to the daily stress of fighting this action. The day after I came out of the hospital, I was due for deposition. I appeared, but informed Fagin's attorney that I was still too ill to answer extended questions. The attorney promptly demanded sanctions against me from the judge, which he refused. I then filed a Petition for Public Trial, as follows:


Now comes plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, as attorney pro se, and petitions the Court for a public trial of this action. Plaintiff prays said petition as a citizen of the United States of America and the domiciled voter of the State of Virginia, under Article 4. Sec. 4, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, and under Article I, Sect. 11, CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA.

1. The object of said public trial would be to determine the validity of plaintiffs claims against defendant by a jury of his peers, and to determine the innocence of said defendant by said jury if defendant is able to prove said innocence.

2. Plaintiff prays said petition as a necessary step in maintaining the public order, in maintaining the courts as an essential part of the public order, so as to avoid anarchy and a general breakdown of law and order.

3. The public must remain sovereign, and the public cannot have sovereignty without public trial.

4. Plaintiff paid substantial court fees for a request for jury trial, and neither wishes to be defrauded of said payments, nor does he wish his fees to pay for a closed trial in which the plaintiff is not only the defendant, but in which the plaintiff had previously paid the court fees for the defendant to attack him.

5. Said closed trial would be a Bill of Attainder against plaintiff, which would violate the Constitution of the United States, Art. 1 Sec. 9.

6. Said closed trial would violate Article L, Sec. 11, Constitution of Virginia.

7. Said closed trial would violate the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

8. Said closed trial would violate the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully moves the Court to remand this action for jury trial as provided by the Constitution of Virginia, with plaintiff as the plaintiff and with defendant as the defendant.

Respectfully submitted,
Eustace C. Mullins

This Motion was also denied, and Fagin's lawyers pressed on with their demands for discovery. Despite my health problems, I was very confident of the suit, looking forward to a jury trial where I could present the documentation of my complaint for damages. Fagin's lawyers were equally determined that the case would never go to trial. As I suspected, Fagin was now hopelessly senile, and would never be able to appear on the witness stand. I no longer had any contact with his secretary. Our telephone conversations ended when she made an obvious attempt to trap me into making a misstatement. I realized that the conversation was monitored, and never called her again.

We had now entered the third year of proceedings. At no time did Fagin ever make a personal appearance in the action. Time was on my side, and I was not pushing for a trial date. In any case, I could not have obtained it without complying with the pre-trial discovery procedures. However, I realized that I needed to get on with my other books (I now had twenty-two projected volumes which I must write over the next twenty years), and it seemed time to speed up the legal process. I did this by filing a Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties. This is a very technical motion which must be phrased just so, or the court will deny it. I did what any paralegal or legal secretary would do; I copied it verbatim from West's book of legal forms. Fagin's lawyers were amazed that I could have produced this motion. They informed the judge that I must have obtained legal counsel without having informed the court, as I was still attorney of record. As the hearing on the motion, the judge sternly asked me, "Mr. Mullins, do you now have a lawyer?" I was surprised by the question, but answered, "No, Your Honor." He then had no choice but to grant the motion. I had named Fagin's son, his accountant, and the treasurer of his firm as co-defendants Although they were deeply involved in Fagin's swindle, I knew that they would not wish to appear and be questioned about their activities. It seemed that at last I was on the verge of forcing Fagin into a settlement. However, I reckoned without the depths to which the attorneys would sink. They immediately devised a plan of counter attack which proved successful.

The judge had ruled as follows:

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

2. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

3. Plaintiffs motion to censure shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

4. Plaintiffs motion for a protective order with respect to production of documents shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

5. Plaintiffs motion for a protective order with respect to depositions shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

6. Defendant's motion to compel discovery shall be, and it hereby is, granted. Plaintiff shall respond to defendant's request to produce documents on or before Oct. 14, 1986. Plaintiff shall present himself for deposition on Oct. 15,1986, at 9:30 A.M., at a location mutually convenient to the parties. Defendant's motion for attorney's fees in connection with this motion shall be, and it hereby is, denied.

7. Ruling is deferred on the motion for an accounting made in defendant's counterclaim.

8. Plaintiffs motion to join and as defendants in this action shall be, and it hereby is, granted."

My Motion for Protective Order Against Deposition noted that

"2. Said defendant used the same tactic against plaintiff in a previous action, aided and abetted by counsel in a vicious campaign of attrition against plaintiff, forced plaintiff to cancel all his speaking engagements for the months of April and May by continuing demands for appearances at depositions in order to force plaintiff to drop proceedings against defendant, and cost plaintiff many thousands of dollars in lost income, in the great tradition of the practice of law as laid down by Roy Cohn when he appeared on Sixty Minutes, 'I make it so damned expensive for the S.O.B.s that they have to drop out.'

3. Defendant has scheduled said deposition so that his hired man can act as judge and jury, and conduct a private trial of this action, thus denying plaintiff the jury trial which he has requested. In a previous action, defendant managed to have plaintiffs complaint moved into chancery for private trial, although plaintiff had requested jury trial.

4. Corpus Juris Secundum 26A 1. 'As a word of legal terminology it (deposition) is usually limited to the testimony of a witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer. . . . At common law, the right to take depositions in law actions was unknown in the absence of consent.' The plaintiff deposes that he objects to said private trial without jury before counsel for defense as a proceeding in chancery.

5. CJS 26 A9: Grounds for Taking. The statutes. . . limit the power to take testimony out of court to clearly marked emergencies and situations. Thus an application to take depositions may and shall be granted only where one or more of the established grounds therefore exist, where there is some reasonable ground for believing that actual necessity requires it." And plaintiff deposes that defendant's demand to take deposition cites no emergency or necessity for said demand.

6. CJS 26A cites as basis for demanding deposition the nonresidence or distant residence, disability, or that it is unlikely that the person will appear at the trial, yet defendant cites none of these bases as none are applicable.

7. Defendant has a proven record of seeking deposition from plaintiff solely for the purpose of harassing and embarrassing him, oppressing plaintiff with undue burden and expense and as a threat to plaintiffs health. Defendant has deliberately set the stage for such oppression by calling for the deposition to be held in the office of one , with whom plaintiff has been in litigation since 1979, and plaintiff as personally sued and is considering further action against said, thus forcing plaintiff into a hostile atmosphere, in which the hired hand of defendant can freely oppress him. Since defendant persuaded plaintiff to begin association with him in 1982, plaintiff subsequently became gray-haired and developed a heart condition and high blood pressure solely due to said association and defendant's manager dropped dead of a heart attack during this same period.

8. Defendant has not established jurisdiction over the person of plaintiff.

9. Defendant Command to take deposition is an integral part of defendant's ongoing campaign to ruin, impoverish and destroy plaintiff, the many details of which plaintiff will duly present before a jury as a revelation of the incredible malice and malevolence of said defendant."

It had long been obvious to me that I had fallen into the clutches of a truly demonic being, who for a time exercised total control over me, and who had provably attempted to murder me and seize control of all of my life's work. I had filed Written Interrogatories and Requests for Admission to Fagin, which he had refused to answer, with no sanctions being levelled against him by the court. He had responded, but without direct answers. During the three years of this action, I had been saving the revelations of the true nature of this demonic being for the jury, and had been holding back the most shocking evidence of his behaviour.

The judge had now placed me under Federal Court Order to take Deposition, and for Production of Documents. Although I still had no inkling of danger, the plan of Fagin's attorneys had now begun. The first strike was a completely new request for Production of Documents, which demanded that I produce

"1. Originals or, if not available, copies thereof, of all Federal and State Income Tax Returns filed for the years 1952 and through, 1985.

2. All documents, writings and records of every kind and description which in anyway relate to income received, and any expenses related thereto, from 1952 through the date hereof in relation to the publication of the book "Mullins and the Federal Reserve."

Fagin's attorneys could not even get the title of the book accurately, it was "Mullins on the Federal Reserve."

I immediately filed Motion to Censure — Abuse of Process. There was no question that the judge would see that the request was impossible. I had already submitted testimony that during many of those years, I was homeless. The FBI agents had had me fired from job after job. I slept by the side of the road, or in empty buildings, or stayed with friends. I had no doubt that the judge would throw out the substituted request.

"The Plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, appearing for himself, moves the Court to Censure Counsel for Defense for violating the integrity of this Court (a bit of sarcasm on my part.ED)., open defiance of a Court Order, and malicious abuse of process, as follows:

1. On June 2, 1986, counsel for defense filed a Request for Production of Documents. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Protective Order on same, which was duly argued in open court on Sept. 16, 1986. The Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, but deferred defendant's motion for an accounting.

2. Counsel for defense later substituted a different Request for Production of Documents from the one which had been argued on Sept. 16,1986, serving this new request on Plaintiff on Sept. 26, 1986.

3. Counsel for defense switched Request for Production of Documents commanded plaintiff to bring all his Federal and State income tax returns for the years 1952 to and including 1985, to counsel for defense's associate counsel's office on Oct. 14,1986, and all of plaintiffs expense accounts connected with the book which is the subject of this action for the years 1952 to the present date. Counsel for defense had not argued this request before the Court in response to plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order. Counsel for defense had no legal basis for this illegal request, because the earliest date mentioned in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is October 15, 1982, which counsel for defense apparently misread as 1952 and called for records from 1952. By demanding an accounting from plaintiff of tax returns and accounting of expenses connected with said book from 1952 through 1985, counsel for defense openly and flagrantly and contemptuously defied the decision of this Court on Sept. 16, 1986 and the Order of this Court that 'Ruling is deferred on the motion for an accounting.'

4. Counsel for defense's demand that plaintiff produce said accounting records for the past thirty-four years is malicious abuse of process with a two-fold purpose: First, to invent conditions impossible for plaintiff to meet, as it is unlikely that any individual can produce Federal and State tax returns and detailed expense accounts for the past thirty-four years, during much of which time plaintiff slept in empty buildings and by the side of the road, and cannot return to said empty buildings and retrieve detailed expense accounts therefrom, and counsel for defense fded such demand with the Court in expectation that plaintiff would drop this proceedings because of inability to meet said demands. In over two years of litigation, counsel for defense has not been able to answer plaintiffs documented charges against defendant, who continues to avoid any physical appearance in Court, remaining secluded on his vast estates like a latter day Howard Hughes while daily ordering out his paid hirelings to attack and destroy anyone who dares to oppose his malignant operations; and second, counsel for defense's associate counsel, with whom plaintiff has been in litigation for ten years, and whom plaintiff has sued for improper conduct, desires plaintiff's income tax returns so as to involve plaintiff in a second vendetta with the Internal Revenue Service, as said associate counsel succeeded in doing when plaintiff sued said associate counsel's client for damages, and said associate counsel boasted, 'Don't worry about Mullin s now; I've seen to it that the IRS will handle him,' and shortly thereafter, plaintiff was summoned by the IRS for an audit, whereupon plaintiff was forced to file suit against the IRS, litigation continuing for many months, and dismissed without trial by jury against plaintiffs wishes.

5. Malicious abuse of process is designed solely to force plaintiff to drop this action against said defendants, as evidenced by the Washington Post, May 19, 1980, "Discovery Cases Abuse Due Process": U.S. District Judge John F. Grady on April 17, 1980 said much of discovery in the ATT case was irrelevant and immaterial. U.S. District Judge Harold H. Green said the discovery process had become 'a trial by combat,' in which the litigant most able to afford the necessary expense or willing to spend funds will eventually prevail by hiring a law firm willing to engage in endless and needless rounds of discovery. . . maneuvers. . . Useless discovery. . . must be curtailed. . .

"Abuse of discovery clogs up the courts and unnecessarily inflates attorneys fees." 17 CJS 10. "Abuse of legal processes or proceedings is a contempt. " in re Toepel, 102 N.W. 369, 139 Mich. 85.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully moves the Court to censure counsel for defense for the above detailed violations and to award plaintiff full summary judgment against the defendants because of these abuses of process."

I never doubted that the judge would order the defendant to withdraw the demand for Production of Documents as excessive and unreal. I was stunned when he upheld the demand that I produce thirty-four years of state and federal income tax forms. During most of those years, the state had not even had a state income tax!

On the appointed day, I and a friend hauled two huge boxes of documents to associate counsel's office. I obtained a receipt from them for delivery of 10,000 documents. To this day, there is no record that any of those documents was ever returned. Included in the boxes were some, but obviously not all, of the tax returns and expense receipts which I had been placed under Federal Court order to produce. The setup, with cooperation on the highest levels, was now in place.

I then appeared for the Deposition. I was expecting an interrogation of from a half hour to an hour. Instead, I was subjected to a ruthless assault of some nine hours of the most intensive grilling I have ever undergone. I was recovering from another kidney stone attack, and had gone on record in my pleadings as having developed high blood pressure and heart trouble due to Fagin's persecution. The attorney, a vigorous man in his thirties, expected that I would collapse and perhaps die from the stress of such a prolonged third degree. After some hours, he began to subject me to pointed questioning about my sex life, hoping to develop something damaging about a relationship with a married friend. She was present at the deposition, and had faithfully supported me throughout the proceedings. I objected, but he pressed harder than ever, as he questioned me about my sex life over the past thirty years. I anticipated filing suit against him on this line of questioning, but when I paid an enormous sum for the transcript, all of these questions had carefully been edited out, as had my responses to them.

Few laymen realize that the supposedly sacrosanct depositions, which are given under oath, are frequently edited by the attorneys before being typed in their final form. There are numerous deletions and alterations, all of which are illegal, and all of which are done with the full cooperation of the court reporter, who depends upon the lawyers for all income. It is but one more development in the total corruption of the legal process.

In previous depositions, the attorneys had usually found me unshakeable, and had given up after a half hour or so. I had had one equally intensive deposition some years earlier, when I sued the Washington Post for a million dollars for criminal libel. Their columnist, George Sokolsky, had pilloried me as a "subversive." Sokolsky died of a heart attack shortly after I brought suit against him. The Post remained as a defendant. Their attorneys, Covington and Burling, which employed Alger Hiss' brother Donald, and a host of other pillars of Washington's liberal Establishment, were the corporate counsel for the Post, one of the properties owned by the international bankers, Famille Meyer, who bought the paper with the proceeds from printing and selling Liberty Bonds in duplicate during World War I, through the War Finance Corporation. At that deposition, I had an attorney, who sat by and said nothing while the Post's attorneys mercilessly threatened and hounded me for several days. Your attorney is supposed to object when the questioning becomes obvious harassment, but this dummy refused to do anything to help me. I fired him the next day.

As the afternoon wore on, Fagin's attorney began to wilt. He became increasingly red-faced, and excused himself several times to go out into the hall. It was apparent that he was on some sort of drug, as he became back refreshed and full of vigor. However, this only lasted a half hour or so, and he would have to go out again. I sat in my uncomfortable chair, totally at ease, making certain my answers contained as much damaging information as possible about the incredible malevolence of the demonic Fagin, who of course was not present. The fact that this material was going into the record infuriated his attorney, who began to scream and shout at me. As the sun sank over the horizon, he suddenly collapsed, and halted the deposition. As we were leaving the building, he came up to me, and with considerable respect, for he had been soundly beaten at his own game, he said, "I think it is time we got together and settled this thing, don't you?" I agreed, and we set a date for the following week. I was jubilant, because I expected a reasonable settlement. I was asking for fifty million dollars, and a tenth of that was now a good prospect.

When I arrived at the attorney's office, I noticed that he seemed calm, rather than downcast, as I had expected. We sat down, and he immediately said, "You haven't produced the tax returns or the expense accounts, have you?" I replied, "No." He said, "You know you are under Federal Court order." I said, "You know, and I know, and the judge knows that I don't have those records for thirty-four years." He said, "In that case, we have to go to the judge for sanctions. That means you will be remanded to custody until you comply with the order."

I understood why the judge had refused to grant my Motion for Abuse of Process, and had upheld the demand that I produce thirty-four years of records. Fagin's associates were desperate, after I brought them in as co-defendants, and their only chance was to have me put in a box. I was now to be committed indefinitely to prison. Since I could not produce the records, I would be in for life. The attorney now offered an alternative. "I mentioned the other day that we should settle this," he said. "Eve prepared this quit-claim."

The quit claim stipulated that I drop all claims against Fagin, allow him to keep $16,000 that he had illegally banked from the sale of my book, and that I turn over the entire $23,500 1 had kept in the bank without drawing upon a cent of it. He was confiscating all of the proceeds from my book.

I realized that this was extortion and blackmail obtained under duress. I signed the quit claim. This same judge had already dismissed two suits with prejudice which I had brought before him; I knew that he would agree, and had probably already agreed, ex parte, to carry out the indeterminate jail sentence until I produced the nonexistent records. I believed that I now had sufficient evidence to have the entire crew prosecuted under criminal statutes. However, after leaving the office, I reconsidered, and decided not to give the attorney the check after all. I went to Charlottesville to consult pertinent statutes in the law library, and returned to my home late in the evening. After I sat down, my front door suddenly was flung open (I had neglected to lock it), and Fagin's attorney came rushing in. He was red-faced, breathless, and extremely distraught. It seemed obvious that he was going to attack me, and my gun was upstairs. He was standing between me and the stairs.

"What do you want?" I asked.

"You've got to give me the check, right now!" he exclaimed. There were only the two of us in the room, but I suspected he might have U.S. Marshals waiting outside to take me to prison. I decided the check would be the final evidence I would need to institute criminal charges, and I wrote it out. He insisted it be made out to his firm, not to Fagin. This again was evidence which I wanted. I wrote him the check.

I then wrote to two United States Attorneys in the states we had been operating in, and to the Department of Justice, as follows:

"The statutes governing misprison of a crime require me as a citizen of the United States to report to you the following offenses: interstate conspiracy to defraud and injure; violations of USC 17; violations of USC 18 245, unlawful coercion, blackmail and extortion, (documents attached) showing Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization." I included documentation, including Fagin's lawyers' assurances that they would obtain rights to all my published books and articles, the receipt for 10,000 documents from the attorneys, the check and its endorsement by Fagin's attorneys, as well as a number of other documents from the file of the case.

I reckoned without Fagin's widespread political influence. Like most very wealthy men, he made regular campaign donations to prominent officials. One U.S. attorney replied to my letter, "You have settled your case, and there is nothing we can do." The registered complaint of extortion, blackmail and undue duress was ignored. I had seen the American legal system in action.