Rape of Justice - Eustace Mullins

The Supreme Court

"The Germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the federal judiciary."
— Thomas Jefferson.

Whether the case may be made that the federal government is in dissolution, or whether it has at last achieved supreme power over the citizens of the United States, is a matter which has not been resolved. Jefferson warned us,

"The great object of my fear is the federal judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever-active with noiseless foot and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step and holding what it gains, is engulfing insidiously the (state) governments into the jaws of that which feeds them." Writings of Thomas Jefferson, v. 10:189.

Jefferson also stated,

"It has long. . . been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression (although I do not choose to put it into a newspaper, nor like Priam in armour offer myself its champion)—That the germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the federal judiciary: An irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scarecrow), working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief over the field of our jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the states, and the government of all consolidated into one. To this I am opposed, because when all government, domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated. It will be as in Europe, where every man must be either pike or gudgeon, hammer or anvil. Our functionaries and theirs are wares from the same workshop, made of the same materials and by the same hand. If the states look with apathy on this silent descent of their government into the gulf which is to swallow all, we have only to weep over the human character formed uncontrollable but by a rod of iron, and the blasphemers of man, as incapable of self-government, become his true historians." Writings v. 15:331.

Jefferson continued (v. 15, p.34 1),

"Our government is now taking so steady a course as to show by what road it will pass to destruction, to wit, by consolidation first, and then corruption, its necessary consequence. The engine of consolidation will be the federal judiciary; the two other branches the corrupted instruments."

He went on to say,

"We already see the power, installed for life . . . the foundations are already deeply laid for the annihilation of constitutional state rights, and the removal of every check, every counterpoise to the engulfing power of which themselves are to make a sovereign part. If ever this vast country is brought under a single government, it will be one of the most extensive corruption, indifferent and incapable of a wholesome care over so wide a spread of surface. This will not be borne, and you will have to choose between reformation or revolution. If I know the spirit of this country, the one or the other is inevitable. Before the canker is become inveterate, before its venom has reached so much of the body politic as to get beyond control, remedy should be applied."

Jefferson was not alone among the Founding Fathers to warn us of the dangers represented by an unbridled judiciary. Now the Supreme Court has come to represent everything which they warned us against; excessive power, the destruction of the system of governmental checks and balances, and the annihilation of the principle of separation of powers. This development has come about because of the systematic "amending" of the Constitution, which was to guard the citizens from excesses of governmental power and its consequent abuses. To accomplish such amending, it was necessary to engage the states in a civil war, or, more properly, a Constitutional revolution, before this goal could be achieved. The subsequent 13th, 14th and 15th amendments effectively repealed the Constitutional guarantees which had been so painstakingly drawn up by the Founding Fathers. In place of the original intent of the Constitution, we were now saddled with the ruthless enforcement of the law merchant. The law merchant respects no individual rights, does not afford trial by jury, and renders useless the appellate process. The law merchant has converted the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court itself, into rubber stamps for the admiralty procedures and decisions of the inferior courts.

The legal profession has carefully concealed from the American people the fact that we no longer have an appellate court system, because the treadmill procedure of appeals continue to provide billions of dollars in fees. The legal profession continues to hold out the carrot on a stick, "We have excellent grounds for an appeal. The court has committed reversible error in numerous aspects of this case." Of course the court has committed reversible error, and every error will be upheld by the rubber stamp appellate court. Although American court procedure remains a game of Russian roulette for the litigant, an attorney knows exactly how much chance an appeal will have. If the client has enough money for an appeal, he will have an appeal.

Abraham Lincoln also expressed his concern about the judiciary, on March 4, 1861,

"If the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court. . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."

Justice Holmes and 'Positivism'

The Bill of Rights was affixed to the Constitution to assure the American people that their newly won freedoms, the result of a successful revolution, would not be abrogated by a later tyrannical government. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has been actively denying those rights. The present era of judicial activism began when Oliver Wendell Holmes inaugurated the era of "positivism" on the Supreme Court. Holmes abrogated the rule of written law by his personal view that the judge does not merely read and interpret the law—he also writes the law. Holmes argued that law is not based upon fundamental or universal truths (a denial of the definition of law as a 'fixed power'), but rather on the more psychological "felt necessities of the times."

During the 1920s, the Yale Law School continued Holmes' legal revolution with the rise of "legal realism." This doctrine claimed that the judge is the law. Meanwhile, Roscoe Pound was teaching his doctrine of "sociological jurisprudence" at the Harvard Law School, which demanded "a pragmatic, sociological legal science." In effect, this was merely a restatement of Karl Marx's theory of dialectical materialism. What was imposed upon the Russian people by armed force was to be fixed upon the American people by judicial fiat. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court, Frankfurter's initial gleeful aside to Justice William O. Douglas was "If we can keep Chief Justice Hughes on our side, there is no amount of rewriting of the Constitution that we cannot do." This was the same Felix Frankfurter, a Viennese immigrant and Socialist revolutionary, who was labelled by President Theodore Roosevelt as "the most dangerous man in America." Frankfurter saw his opportunity to use the Supreme Court as the vehicle to impose a Socialist tyranny upon all American citizens.

The Wall Street Journal has opened its editorial pages to views critical of the Frankfurter legal system. On Feb. 7, 1989, Prof, of Law Stephen L. Carter warned that

"The decisions of the courts are the law of the land in the sense that the parties to them are legally obligated to obey them. They are not, however, the fundamental law of the land—not, at least, in the sense that the Constitution itself is fundamental."

In fact, the decisions of the post-Frankfurter court are binding upon the parties only through the law merchant, and not because of a Constitutional orientation. Carter concludes his argument with the admonition that "Obedience to the courts is obviously among the most fundamental of our traditions, but surely obedience to the Constitution is even more so." This flies in the face of the Hohnes-Frankfurter brand of judicial activism and the imposition of admiralty procedure upon the American people. Its motto is "the Supreme Court decisions are the law of the land," even though these decisions regularly reverse themselves, to achieve the condition of national instability which the saboteurs have planned. Legal critic Walt Mann tells us that the seal of the Supreme Court is not the standard judicial seal of the blindfolded maiden and the scales of justice; instead, it is a copy of the Seal of Office of the President! Notes appearing in the U.S. Code, 28 USC 44 ad and 28 USC 88, appendix 1, indicate that the present Supreme Court is not the true Supreme Court, but an impostor. The original Supreme Court still exists in the District of Columbia, but its name was changed during Roosevelt's presidency in order to have a court which would support his National Recovery Act, legislation which was copied directly from the corporate state of Mussolini by Gerard Swope, the president of General Electric, and longtime vassal of Bernard Baruch.

The original Supreme Court is defined in the Constitution, Art III, and the 1789 U.S. Statutes at Large, the Judiciary Act. Since Roosevelt superseded it, U.S. courts have lacked all first instance trial prosecution and trial jurisdiction. Thus the U.S. Criminal Code does not contain specifications of crimes, but specifications of overt acts, that is, criminal contempts of violations of previous injunctive orders. The courts rely on the injunctive process based on the violation of a court order, rather than providing a legal trial under Constitutional principles where evidence is argued and admitted or denied, with a jury making the final decision. Under this injunctive process, only the overt act of violation of the injunction itself need be proven to obtain a conviction. The "information" which has taken the place of indictments for violations of laws, has only to claim that a violation of the injunction has taken place. The crime itself will never be prosecuted.

The U.S. Criminal Code itself was originally a civil code, because the Criminal Code, Title 18, was included in the Civil Judicial Code and the Aliens and Foreigners Control Code, Title 8. The 14th amendment was then written in order to provide the government authority to treat American citizens as aliens and foreigners, as decided by Frost v. RC, 271 US 583, 596-7, which defined us as mere aliens, and Lehigh RR. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396, which ruled that the law enforcement powers in America apply only to foreigners, foreign relations, and international affairs.

Judicial Activism

The doctrine of federal judicial supremacy was fastened onto the necks of the American people as an irrevocable yoke because it was done insidiously, and under the cover of more striking and dramatic events, such as the Civil War. After the Second World War, the judicial activists, who had thoroughly cowed the leaders of our two political parties, imposed a series of stunning decisions which, in effect, placed the American people on notice that they now had no rights remaining to them. This situation was dramatized by Gov. Orval Faubus of Arkansas, in a speech to the Arkansas Legislature, Aug. 26,1958, in which he quoted extensively from the resolutions passed by the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Supreme Courts earlier that month, concluding with their finding that:

"The Supreme Court has been usurping the rights reserved to the states by the Constitution.. . . It is not merely the final arbiter of the law; it is the maker of policy in many major social and economic fields."

The activists' pretensions to judicial supremacy dates from the historic case of Marbury v. Madison, 1803. The decision was the work of Chief Justice John Marshall, who had been appointed to the court by President John Adams, the leader of the New England school of separatists. Marshall ruled that the judiciary has the power to strike down any law or act of Congress which violate the Constitution under Art. III, sec. 2 par. 1, or "the supreme law of the land" clause, Art. VI, sec. 2. However, Marbury v. Madison, rather than being a sweeping review which established the court as the final arbiter of government power, was actually a partisan political squabble over the spoils of election victory. Congress had passed a new Circuit Court bill Feb. 13,1801, which authorized sixteen additional federal judges. Pres. Adams at once filled them with Federalists, who were confirmed by the Senate March 2, and their appointments signed by President Adams and sealed by Secretary of State John Madison on March 3. Marbury v. Madison arose from a comparable situation, the passing on Feb. 27, 1801 of the District of Columbia Organic Act, provided for the appointment by the President of justices of the peace for Washington and Alexandria within the District.

On March 2, the President nominated twenty-three justices for Washington and nineteen for Alexandria and sealed by the secretary before midnight of March 3, the famous "midnight justices of the peace. The commissions were delivered that same night by Marshall's brother James. However, William Marbury of Washington did not have his commission delivered, which became the subject of litigation in December of 1801; the case was finally heard by the Supreme Court in Feb., 1803. John Marshall believed that the commissions were valid when the Seal of the United States was affixed, rather than when they were delivered. Today, the Supreme Court has no file on the case or any of the papers relevant to it. The only record is that made by reporter William Cranch. The Court ruled that Marbury had a right to the commission because of the power of the Court to adjudicate the validity of an Act of Congress. However, the Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus, thus deciding in favor of Madison. The Court stated that the Constitution forbade the grant of power to issue the writ but that the Court did have the power of judicial review. The Court ruled that the Constitution was the superior and paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, and the supreme law of the land. Sec. 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 attempted to give the Supreme Court power to issue a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding against an officer of the United States, including the Secretary of State; the Court concluded that Art. Ill of the Constitution prohibited the grant of such power by Congress to the Supreme Court.

Thus the original dilemma, that Secretary of State James Madison had worked far into the night signing commissions of justices of the peace for the Federalist Party, including Marbury's commission, had had part of his work undone when the incoming Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, seeing the stack of signed co mm issions on the following morning, decided that he would not allow them, and threw them into the wastebasket. Marbury then sued to obtain the commission he had been promised for his dedicated party service. In deciding the case, Chief Justice Marshall, one of the leaders of the Federalist Party, cleverly avoided the main issue before the Court, that of partisan politics, and shifted the issue to one of governmental powers, by deciding that the final arbiter would henceforth be the Supreme Court.

Thomas Jefferson delivered his opinion on the Marbury v. Madison decision, stating,

"Nothing in the Constitution has given them (the Supreme Court), a right to decide for the Executive, more than for the Executive to decide for them. The opinion. . . would make the judiciary a despotic branch."

Jefferson further warned about judicial supremacy in 1819, stating,

"The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please."

However, the court was careful not to flaunt its newly assumed power. Between 1803 and 1870, the Court declared as unconstitutional only six acts of Congress, three of those being decided in 1870. From 1871 to 1899, it overruled Congress sixteen times, a power which was increasingly used from 1900 to 1936, during the period of Holmesian judicial activism. During that period, the Court rendered fifty-one decisions against the Congress.

The battle over an American central bank also spawned landmark decisions by the Supreme Court. After the European Rothschilds had commissioned Alexander Hamilton to set up a central bank in the United States, immediately after the American Revolution, Thomas Jefferson led the fight against its adoption. In McCulloch v. Madison, 1819, the Supreme Court upheld the bank against the states. In Craig v. Missouri, 1830, the Supreme Court invoked the Constitutional ban on state-issued currency to invalidate loan certificates issued by a state, a decision which severely affected the growth of state banks, and encouraged the demand for a central bank. A longtime crusader against the central bank, Roger Taney, was rewarded for his opposition by President Andrew Jackson, who appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1836. In 1837, the Taney Court reversed Craig v. Missouri in the decision of Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, and upheld the state law authorizing the issuance of bank notes by a state institution. Lawrence Tribe comments on this decision,

"The demise of the central banking system and consequent disruption of the nation's finances played a large part in triggering the devastating economic depression of 1837."

Although Tribe is a well-known legal scholar, he seems less aware of the facts about monetary history. Henry Clews stated, in his book, "Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street,"

"The Panic of 1837 was aggravated by the Bank of England when it in one day threw out all the paper connected with the United States."

As the present writer pointed out in "Secrets of the Federal Reserve," the order to refuse any American securities, shares or loans came directly from Nathan Mayer Rothschild, who thereby deliberately precipitated the panic of 1837. The goal was to punish the United States for refusing Rothschild's central bank, and to drive down the prices of all shares in a financial panic, such shares then being available for purchase by the Rothschilds at a much lower price. Does Tribe known anything of these details? A Harvard law professor since the age of twenty-seven, he is described by Time magazine as one of the most powerful lawyers in the United States. He has long been in the five hundred dollar an hour fee range for consultation, and may be relied upon to present an acceptable justification for Establishment programs.

With the advent of Zionist power on the Supreme Court in 1916, the head of the World Zionist Organization, Louis Brandeis, being appointed to the Court by President Woodrow Wilson, the Court moved from its dedication to the enthronement of judicial supremacy, to a new program, the supremacy of Zionist interests around the globe. Because Supreme Court decisions are not binding upon other nations, this program first succeeded in placing Zionist interests firmly in control of the federal offices in Washington, where they were then exported to the rest of the world as "American" interests. President Wilson appointed Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme Court June 1, 1916; he served on the Court twenty-two years. Another Zionist, Benjamin Cardozo was appointed Feb. 1, 1917, serving twenty-three years, until 1939; The Jewish seat was then given to Felix Frankfurter by Roosevelt in 1939. Arthur Goldberg served on the Court for three years; Abe Fortas was appointed Oct. 4,1968, later resigning after charges of involvement with wealthy Zionists who had matters before the Court.

Brandeis' appointment to the Supreme Court has been explained as the result of a $50,000 contribution by Bernard Baruch to Wilson's re-election campaign, and also as a blackmailing effort by Zionist leaders who held Wilson hostage for the Peck letters, a number of which purportedly established a secret liaison between Wilson and a paramour. Brandeis' appointment was affected by both elements. An indefatigable social activist, he had aroused strong opposition for years because of his controversial work, yet he was finally confirmed by the Senate. He was known worldwide for his fanatical leadership of the Zionist Organization of America; he fulfilled a continuous round of Zionist meetings and policy sessions, stating for the record that "Zionist affairs are the only important things now," a curious allegiance for a Justice of the Supreme Court, who was supposedly "impartial."

Wilson later appointed Brandeis' mentor, Bernard Baruch, as head of the War Industries Board during World War I, and Baruch's partner, Eugene Meyer, head of the War Finance Administration, in charge of Liberty Loans. Baruch later boasted to Congress that as economic czar of the United States, he daily exercised more power than any other man in the nation. It was Baruch who, with Brandeis and Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference, wrote the impossibly punitive reparations assessments against Germany, which made a Second World War inevitable.

Hugo Black and Freedom of Religion

A pivotal figure on the Supreme Court during the 1940s and 1950s was Justice Hugo Black. Max Lemer's biography of Black notes that he joined the Masons before he reached the age of twenty-one. As the next step in his political career, he then joined the Ku Klux Klan, even though the Klan's charter expressly forbade the admitting of Jews, Masons or Catholics. Black ran for the Senate with active Klan support, and won. Black then supported Roosevelt's court-packing plan in the Senate, and was himself appointed to the Court as a reward. After he was sworn in, the story was leaked in Washington that Black had been an active Ku Klux Klan member since 1927. Despite a firestorm of protest from the liberals and Communists who made up Roosevelt's entourage, Black refused to resign from the Court, and Roosevelt refused to request his resignation. A deal was made, and Black became known as one of the most liberal members of the Court. He worked actively to offset the votes of "the Four Horsemen" of the Hughes Court, the dedicated conservatives, Pierce Butler, Willis van Devanter, George Sutherland, and James McReynolds.

As the "judicial activist" leader of the Court, Black led the writing of the decision against prayer in schools in 1954 as an absolutist doctrine. In a 1962 prayer case, Black claimed that by way of the 14th Amendment and the Bill of Rights, restraints upon the states were incorporated into the Constitution. This became the basis for the liberal wing of the Court in future argument, although other Supreme Court decisions refuted Black's claim. Justice Frankfurter ruled in Adamson v. Cal., 1947, that:

"The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was a covert way of imposing upon the states all the rules which it seemed important to eighteenth century statesmen to write into the Federal Amendments was rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses to of the process by which the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution."

In Engel et al v. Vitale et al, Steven Engle and other parents of the New Hyde Park N.Y. v. Union Free District #8, plaintiffs objected to a non-denominational prayer from the State Board of Regents containing twenty-two words drawn from the state constitution,

"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."

This innocuous prayer had been repeated at the beginning of each school day, with the Pledge of Allegiance; there was no compulsion of students to join in its recital. The Supreme Court itself opened each day's sessions with the prayer, "God Save the United States and This Honorable Court"; prayer was also used at the opening of both Houses of Congress. However, Justice Black claimed that the school prayer served to set up a state religion, and thereby violated the establishment clause of the Constitution. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Black's argument that this clause forbade all religious expression actually perverted it into a prohibition against the free exercise of religion. The prayer issue continued to come repeatedly before the Supreme Court; in 1984, the Court's famous "reindeer rule" held that nativity scenes and menorahs could be permitted on public property only if they were accompanied by secular symbols such as reindeer, Santa Claus or his elves. This decision has been condemned as "tortured reasoning"; it is not reasoning at all, but rather, is a conscious attempt to inhibit and finally destroy the exercise of religion in the United States.

Shelby vs. Kraemer and White Flight

A succession of socialist activist decisions by the Court changed the quality of life for all Americans. The Shelby v. Kraemer decision, 433 USI 1984 1948, outlawed restrictive real estate contracts, and changed the capital city of the United States from a white middle class residential area to a largely black, crime-ridden city which is now known as "the crime capital of the world." Its mayor, Mayor Barry, is continually criticized for his close associations with known drug peddlers, some of whom have now been arrested. Barry formerly ran a black organization called "Pride" which collected payment from Jewish merchants on Seventh St. in Washington for assurances that their stores would not be vandalized or set on fire. After millions of dollars had vanished into Pride's coffers, Mayor Barry had his wife take the rap for the sum of $675,000, which had mysteriously vanished.

If an invading army had tried to destroy our nation's capital city, as the British did during the War of 1812, it would have met with armed resistance. However, when the Supreme Court decision launched a wave of "white flight," and handed the city over to blacks, not a protest was heard. Shelby v. Kraemer, did not, as was widely but erroneously believed, outlaw racial covenants in real estate contracts. It did take on the language which was widely used in such contracts, such as that quoted in Ringgold v. Denhardt,

"That the house on said lot now erected shall be used only as a dwelling house, and the same shall not be given, sold, rented or subleased to a negro or person of African or Mongolian descent."

Many such racial covenants also excluded Jews or other groups, in an effort to continue the ethnic makeup of particular neighborhoods. The value of the real estate depended in large part upon such restrictions. Once those restrictions were abandoned, the value of the real estate would plunge.

Instead of outlawing such contracts, the Supreme Court did not face the issue squarely. To have done so would have violated the Constitutional provision against the impairment of contracts. The justices of the Supreme Court carried out a flanking attack on their objective; while their cowardice would not allow them to outlaw such contracts, they ruled that the courts would no longer enforce such contracts by legally upholding them. Their "rule of law" weaseled out of a necessary stance by establishing that the provisions of such a contract could not be enforced by the courts.

The famous interview with Philip Elman in the Harvard Law Review, vol. 1987, p. 817, revealed that the Department of Justice had intervened actively to secure the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, filing a 150 page amicus curiae brief for the plaintiffs, which was later published as a book. Elman states, "I had friends working in the NAACP, the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and other organizations." Elman, as Felix Frankfurter's "law clerk for life," and closest confidante, was working for the plaintiffs as amicus curiae while his employer, Frankfurter, was hearing the case in preparation for handing down an "impartial" opinion. Elman states that the Solicitor General of the United States, Philip Perlman, had requested that he prepare the amicus curiae brief, again an improper procedure, because the clerk of a Justice cannot intervene on behalf of either the plaintiffs or the defense. The brief finally appeared with the names of five Jewish lawyers as its authors. Perlman was disturbed by this, and demanded of Elman, "Can't you find any gentiles to work on this thing?" Thus we find that the same organizations which orchestrated the complaint of Brown v. Board of Education also masterminded the Shelley v. Kraemer decision which destroyed our nation's capital. Their presence was illegal, conspiratorial, and constituted obstruction of justice.

The present writer was living in a pleasant home on Capitol Hill when the Supreme Court decision was announced. Within months, real estate speculators had begun the practice of bringing in one black family per block, the famous practice of "block-busting." At the sight of the black invasion, white owners would immediately sell their homes for as little as one-tenth of the amount they had invested in them. Fortunes were made overnight, as Washington became a black city. One Supreme Court decision changed a sleepy Southern white city with a minority black population into one of the largest black cities in the world, a crime-ridden, poverty-stricken enclave surrounded by well-to-do white suburbs in Maryland and Virginia.

Newspapers carried headlines such as "Fear Becomes Billion Dollar Industry," as sales of locks, alarm systems, security programs, and guns—yes, guns, soared. Many women found that if they chose to live in the District of Columbia, they must become proficient in the use of a handgun, the same handguns which Senator Teddy Kennedy and other bleeding hearts seek to deny to all Americans who are not criminals. As robberies and murders of cab-drivers soared in the District, many cab drivers stopped picking up black fares, and refused to deliver passengers to high-crime areas. A group of yuppy black lawyers recently sued several cab companies, because they had repeatedly been passed by when they tried to hail a cab. Mayor Barry had already forced a measure through City Council automatically fining cab drivers $100 for refusing a passenger.

The Washington Post, in reporting on the yuppy lawyers litigation, mentioned that ninety-seven per cent of the cab drivers in the District of Columbia were black. The black lawyers were suing their racial colleagues! The Post also interviewed taxi driver Albert K. Acheampong, who said, "I discriminate a lot. I'll pay the $100 fine. I'm not going to put my life on the line."

It is typical snobbery of black leaders such as Mayor Barry, who are surrounded by armed bodyguards and chauffeurs, that they wish to fine other blacks $100 because they are fearful of being murdered in what the press habitually refers to as "the crime capital of the world." In Western cities, fake gunfights are staged for tourists; in Washington, the gunfights taking place in Washington on Capitol Hill are real. Nevertheless, Mayor Barry was recently quoted in Newsweek as remarking that "The crime rate in the District of Columbia, if you don't count the killings, is lower than that in other major American cities."

In the case of Com. of Pa. v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court ruled, in 353 US 230,1957, that Stephen Girard, a patriot of the Revolutionary period, who died in 1831, erred in leaving his large fortune for "schools for poor white orphan boys." The funds, which were used to found Girard College in 1848, could no longer be spent for the purposes which Girard had devised, according to the Supreme Court. Despite a lengthy record of previous decisions which honored testamentary directives, the Court ruled that Girard's will, in the light of current sociological requirements, was now found to be discriminatory; his money could no longer be spent for the benefit of poor white orphan boys.

A farmer was sued for raising grain in excess of Department of Agriculture regulations and feeding the surplus to his cattle. A lower court ruled that some powers are granted to Congress by the Constitution, and others are later conferred by amendment; Congress had originally no power to enact an income tax or to prohibit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages; but no amendment to the Constitution granted to Congress the power to regulate agriculture. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, ruling Per Curiam Feb. 24, 1949, "The judgment is reversed. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 US 111." The Court handed down no written decision, because its ruling for an order of reversal had violated both the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments.

Liberal Judges and Criminal Law

Throughout our history, the qualifications for nomination to the Supreme Court have remained the same—solid political support. During the nineteenth century, nominees were frequently rejected by the Senate on partisan political grounds. In 1930, the Senate rejected an unusually distinguished nominee, Judge John J. Parker, because of his conservative views on race relations and labor law. A concerted propaganda drive by union political leaders persuaded the Senate to refuse him, in a preview of the famous Bork Hearings of our era.

Because of such political impasses as the shocking rejection of Judge Bork for the Supreme Court, Prof. Laurence Tribe suggested a compromise solution; that the Supreme Court should maintain a constant political balance of three liberals, three moderates, and three conservatives; when any Justice left the Court, he should be replaced by a successor chosen from the category to which he belonged. Tribe's suggestion was received with derision in Washington, because no one today can say for certain who is a liberal and who is a conservative, while moderates no longer exist. Judge Bork had been rejected by the Senate as too conservative, although during most of his life he had been considered extremely liberal; he had been married to a Jewish liberal, a socialist, and his closest friend for years had been the well-known leftwing Judge Abner Mikva, whose Congressional career had been marked by his extreme pro-Communist views.

From the time of Brandeis, there had been a traditional Jewish seat on the Supreme Court, although no seat was ever reserved for anyone who might be considered even remotely anti-Jewish. When Frankfurter died, he was replaced by Artie Goldberg; when Goldberg was asked to resign to defend Zionist interests at the United Nations as the ambassador from the United States, he was replaced by Abe Fortas. At that time, no one anticipated that Fortas would have to resign because of his connections with Las Vegas mob figures and with wheeler dealer Fouis Wolfson, who later went to prison. Fortas had signed an agreement with Wolfson while on the Supreme Court that he would receive $25,000 a year from Wolfson's foundation for life. The public outrage over this arrangement forced Fortas to resign. His firm, Arnold, Fortas and Porter, had become the most powerful Washington lobbyist. While Fortas was serving on the Supreme Court, his wife took his place with the firm, bringing in many large new accounts. The firm has since dropped the Fortas name from its masthead.

As part of the growing federalization of the legal system, the Supreme Court ruled that all state courts must now follow Federal rules of evidence, whether they were in conflict with state statutes or not. This placed much greater restrictions on the crime-fighting power of state and local police, as well as state courts. The Justices had reversed traditional police procedures. Henceforth, no evidence could be presented in court if anyone in the police department had erred in any way, no matter how trivial, in gathering the evidence, even if it meant that an obviously guilty and dangerous criminal would go free. A landmark reversal in the history of criminal justice in the United States, the notorious "exclusionary rule" was applied in the court's Mallory decision of 1957. Mallory's seven and a half hours of detention before his arraignment was held by the Supreme Court to have violated his Constitutional right to be brought before a magistrate without "undue delay."

In 1961, the Supreme Court invaded another realm of state law by limiting the ability of local police agencies to conduct searches in quest of incriminating evidence, a domain previously held to be within the domain of state law. In 1963, the court's Gideon decision released a convicted criminal, Gideon, on the grounds that every indigent such as Gideon should have a lawyer provided and paid for by the state. This decision, although doing nothing for the great majority of law-abiding Americans, who still had to pay for their own legal representation, proved to be a great boon for the legal profession. Only one task yet remains for the Supreme Court, to outlaw any citizen from representing himself in court, or to appear without a lawyer, to continue the Supreme Court's chosen role as the Santa Claus of the legal profession.

In 1964, the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule by barring evidence seized during the search and seizure operations involving an automobile. In 1964, the Escobedo decision freed a convicted murderer because he had not been allowed to see counsel at the station house before he made a full confession to the police. In 1966, the Supreme Court decided four cases comprising Miranda v. Arizona. The court ruled that the police could not question a suspect if he demurred, and the service of a lawyer must be energetically pressed on him and financed by the state if indigent. A further ruling declared that the presence of a uniformed policeman in the station house psychologically acted to coerce the defendant and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The implication of this Supreme Court ruling was that whenever a criminal was being brought into a police station, those policemen present must either strip, or absent themselves.

Not only were these rulings ludicrous; they also reflected the dedication of the social activist justices to the wellbeing of the criminal. It also reflected their active dislike and distrust of the police and for members of the law abiding public. One might say that the Supreme Court no longer bothered to conceal its commitment to the criminal, and its distaste for the bourgeois property owners of society who had been caricatured by Karl Marx and other Communists in their writings. They ruled that the police must now be handcuffed, while criminals were being given carte blanche to carry on their profession.

Brown vs. Board of Education

Because of these decisions, as well as the increasing concern of the Justices for Communists, public reaction quickly surfaced in national campaigns to impeach the more notorious liberal leaders of the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas. Earl Warren had not always been known as a liberal. As a young California politician, he had a brilliant career until a family problem threatened his reputation. His father, according to researches by famed classical scholar Dr. Revilo Oliver, had been sexually abusing a number of young women who were his tenants in a shantytown in California. Several rape charges had been filed against him, and Warren realized that he must act quickly. He went to talk to his father, who was then found with his head bashed in. Dr. Oliver states unequivocally that Warren murdered his own father in order to protect his political career. He was then elected Atty. Gen. of California, but made no effort to find the murderer of his own father. The case was closed.

As Atty. Gen. of California, Earl Warren showed few liberal tendencies. He led the Committee of 100, a nativist California group, in a campaign to have all Japanese small businessmen and farmers interned after Pearl Harbor. Despite the assurances of J. Edgar Hoover and other intelligence officials that these merchants had been investigated and presented no threat, Warren and his cohorts insisted that Roosevelt intern the Japanese. Their properties were then bought for a few cents on the dollar by Warren and the members of his Committee. Land which they obtained for a few cents an acre in 1942 is now worth millions. The fortunes from this campaign not only financed Warren's later career; it also provided the financial backing for the successful Presidential campaigns of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Later elected Governor of California, Warren went to the Republican convention in 1952 with a California delegation which had been pledged to the party's nominee, Robert Taft. At the convention, Warren was promised the post of Chief Justice if he would switch to Eisenhower. It was an offer he could not refuse.

When he arrived in Washington, Warren was told that the first case on the Court's docket was a very urgent one. It was Brown v. Board of Education, the school desegregation case. Hearings on this case had begun on Dec. 13, 1952. Chief Justice Fred Vinson soon let it be known that he was prepared to uphold the longstanding ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson, which had long ago established the "separate but equal" principle for American education. Few Washington insiders believed that the arguments in favor of Brown v. Board of Education would bring any surprises. It was but one of a series of cases which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had routinely been bringing to the Court. However, in this case, the NAACP had been given a special fund of many millions of dollars, donated by wealthy New York Jewish families such as the Spingarns, who had run the NAACP for many years. These funds enabled the NAACP to hire many "experts," more than two hundred such witnesses, at a cost of more than ten thousand dollars a day. Other funds donated to the NAACP came from such leftwing activist groups as the CIO Political Action Committee, the majority of whose dues-paying members were white; the Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress; the American Civil Liberties Union, and allied interests. In all, the NAACP came to court for Brown v. Board of Education with a war chest of ten million dollars. In contrast, the southern states who argued against Brown had only a few thousand dollars of expense funds to present their case.

Despite their massive expenditures, the NAACP millions, after some months of argument, had made little impression on the Justices. The Court had originally allotted two weeks for the hearing of Brown v. Board of Education. As it dragged on during the 1952-53 term of the Court, it became obvious that the NAACP was desperately stalling for time. No one could then envision the denouement for which the NAACP had been told to wait. A plan had been put into effect which was to change the composition of the Court, and thereby to effect a favorable decision for Brown. The defending lawyer for the states, John W. Davis, a former Presidential candidate, sent a note to his associate, Robert Fig,

"I have never read a drearier lot of testimony than that furnished by the so-called educational and psychological experts . . . I think it is perfectly clear from interior evidence that the witness Clark drafted the appendix which is signed by the worthy social scientists. I can only say that if that sort of guff can move any court, God save the state."

Davis was referring to the well-advertised "psychologist," Dr. Kenneth Clark, whose professor at Columbia University, Dr. Henry Garrett, was the most respected psychologist in America. Garrett stated that Clark had been none too bright as a student. Now this student was testifying before the Supreme Court as the originator of the "doll tests." He had shown both black and white dolls to a few black children, and he claimed that they had picked the white dolls in preference to the black ones. From these "tests," Clark deduced that the Negro children were suffering from an inferiority complex, because they had picked the white dolls, and that this complex had been created in them because they could not go to school with white children. No evidence was ever presented to the Court which verified Clarks unsupported claims. However, later court cases revealed that he had deliberately falsified his testimony before the Court. He had conducted earlier tests in some northern states, where the public schools had long been integrated. It was in those integrated states that the black children had picked the white dolls! In the southern states which were not integrated, the black children had picked the black dolls. Nevertheless, Clark succeeded in placing his falsified findings before the Supreme Court.

This was not the most flagrant falsification presented to the Court in Brown v. Board of Education. The presence of the principal advocate for the plaintiff, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, never intimated in any way that this association was not a national association of colored people. It had been founded in 1910 by a small group of white people. Present at this meeting were John Dewey, who was to revolutionize American education on Socialist lines; Jane Adams, a lifelong Socialist; Mary White Ovington, only child of millionaire Theodore Ovington, from a well-known Abolitionist family; he owned Ovington' s, the most fashionable store on New York's Fifth Avenue. Mary White Ovington was the epitome of the wealthy white liberal; although she listed herself as a Socialist in Who's Who, she resided for many years in a luxurious suite in Brooklyn's St. George Hotel. She spent her later years living on the fashionable Upper East Side of Manhattan. Also present at the founding of the NAACP were Rabbi Emil Hirschberg, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Dr. Henry Moskovitz, Lillian Wald, and Florence Kelly, who had changed her name from Weschnewetsky.

Only one black was present at the founding of the NAACP, William E. B. DuBois, a lifelong Communist revolutionary who finally denounced the United States, gave up his American citizenship, and went to live in Ghana, Africa. For many years, no black was allowed to head the NAACP. Mary White Ovington was chairman of the board after its founding. Albert Spingarn, of a wealthy Jewish family, was president from 1911 to 1940. He was succeeded by his brother, Joel Spingarn, a wealthy newspaper publisher who lived like royalty in a huge mansion. He also founded the publishing firm of Harcourt Brace. Joel became treasurer of the NAACP, his brother Arthur serving as president from 1940 until his death in 1971. The NAACP was the personal preserve of the Spingarn family from its inception until 1971. Even while the NAACP was arguing Brown v. Board of Education before the Supreme Court, the Justices never knew that no black person had ever served as president of the NAACP.

Walter White, secretary of the NAACP from 1931 to 1955, was described in Current Biography in 1942, "It is only through his own insistence on his negro blood that anyone would ever take him for a negro. He has fair skin, blue eyes, and blond hair."

The official report of the Communist Party's 4th national convention stated that the Party had "penetrated" the NAACP. Florence Kelly, or Weschnewetsky, a personal friend of Engels and Lenin, was on its board of directors, as was Felix Frankfurter. The field secretary, William Pickens, also a Socialist Party member, was active in Communist affairs.

The most interesting name among the founders of the NAACP in 1910 was that of Dr. Henry Moskovitz. His wife, Belle Moskovitz, was one of the most influential Democratic Party leaders in New York. She also had been a secret director of the Communist Party for years. "The Red Network" lists a Dr. Moshewitz as Communist Party central committee; this is believed to be another spelling for the name of Dr. Henry Moskowitz. Belle Moskovitz ran Gov. A1 Smith's office for eight years, in alliance with Robert Moses and Judge Joseph Proskauer, the president of the American Jewish Committee. Proskauer personally selected all judges in New York state for years. Louis Howe, Franklin D. Roosevelt's press aide, was envious of Proskauer; he said to him one day, "By God, Joe, you've gone too far; there's not a single gentile judge left in the state." Proskauer looked solemnly at him. "You know, Lou," he said, "I didn't expect to reach this goal for another five years."

Belle Moskovitz, born Belle Lindner, had married a Charles Israels; when he died, she married Dr. Henry Moskovitz. Nathan Miller's biography of Roosevelt notes that "Moskovitz and Proskauer felt that Roosevelt, as a cripple, would be unable to interfere in their direction of the campaign. Like A1 Smith, they viewed the patrician in politics with contempt, regarding Roosevelt as little more than a handsome piece of window dressing." When Roosevelt succeeded A1 Smith as Governor of New York, Smith said to him, "Now Franklin, you will want Mrs. Moskovitz, of course, and I think the best thing you can do is appoint her the Governor's secretary." Belle Moskovitz was a longtime social worker, Communist Party worker, labor leader, Jewish leader, head of the Council of Jewish Women, and the Communist who inducted atomic spy Julius Rosenberg into the Communist Party. It was she who put together the liberal coalition of Jews, Communists, Socialists, and labor leaders which became Roosevelt's unbeatable political base. As head of the Progressive Party, she had nominated Oscar Straus for Governor; she was introduced to A1 Smith through Abram Elkus, law partner of Judge Proskauer, and became Smith's political alter ego. She became director of publicity for the Democratic National Committee, and was given credit for the political careers of Newton Baker, Herbert Lehman, and A1 Smith, but her greatest achievement was making possible the election of FDR to the Presidency. She was denied her moment of glory when she fell down the stairs and was killed, a few days before Roosevelt's inauguration. Four thousand people came to her funeral at Temple Emanuel in New York. A1 Smith described her as "his alter ego."

Neither then nor later did anyone ever challenge Felix Frankfurter, a sitting justice during all of the argument on Brown v. Board of Education before the Supreme Court, as to a possible conflict of interest, because he had been a director of the NAACP for eighteen years, and was now hearing a case brought before the Supreme Court by the NAACP.

The ruling which the plaintiffs of Brown v. Board of Education sought to overturn was a well established precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson, which laid down a guideline observed since 1894.

"Laws permitting, or even requiring, their (racial) separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, received as written within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their state power."

Louis Brandies and Felix Frankfurter

Thus the overturning of Plessy v. Ferguson required testimony and evidence which would justify the nullification of the state power to control its education and its schools. No such evidence was ever presented before the Supreme Court. Instead, a furtive conspiracy between the plaintiffs and a Justice of the Supreme Court, involving murder, resulted in the unanimous decision in favor of Brown. This conspiracy is documented in the authoritative publication, the Harvard Law Review, 1987, pp. 817 et. seq. by Felix Frankfurter's longtime law clerk and confidante, Philip Elman. In an interview about Brown v. Board of Education, Elman stated,

"There's no question that the grand strategist in all this inside the Court was Felix Frankfurter. To use the Yiddish word that Frankfurter used at the time, he was the Kochleffel, or cooking spoon, which kept things stirred up. Frankfurter was in touch with the lawyers who won Brown, Jack Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall, William Coleman. It was a victory that changed the whole course of race relations in the United States."

Elman showed no remorse at the fact that this "victory" was won by means of conspiracy, illicit contacts between a Justice of the Supreme Court and the attorneys for the plaintiff, in which Elman was the main go between. The interviewer asked him about the obvious impropriety of this situation, "Frankfurter was receiving a government briefing almost daily from you, to which Davis (lawyer for the defense) never had a chance to reply." ELMAN. "I regarded myself, in the literal sense, as amicus curiae."

Because of his complicity in illegally participating in the Brown decision, Frankfurter's later books, essays and articles mention neither the case nor his association with the NAACP. In an article on the Scottsboro boys, as well as in other civil rights articles, he makes no mention of the fact that he was legal counsel for the NAACP. His many biographies usually omit such reference, as does his Who's Who listing. "Justice Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties," by Clyde A. Jacobs, Univ. Cal. 1961, omits any mention of Frankfurter's position with the NAACP, or of Brown, although one would suppose this would be central to the material from which the title was derived. Philip Kurland's book, "Felix Frankfurter" also "neglects" to mention the NAACP or Brown. Helen Shirley Thomas book, "Felix Frankfurter" confines the association to five words on p. 21, "Felix Frankfurter, legal adviser to NAACP." Liva Baker's biography, "Felix Frankfurter," notes that Frankfurter was "legal counsel for the NAACP." Baker also makes the startling admission that "There was no doubt about where Felix Frankfurter stood; he had but one course to take on segregation."

Thus an "impartial" Justice hearing a case on segregation left no doubt about where he stood. And what about the arguments before the Court? How did they affect the decision? Elman leaves us in no doubt about that. In his interview, he states that the judges had already made up their mind. "Oral argument made no difference in their decision. In Brown, nothing that the lawyers said made a difference. Thurgood Marshall could have stood up and recited "Mary had a little lamb," and the result would have been exactly the same." However, the principal evidence impeaching both Frankfurter and the Court's decision in favor of Brown is the record of Frankfurter's eighteen year association with the NAACP, which both he and his biographers have tried to conceal.

In "The Brandeis-Frankfurter Connection: the Secret Political Activities of Two Justices," Oxford 1982, B. A. Murphy notes p. 201, "In 1930, Felix Frankfurter organized a crack legal staff for the NAACP to litigate against segregation throughout society." Although Frankfurter publicly resigned all of his numerous political affiliations when he was appointed to the Supreme Court by FDR in 1939, including the NAACP, he continued to direct the legal staff of the NAACP from behind the scenes, as he had done for many years.

During World War II, Frankfurter had one of his proteges, William D. Hastie, the dean of Howard Law School in Washington, appointed by Secretary of War Henry Stimson, a key member of the Brotherhood of Death, as a special assistant on Negro problems in the armed services. Frankfurter also had Stimson appoint as his two special assistants in the War Department two other Frankfurter proteges, Harvey Bundy and John J. McCloy. Murphy states that this was done "to provide Frankfurter with an indispensable means for influencing War Department policy."

Why would a Supreme Court Justice need to influence War Dept, policy at the height of the Second World War? Because Frankfurter, a Viennese immigrant who had succeeded FDR's mentor, Bella Moscovitz, as commander of the secret Harold Ware cell of Soviet agents in the government in Washington, needed to direct our war strategy in favor of its principal goal, the rescue of the Soviet Union from attack by the German armies. Murphy states that Frankfurter served as a constant intermediary between Stimson and FDR throughout the war.

Throughout FDR's long regime, Frankfurter continuously placed his proteges in key government positions. Secretary of the Interior Ickes notes in his Diary, March 24, 1933 that he had appointed Margold as Assistant Secretary of the Interior "after advising with Dr. Felix Frankfurter." He explains that Margold had been serving as "special counsel for the NAACP."

It was necessary for Frankfurter to avoid any mention of his eighteen year association with the NAACP during the Court's hearing of Brown because he had personally organized, selected and trained the lawyers who were arguing the case. He had inaugurated the NAACP's campaign of litigation against segregation; each of the lawyers appearing before him was his personal protege; and another protege, Elman, was secretly serving as amicus curiae for Brown. This documented evidence proves that Brown was illegally decided through improper contact with attorneys, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and is invalid. As there is no statute of limitations on conspiracy, the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, now stands invalid, returning the situation to the rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, maintaining "separate but equal" schools. Every racially integrated school in the United States, whether public or private, is now operating illegally.

Elman's Harvard Law Review interview also recounts the exact wording of Frankfurter when Elman met him at Union Station after the news of Vinson's heart attack. Elman says that Frankfurter stated "happily" and "sarcastically," "I'm in mourning. Phil, this is the first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that there really is a God." Elman also reveals that Frankfurter had code names for each of his fellow justices, which demonstrate his utter contempt and hatred for them; his private name for Justice Stanley Reed was Chamer, the Yiddish word for "fool." Elman also expresses distaste for Dr. Kenneth Clark's testimony in Brown about his doll tests.

"He trivialized the basic truth and opened himself and the NAACP to ridicule. John Davis was the lawyer for South Carolina. And he demolished the doll test. He cited an article by Clark, 'Racial Identity and Preference in Negro Culture,' 1947, in which Clark stated they had given this test not only to black kids in southern states, but also to black kids in northern states, and the strange result was that the southern kids were significantly less likely to reject the white doll than the northern kids."

Elman also attributes Warren's use of the phrase, "with all deliberate speed" to integrate the schools in the Brown decision to Frankfurter. He states that it was originally quoted by Holmes from Francis Thompson's poem, "The Hound of Heaven," and that Frankfurter liked it so much that he quoted it in three of his decisions.

Thus we have a Supreme Court decision which changed the educational system throughout the United States, arrived at by the murder of one Chief Justice and his replacement by Earl Warren, who placed himself totally in Frankfurter's hands. We had an amicus curiae for Brown who was Frankfurter's law clerk, advising a staff of lawyers arguing for Brown who had been handpicked and trained by Frankfurter at the NAACP "to litigate against segregation." No other case ever heard by the Supreme Court so reeks of conspiracy, illegal activities, improper contamination of a Supreme Court Justice, and absolute nullification of the subsequent decision by these documented factors.

The academic argument for Brown and the NAACP was provided by a voluminous "scholarly" work, "The American Dilemma," by a Swedish Socialist, Gunnar Myrdal. Both Myrdal and his wife Alva were longtime Rockefeller Fellows. She served as a member of the Swedish Parliament, was a director of UNESCO, and a member of many United Nations organizations. She and her husband had toured the United States in 1929 and 1930 as Rockefeller Fellows, where they developed a deep-rooted contempt for native American workers. Gunnar Myrdal spent from 1938 to 1942 working on "An American Dilemma"; he was funded by the Carnegie Foundation, which was run by the Rockefeller interests as a subsidiary of the Rockefeller Foundation. The book, some 1483 pages, was published in 1944 by Harper Bros. New York. Carnegie had been headed for many years by Frederick Keppel, a director of Equitable Life and Guaranty Trust, the bank which had sought throughout the 1920s to increase American funding and recognition of the Soviet regime. Carnegie had also funded Lord Hailey's "An African Survey" and had given millions of dollars to Tuskegee and Hampton Institutes. Myrdal had also spent a year in the United States as a Fellow of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Fund. With Keppel on the staff of Carnegie at this time were Ralph Bunche, named as a Communist Party member; M. F. Ashley Montague, a tireless Communist propagandist; Eugene Horowitz; Herbert Goldhamer; Melville Herskovitz; Edward Shils; and Benjamin Malzberg.

"An American Dilemma," which was never read by any of the Justices, reeked of Myrdal's contempt for native born Southern white citizens. On p. 563, we read, "The low level of education and general culture in the white South is another important background factor. . . Another important background factor in the causation of lynching and other major forms of violence is the isolation, the dullness of every day life, and the general boredom of rural and small town life in the South." Myrdal then excoriates the people as "narrow-minded, intolerant, evangelistic." He writes with disapproval of their "evangelistic religion."

On p. 565, Myrdal writes approvingly of "the growing strength of Southern liberalism." On p. 582, he writes "there is a great class of Southern whites who are also poor, uneducated, coarse and dirty." One can envision the fastidious Myrdal recoiling in horror from the "dirty white Southerners. " As an elitist and beneficiary of the Rockefeller billions, it must have been an ordeal for him to travel for four years in the South for his research on "the American Negro problem." The problem is not the Negro at all, but the coarse and dirty white Southerners. On p. 597, he writes of "the lower class whites in the South," but he never uses such terminology in writing of the Negroes. He also followed the Communist Party line by including several pages of vehement denunciations of police statistics on Negro crime. One wonders what Myrdal would make of the front page of the Washington Post, which daily recounts the staggering incidence of Negro crime, which has made our a nation's capital the crime capital of the world.

Had the Justices or the attorneys for the Southern school systems ever bothered to glance at the 1483 pages of "An American Dilemma," they would have been shocked at its rabid bias against the South and its white citizens. Yet this book was cited as a principal influence on the final decision of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff in Brown v. Board of Education! This evidence, which was never argued before the Court, actually impeached its own goal. Why would black children be improved by being forced to attend school with "coarse and dirty Southern whites?" Perhaps it was a subtle ploy to aid Southern whites by giving them the opportunity to associate with immaculate, well-spoken and highly intelligent and motivated black children.

Death of Justice Vinson and 'Desegregation'.

The 1952-53 session of the Supreme Court closed with no decision announced on Brown v. Board of Education. It was then scheduled to be carried over to the next session. However, the anticipated outcome was never in doubt. Justice Reed and others in the know stated that they expected Chief Justice Vinson to uphold Plessy v. Ferguson, ruling against any racial integration of the schools. John W. Davis, lawyer for the defending Southern states, announced that there would be a 6-3 decision against Brown v. Board of Education. The ruling was expected shortly after the opening of the fall term. On June 5, 1953, the five segregation cases before the Court were redocketed for Oct. 12, 1953 re-argument. Washington observers expected a short hearing, and that Vinson would then issue the 6-3 ruling against Brown. This had already been established by internal memoranda of the Court.

This opinion was never issued; at 3:15 A.M. on Sept. 8, 1953, Chief Justice Vinson died suddenly of a heart attack in his suite at the exclusive Wardman Park Hotel. Only 63 years old, and enjoying robust health, Vinson had shown no sign of any health problems. It was but one more of those strange "government heart attacks" which have played such an important role in major policy decisions. Despite their shock at his sudden death, Washington insiders saw no reason to change their expectation that the NAACP would still lose the segregation cases, perhaps on a 5-4 ruling instead of the anticipated 6-3. Nevertheless, a few of the protagonists greeted the news of Vinson's death as "a day of liberation."

Justice Frankfurter, on being informed of his longtime colleague's death, chortled gleefully, "This is the first indication I've ever had that there really is a God." He was referring to the Canaanite god, Baal, the agent of Lucifer, who apparently had been summoned to dispose of Chief Justice Vinson. Years passed before Frankfurter himself was revealed as the secret head of the influential-Harold Ware Communist cell in Washington. At the death of Bella Moscovitz, Frankfurter had inherited her leadership of the Communist agents in the Roosevelt Administration. At the same time that Frankfurter was serving on the Supreme Court, his brother, Otto Frankfurter, was serving a long sentence in the Anamosa State Prison of Iowa.

On Oct. 5, 1953, President Eisenhower announced that he had named Earl Warren to replace Justice Vinson as Chief Justice. It was immediately noted that Warren, a newcomer to Washington, had placed himself in Frankfurter's hands. There was still no indication that the new appointment would change the expected ruling on Brown. Arguments in the case were desultorily resumed, but months went by, with the case still in limbo. Washington journalists still expected a brief announcement that a decision had been made against Brown. On May 17, 1954, at 12:52 P.M., with no prior notice, Chief Justice Warren began reading the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. He first stated that all of the evidence presented by the NAACP had been "inconclusive," which seemed to verify the fact that Brown had lost. However, Warren then stated, AS A UNANIMOUS DECISION OF THE COURT,

"We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, for whom the actions have been brought, are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. . . . In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government."

Warren's statement that the Constitution prohibits "racially segregated schools" went beyond the scope of the arguments of the NAACP; the Constitution actually said nothing on the matter. The decision unleashed chaos throughout public education in the United States. The amazing ruling, even more amazing because it was unanimous, instead of the long-anticipated 6 to 3 ruling against Brown, was based on no legally acceptable evidence. Clark's doll manipulations and Myrdal's vicious denunciations of white Southerners were "evidence" which would have been laughed out of most courts. Rumors immediately began to circulate that Vinson had been "disposed of in order to end his opposition to a ruling in favor of Brown. His son, Fred Vinson (a classmate of the present writer at Washington and Lee University), also died suddenly while at the Department of Justice.

Kenneth's Clark's "evidence," later revealed to have been distorted, still threatened the validity of the Supreme Court ruling. NAACP lawyer Jack Greenberg then took a desegregation case before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a prearranged decision, as follows,

"We reiterate that no inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by the Supreme Court in the (1954) Brown decision, even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred as to its facts or to the law."

This amazing ruling tried to dictate that Brown could never be overturned, even if it were proved to be in error, as was the case. However, in a later case, Evers v. Jackson Ms. Municipal School District, 232 F. Supp. 241, 1964, Fed. Judge Sidney Mize noted, "In this case, the evidence as to racial differences is of such significance as to reasonably require the separation of school children for educational purposes is overwhelming, undisputed and unchallenged. In the opinion of this court, the facts in this case point up a most serious situation, and indeed, cry out for a reappraisal and complete review of the findings and conclusions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1954 Brown decision."

Washington insiders now concluded that Chief Justice Vinson had indeed been murdered as part of a sinister plot to force racially integrated schools on all Americans by the use of armed troops. Earl Warren became Governor of California through one murder, and Chief Justice of the United States through another.

Justice Felix Frankfurter was never criticized for the fact that he had been a director of the NAACP at the time he ruled in their favor. Nor did he reveal that he had personally selected the attorneys for the NAACP, Jack Greenberg, a longtime associate, and Thurgood Marshall. Marshall was then named to the Supreme Court himself, where he failed to disqualify himself in the long procession of racially sensitive cases before the Court. Loyal to the end, he always voted for his employers, the NAACP.

In 1987, the Harvard Law Review reported "a stunning fact" about the Supreme Court's milestone ruling in Brown vs. Board of Education:

"Which declared racially segregated public schools to be unconstitutional; Justice Felix Frankfurter had secret, improper, and unethical contacts with a lawyer for the plaintiff, with a view to engineering a victory for that side. He succeeded."

In the Detroit Free Press, Mar. 29, 1987, an editorial commented that had it been known, "Frankfurter would have been impeached, removed from the bench, and ruined." In fact, Frankfurter's association of many years with Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall in the NAACP is proof that a legal conspiracy was effected, and that Brown v. Board of Education is thereby totally invalidated. All persons who claim injury as a result of the forcible integration of the schools can now bring action against the government, as can any school district which has been adversely affected by the ruling.

It now seems evident that a further goal of the Brown v. Board of Education decision was to destroy the rapidly growing and independent black middle class throughout the United States. A black elite, composed primarily of ministers and educators, had succeeded in raising the standards of blacks in many areas, threatening the traditional plantation system by which Communist revolutionaries such as Frankfurter and wealthy white liberals as Mary White Ovington used black citizens for their own ulterior purposes. Thus blacks have as much reason to sue the government for damages resulting from the Brown v. Board of Education as whites, if not more so. Pleasant black residential neighborhoods are now drug-tormented, crime-ridden areas in which no one is safe; neither stable family life nor an effective educational system is possible. The Brown ruling was recalled in the Washington Post, April 22, 1989, in an interview with Charles Lofton. Lofton had been principal of the black elite high school, Dunbar High School, which produced many black leaders in the Washington area. He commented that:

"I had more influence on my students in the segregated environment. . . They used us as role models. I was at Dunbar when integration came in and—it knocked us out. We had been getting the cream of the crop, but with integration, students had to go to schools in their zones. I lost some of my finest teachers, because there was just not the same demand for subjects such as Latin or advanced calculus. Partly as a result of integration, our children do not have as positive a sense of self. We have lost a whole generation, the generation from sixteen to thirty-two, and we're never going to get it back."

The calculated destruction of the black elite has made possible the total government control of the black population. The dedicated black teachers and ministers have been pushed aside, replaced as role models by drug pushers and political demagogues. One black educator mourned that

"We now realize that a terrible crime has been committed. An entire generation of black youth has been deliberately tossed onto the scrap heap by false leadership which has left the black community disorganized and without hope."

Black leaders are also concerned about an apparent campaign to eliminate the entire black population in Africa through the deliberate inoculation of AIDS, and by famine and starvation. The Dark Continent can then be returned to the Rothschilds and to the tender ministrations of Global 2000, as a largely uninhabited area rich in natural resources, which can be plundered at leisure.

The Warren Court

After Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren found that his most consistent supporter on the liberal Court was Justice William O. Douglas. In a later desegregation case, Douglas delivered the amazing opinion that "No one has a right to attend a segregated public school." Due to his continuous pursuit of young women, Douglas soon began to exhibit serious signs of mental and physical degeneration. He became increasingly paranoid, claiming that listening devices had been planted in his offices; he sometimes asked lawyers to step out into the hall to carry on conversations. He endured more criticism when he married again, in the well-advertised "case of the child bride." A New York Times story of Aug. 21, 1988 cited J. Edgar Hoover's opinion of Justice Douglas, as revealed in FBI files, "Of course, Douglas is crazy and is not in too good health." During years of senile degeneration, Douglas continued to occupy his seat on the Supreme Court. His writings were a continuing puzzle to clerks and other officials of the Court. In "The Brethren," we are told,

"Former clerks were called regularly for clues to the meaning of Douglas' notes and his frequently incomplete references to old cases; his sentences were almost a private code, their meanings evident only to him."

The book goes to discuss Douglas' continuing incontinence, which caused his family to ask him to resign. He indignantly replied, "No! There will be no one on the Court who cares for blacks, Chicanos, defendants, and the environment." Despite their increasing aggravation at Douglas' presence, protocol prevented the other Justices from filing complaints about him. He had long since lost control of his lower body functions, and the continuous noxious odors arising from his chair sometimes caused his fellow Justices to become physically ill.

At the time the segregation decision was announced, blacks occupied all of the low level service and maintenance jobs at the Supreme Court. There was not a single black secretary in the entire building. Court personnel were routinely ordered to do personal work on their own time for the Justices, such as taking oriental rugs to the cleaners, shopping, and going across the city on other errands. The Court was exempt from civil service laws, and employees could be fired immediately, with no appeal. Numerous work hazards existed throughout the building; the black service personnel worked on rickety scaffolds, sometimes resulting in serious injury. The great bronze doors were regularly cleaned and polished with hydrochloric acid, whose use had long been outlawed in American industry.

After Douglas' death, Justice Thurgood Marshall represented the most liberal bias of the Court. A protege of Zionist Justice Brandeis, he had been a member of the ACLU for many years, studied at the obligatory New York version of the Lenin School, the New School for Social Research, and served as special counsel for the NAACP from 1937, when he was personally approved by Felix Frankfurter, until 1961. He delivered a stinging denunciation of the Constitution in a recent speech. Rumor is rife in Washington that he suffers from Alzheimer's. An article by Dept, of Justice attorney Terry Eastland in the National Review, April 21,1989, "While Justice Sleeps," notes that Marshall sleeps through oral arguments, and spends much of his time in the Court building watching television situation comedies; a favorite is "I Love Lucy." He lets clerks write his opinions, and told Life Magazine, 'I ain't giving no break to no drug dealer! Disgusting!' Although the Supreme Court renders 130 opinions each year, Marshall is only assigned fifteen. He refuses to retire, and vainly hoped that the Democrats would win in 1988, so that another liberal could be appointed in his stead.

In "The Brethren," Marshall is described as being overweight, drinking too much, eating too much, and thoroughly soured on his work. He has had one heart attack, from which he has never fully recovered, but still refuses to retire until a Democratic President has been elected.

The history of the Supreme Court reveals a steady retreat from its assigned role of protecting the legal rights of all American citizens. In 1833, the Court ruled that the Bill of Rights provided only protection against federal authority, but not against state action. In Barron v. Baltimore, the city was sued because it had impaired the value of the plaintiffs property. Barron claimed this was taking his property without due compensation, and thereby violated the Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the Bill of Rights only secured against "apprehended encroachment of the general government—not against those of the local governments." Marshall's ruling has never been reversed, although it was superseded by the three Civil War Amendments, the 13th, 14th and 15th.

On restrictive covenants, the Court dismissed Corrigan v. Buckley in 1926, effectively upholding restrictive covenants. Twenty-two years later, the Court effectively nullified restrictive covenants by forbidding the state to enforce them. Chief Justice Vinson ruled in Shelley v. Kraemer and McGee v. Sepes, 1948, with three justices abstaining,

"We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws, and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand."

In 1989, the Court hesitated somewhat in its heretofore upholding of affirmative action cases, by stating that "a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party." This seemed to end the era of class actions in which rulings affecting large groups of Americans had been routinely handed down, even though most of them had never been a party to the action.

In 1945, the Court vainly attempted to stem the rapidly growing monopolization of the media by ruling that "The First Amendment presupposes that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." This decision was later used as the basis for a 1978 Court decision which prevented daily newspaper owners from buying radio and television stations in the same cities as their newspapers, and thereby establishing a media monopoly. The decision seems to have had little effect in preventing media moguls from expanding their empires. It was recently predicted that within the next decade, four giant corporations will control all of the world's communications.

The Supreme Court ruled in Totten v. U.S., 92 U.S., that "Public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, or respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated."

This would seem to guarantee personal privacy, but it has not restrained judges from routinely ordering all personal papers and records to be turned over to the opposing party in general lawsuits.

Masonic Domination of the Supreme Court

The considerable Masonic direction of the Supreme Court throughout its history was documented in 1988 by Paul A. Fisher's book, "Behind the Lodge Door." A veteran of the OSS and the Counter-Intelligence Corps, Fisher used his considerable talents for intelligence analysis to build an irrefutable case for the domination of the Court by Masons. He begins with Chief Justice Marshall, who was Grand Master of the Virginia Lodges, and documents the fact that the secret oath of the Masons has played a major role in Court decisions ever since. He notes that FDR's plan to pack the Court originated with four Masons, whom FDR subsequently appointed to the Court, Black, Byrnes, Minton and Jackson.

Another recent study shows that nine of sixteen members of the Congressional Committee on the Judiciary are Masons, showing that the continuing Masonic influence still permeates not only the Supreme Court, but the entire Judiciary. This influence extends not only to the Justices, but to their law clerks as well. In "The Brethren," we are told that the law clerks in the office of the Chief Justice exercised great power. "The way things worked in the Chiefs chambers gave them tremendous influence. Warren told them how he wanted the cases to come out." So much for "impartiality." Woodward and Bernstein also quote Warren's successor, Chief Justice Burger, on Warren, "sloppy, politically motivated, interested more in results than in legal reasoning, a man without intellectual honesty."

Despite the fact that the RICO law, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law enacted by Congress, has been perverted by the Department of Justice from its stated purpose of fighting organized crime to a weapon of terrorism against legitimate business, the Supreme Court recently refused to recognize this perversion. More than one thousand RICO suits are being filed each year; 93% of them have no connection with organized crime. The Wall Street Journal and other publications have repeatedly denounced this rape of justice. Nevertheless, on June 26, 1989, the Supreme Court refused to rein in the law. The Court ruled 9-0 to continue civil suits for triple damages, although Justice Scalia admitted that the law is "so vague it violates the Constitution."

The Court now faces a challenge in its necessity of ruling whether the judiciary can impose direct taxes. U.S. District Judge Russell Clark had ordered Kansas City property taxes increased by 95% to pay the costs for forced desegregation, and ignored the will of the voters by authorizing the school district to issue $150 million of capital improvement bonds. The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the judge's arbitrary action, which clearly flouts the Constitution, and which totally abrogates Art. 1, sec. 8 by giving the courts power to tax. The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in the case by Oct. 1989.

Judge Clark's action is typical of the social activism in which the Supreme Court itself has taken the lead. A Washington Post story Dec. 28, 1988 declared

"Many in Washington view it as judicial activism run wild; seven judges forcing this wealthy township, Bedminster, N.J., to build housing for the less fortunate, nearly tripling its population. Sen. Gerald Cardinale said of the justices, 'They think, like all social planners, that their view of society is superior to everyone else's. The court is destroying the democratic process.'"

For years, the N.J. Supreme Court has been headed by Chief Justice Robert Wilentz, heir to the political power wielded by his father, a Democratic ward heeler and B'nai B'rith activist. David Wilentz had prosecuted Bruno Hauptmann in the Lindbergh kidnapping case. As exposed by Anthony Scaduto in his ground-breaking book, "Scapegoat," Wilentz had never before tried a criminal case of any kind; he had been appointed Attorney General by Gov. Harry Moore as a political payoff for switching the support of the B'nai B'rith Masonic power to Moore's campaign.

Wilentz determined to convict Hauptmann, despite the lack of evidence. He rounded up a group of witnesses who were willing to commit perjury, bolstering their incredible testimony with crudely manufactured "evidence." Wilentz' principal witness was 87 year old Amandus Hochmuth, who testified that Hauptmann had driven up to him on the day of the kidnapping and inquired the way to the Lindbergh residence. Social Security records proved that Hochmuth was not only legally blind from cataracts, but was also hopelessly senile. Wilentz also withheld from the jury the Reliance Property Management paybook which proved that at the time of the kidnapping, Hauptmann was working in New York!

When J. Edgar Hoover was informed of Wilentz' activities, he indignantly ordered all FBI agents to withdraw from the case. He refused to have the Bureau's work contaminated by such crude perjury; Hoover also expected the roof to fall in on Wilentz when his conspiracy was exposed. Hoover remarked to his associate, Clyde Tolson, "I don't know if Hauptmann will ever go to jail, but I'm damned sure Wilentz will." In fact, with the B'nai B'rith power behind him, Wilentz succeeded in having Hauptmann convicted and electrocuted. For years, his widow, Anna Hauptmann, worked to have the frame-up exposed, but she was jeered at by the entrenched powers of the media and the legal system.

Wilentz typified the unbridled arrogance of the judiciary who daily wield their power in our courts. The Associated Press noted Dec. 29, 1988, that a Ft. Lauderdale judge, J. Leonard Fleet, routinely sentences lawyers who displease him or who are late coming to court, or even if their mode of dress offends him. He orders them to go to a supermarket and buy food for the poor. Again, this is social activism and has nothing to do with the administration of justice. However, it is typical of the rape of justice.

The Portland Press Herald recently decried the practice of retired federal judges drawing full pay, even though they no longer hear any cases. It cited former Chief Justice Warren Burger, who receives $115,000 a year. The editorial noted that twenty per cent of all senior judges draw full pay, even though they do no work. However, in view of the omnipresent acts of judicial tyranny, it might be better if we retired all of them. The Yonkers case, which was headlined daily in the press throughout 1988, typified the judicial dictatorship which now terrifies our people. Federal Judge Leonard Sand personally decided that the city of Yonkers, the fourth largest city in New York, was not doing enough to "wipe out racial discrimination." He ordered the city to build one thousand new units for blacks in residential neighborhoods in which substantial racial integration had taken place. After residents opposed the order, he imposed $500 a day fines on three Yonkers city councilmen and a fine of one million dollars a day against the city itself. The judge resided in Chappaqua, a wealthy white suburb north of Yonkers. Columnist Pat Buchanan wrote,

"What is happening in Yonkers is an outrage. A Harvard educated dictator in black robes, elected by no one, is ordering the fourth largest city in New York, against the will of its people and elected officials, to spend millions of tax dollars building public housing it doesn't want or need, in areas Sand alone will determine. If Yonkers refuses, the Judge will destroy the city financially, and jail its elected officials. Will someone explain to me what exactly George III did to our forefathers to compare to that?"

British troops who tried to enforce a decree as dictatorial as Judge Sand's would have been met with armed rebellion. The hidden explanation of Judge Sand's action, as the present writer explained in "The World Order," is that every public official has a secret agenda to aggravate and increase racial tensions by every means possible, in order to provoke a raging conflict, and provide the excuse for active government repression against all groups. The minorities continue to be helpless pawns in this obvious but never openly stated program.

The Supreme Court again maddened the populace with its July Fourth approval of the desecration of the flag. One Joey Johnson, a New Yorker who echoes the staunchest tenets of Leninism, claimed that "the flag is a symbol of oppression, international murder and plunder of a sick and dying empire." He was then arrested in Texas for publicly burning the flag. The Supreme Court, in Texas v. Johnson, ruled 5-4 that burning the flag was a free speech exercise which was protected by the First Amendment as a political statement. The front page of the Washington Post headlined "Court Nullifies Flag Desecration Law." Just below it was another feature story, "Soviet U.S. Becoming Partners." The majority of the Justices ruled that conviction for flag-burning was not consistent with the First Amendment. Justice Stevens dissented,

"The value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured. The court is therefore quite wrong." Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "(The flag) has come to be the visible symbol embodying our nation. . . Millions of Americans reverence regardless of what sort of social, political or philosophical beliefs they may have."

Pat Buchanan wrote another stinging column about the flag burning decision. On July 6, 1989, he stated,

"For 30 years a despotic court has been writing into our Constitution, and law, its own arid ideology, its own prejudice, its own view of how a rational society should govern itself, casting aside as so much trash the deepest sentiments, traditions, beliefs of the American people, all of the accumulated wisdom of the race. . . A predominantly Christian people has had yoked upon it an alien, secularist concept of the good society . . . America today Where they celebrate raucous dissent, we tolerate it. Where they believe the marketplace of ideas must remain open to all sentiments, no matter how pernicious, seditious, or disgusting, we believe there are limits to the toxicity of the moral pollution a democratic Republic can stand . . . We have had enough judge-made law."