Rape of Justice - Eustace Mullins

Taxation Without Hope

During much of my adult life, the years spent in research and study, I had no contact with the Internal Revenue Service, because I had nothing to report. My first taste of the financial rewards of a writing career came when I received a $1500 advance for my biography of poet Ezra Pound, in 1961. In exchange for my room and board, I was teaching at a small Christian school in the mountains, when I received a summons to travel to the city. I was called into an IRS office, where the agents indignantly demanded a reason why I had not paid $500 of this sum as income tax. I contacted my brother, who was an excellent tax adviser. He informed me that I need only file a revised return, proving that I had spent more than $1500 in researching the book. I did so, and the IRS was satisfied.

Some fifteen years passed before I heard from them again. I had been embroiled in several lawsuits, during the course of which I was forced to file suit against an attorney for the defense. He had persisted in repeating outrageous and malicious lies about my pleadings to the judge, in order to justify the judge's one hundred per cent denial of all of my motions.

I sued under the statutes, which provide legal redress when an attorney makes false statements. This not only caused consternation (apparently no one had ever sued a lawyer in my town before), but also doubled his malpractice insurance. He seemed anxious to convince me that my effrontery had not gone unnoticed, and one morning when I was passing by his office, he was trudging towards the door. "Mr. Mullins," he said. "Oh, good morning," I replied, without halting stride. For those who persist in claiming that there is no God, this attorney, at the very moment he was uttering vicious lies against me, was stricken, and his face began to rot away from a malignant and rapidly spreading growth. I had little desire to come closer to this apparition, a head of Medusa, and a reminder to all that God is not mocked, when he said, "Just a minute," "Yes?" I asked.

"You may think you are getting somewhere by filing these lawsuits," he said, "but you won't be a problem much longer."

"How is that?" I asked.

"The IRS will be taking care of you," he said.

"I have no problem with the IRS," I told him.

"You do now," he said. He tried to smile, with the result that his decaying features contorted into a grin which would have done credit to a corpse.

The next day, I received a summons from the IRS to appear for an audit. I appeared at the office with a tape recorder, which I did not know how to turn on, and two truculent friends. After a brief encounter, we left the office. I had already filed suit against the IRS agent for damages, asking $300,000 for terrorism. The government promptly remanded my suit to federal court. I then filed a petition for remand to state court.


Comes now plaintiff, as Attorney pro Se in this action, and moves the Court to remand this action to State Court for the following reasons:

1. Plaintiff filed this Motion for Judgment against an individual in a State Court.

2. Plaintiff filed a Motion of Opposition to defendant's Petition for Removal to federal court.

3. Defendant has admitted in Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 10, 1980 that federal court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.

4. Plaintiff denies that the United States District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28, U.S. Code Section 1346

(a) as plaintiff denies that this is a claim against the United States.

5. Plaintiff denies that defendant was "acting within the scope of his office or employment. N.C.St Hwy Comsn v. U.S. D.C. N.C. 1968 288 F. supp. 757 affirmed 406 F 2d 1330.

6. Plaintiff denies that the United States of America can be substituted as defendant in place of C. L. Wright Jr. pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2679 (d) and plaintiff cites Title 28, United States Code, Section 2680. "Exceptions, (c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. (1). Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system."

7. Plaintiff cites Title 28, Section 1446-2, United States Code. "Construction. Grounds and procedure of removal will be strictly construed in effort to preserve jurisdiction and comity of state and federal courts. Wood v. DeWeese D.C.Ky 1969 305 F Supp. 939. This section should be strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction. Vilas v. Shaip D.C.Mo. 1965 248 F.Supp. 1019. Higson v. North River Ins Co. C.C.N.C. 1911 184 F.165. Daugherty v. West Un Tel Co

C. C. Ind 1894 6. F. 138. Proteus Fds & Industries Inc v. Nippon Reizu Kabushiki Kaisha D.C.N.Y. 1967 279 F Supp 836 Ziegler. V. Hunt D.C.Fa. 1941 38 F Supp 68 Soldifar v. Heiland Res Corp D.C.Tex. 1940 32 F. Supp 248."

8. Plaintiff further cites Title 28, United States Code, Section 2680, note 67. "Test of whether government officer is immune from tort suit depends on whether individual defendant was exercising a discretionary function. Gamer v. Rathbum

D. C.Colo. 1964 232 F Supp 508. affirmed 346 F. 2d 55. Note 14. Abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion does not impose liability on the United States under this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title. U.S. v. Morrell C.A. Utah 1964 331 F 2d 498 certiorari denied 85 S Ct 146 379 U.S. 879 13 L Ed. 2d 86.

9. Plaintiff denies that this proceeding is a tort action brought against the United States as defined by Title 28, United States Code, Section 2671 et seq.

10. Plaintiff cites Title 26, United States Code, Section 7214 (a). "Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents. Any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States (1) who is guilty of any extortion or wilful oppression under color of law. . . . 4. whoever conspires or colludes with any other person to defraud the United States. . . shall be dismissed from office, fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

11. In "MY LIFE IN CHRIST," Faith and Service Books 1968, by Eustace Mullins, plaintiff has written, on p. 87, "The secret of Christ Power lies in the nature of human potential." Defendant's action in singling out plaintiffs poverty level tax return for "special attention" is due solely to plaintiffs Christian work, to plaintiffs work as officer of a taxpayer organization, and to plaintiffs authorship of numerous articles such as "WITHHOLDING TAX IS ILLEGAL," Christian Vanguard, Issue #86, Feb., 1979, and reprinted by popular demand in the March 1980 issue of the Christian Vanguard, and thereby defendant's prejudicial actions against plaintiff were outside the scope of his office and employment.

12. On Feb. 24, 1980, on the program "60 Minutes" Paul Strassels, former Internal Revenue Service official and nationally-recognized authority on the operations of the Internal Revenue Service, stated that any citizen reporting an income of below $15,000 had little chance of being audited, and that any citizen reporting an income of less than $10,000 had NO chance of being audited, yet defendant bypassed the established procedures of the Internal Revenue Service to order an audit of plaintiffs poverty-level income.

13. Plaintiff has requested a jury trial of this action, and remand to state court would preserve plaintiffs constitutional right to jury trial.

14. Defendant acted beyond the scope of his official duties in singling out plaintiffs poverty-level income for "special attention" because plaintiff is listed as No. 2 on a list of American patriots who have publicly opposed the subversion of the legal government of the United States by the State of Israel, and said list was compiled by Mossad, the Israeli Intelligence Service, and turned over to the Internal Revenue Service by said alien saboteurs with the demand that the Internal Revenue Service take immediate action against plaintiff and other patriots.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the Court to remand this action to state court as originally filed by plaintiff.


I then filed a request for my IRS file.


Comes now plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, a citizen of the assembled States of the Republic of the United States of America, with all rights and privileges attendant, and moves the Court to order defendant to produce for plaintiff all pertinent records of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service concerning plaintiff in any way, for plaintiffs due perusal and study as an essential part of plaintiffs prosecution of this action.

In almost two years of litigation, the IRS never produced any documents. I also filed Written Interrogatories to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. I never received any answer to these Interrogatories.

I then filed a motion for injunction to prevent the government from sending the fraudulent 1040 form through the mail.


Comes now plaintiff, Eustace C. Mullins, as attorney pro se in this action, and moves the Court to issue an Injunction against Defendant To Deny Use of Mails for Fraudulent Documents (1040 Forms), for the following reasons:

1. The 1040 Form which is mailed to citizens of the United States by the Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, is a fraudulent document because it is a legal summons, but nowhere on this form is the recipient notified that this is a service of a legal summons, thereby creating a fraudulent act by sending said document through the mail improperly and illegally lacking any identification as to its true nature, nor does it warn the recipient of the penalties for disobeying said summons: United States Code Title 26-7210. Fail to obey summons will result in fine of not more than $1000.00 and imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.

(a). Corpus Juris Secundum, v.83, p.795. A Summons is defined as "A call to attend, or to act, as at a particular place or time." The 1040 form is a call to attend, or to act, as at a given place or time, and is a legal summons.

(b) . 1672 Rec. Proc. Justin, crt Edinb. (S.H.S.) II 77 A Messenger executing a Summonds must shew his warrant.

(c) . 1578 Lindsaye, (Pitscottie) Chron. Scot. (S.T.S.) 1.150 Than was send ane summondes of foirfaltour.

2. The 1040 form is a legal warrant, but nowhere on this form is the recipient informed that this is the service of a warrant, and it thereby becomes a fraudulent act to send said document through the mails improperly and illegally lacking identification as to its true nature. United States Code 265557 authorizes internal revenue agents to issue search warrants but said warrants must be properly identified. United States Code 26-7608 (b) also authorizes internal revenue agents to execute and serve search warrants, but does not authorize the service of same without proper identification. United States Code 18-2234, Authority exceeded in executing warrant. "Whoever, in executing a search warrant, willfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with undue severity, shall be fined not more than $1000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year." Je25 48, C645 62 Stat. 803. The action of defendant in sending the 1040 search warrant through the mail without proper preliminaries is a violation of United States Code 182234, because it exceeds statutory authority for sending a search warrant without proper legal preliminaries. United States Code 18-2235. Search warrant procured maliciously. Whoever maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant to be issued and executed should be fined not more than $1000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year. Code of Virginia 19.2-52 When search warrant may be issued: 19.2-55 issuing general search warrant without affidavit deemed malfeasance. 19.2-59 Search without warrant is a misdemeanor. Plaintiff, a citizen of the sovereign State of Virginia, is protected against said violations.

(a) Corpus Juris Secundum, sec. 932. "The guaranty of the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures includes searches and seizures under, or in connection with, internal revenue laws. Amos v. U.S. S.C.41 S.Ct.266, 255 U.S.313, 65 L.Ed. 654. U.S. v. Costner, C.C.A.Tenn. 157 F. 2d 23 U.S. v. Swan 1 D.C.Cal. 15 F.2d 598 U.S. v. One Kemper Radio, D.C.Cal.

1 8 F.Supp.304." The burden of these decisions is that the 16th Amendment to the Constitution authorizing the income tax does not confer upon defendant any authority to violate other provisions of the Constitution.

(b) Corpus Juris Secundum, sec. 933. "An affidavit on which a warrant is issued must conform to the statutes and to the Fourth Amendment. . . . In view of the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, a showing of probable cause is necessary to justify the issuance of a warrant."

(c) Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 934. "A search without a warrant contravenes the Fourth Amendment."

3. The 1040 form is a legal contract between the party of the first part, the citizen who makes out and signs the form as a statement of debt and promise of payment, and the party of the second part, the defendant who receives payment but does not sign the contract, and said contract is therefore invalid. O.E.D. A contract is defined as "to enter into mutual obligations." F. contractus, an agreement enforceable by law, an agreement which effects a transfer of property, a conveyance. "

(a) 1588 A.King tr. Canisius Catech. 39. All unlawful.

. . . usurping of vthir mens geir be thift usurie, inust winning, decept, and vther contractis." The 1040 form effects a transfer of property from the party of the first part to the party of the second part, even though the party of the second part does not fulfil its obligations, and is therefore a fraudulent document, and cannot legally be sent through the mail.

4. The 1040 form of defendant, demanding monies with the tacit and implicit use of force, is legally an extortion note, and is in violation of United States Code 18-875, 876, 872, 606, 607, 597 and 602. Because the 1040 form attempts to extort monies from citizens of the United States by force in order to give or pay tribute to foreign potentates and princes with said monies, said extortion is in violation of United States Code Chapter 11, Section 18-201.

5. The 1040 form of defendant contains a section for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, "Do you want $1 to go to this fund?" This violates United States Code 18.606. Intimidation to secure political contributions, 607, Making political contributions, 597, Expenditures to influence voting, and 602, Solicitation of political contributions. This also violates the fundamental Constitutional principle of secrecy of the ballot, a basic principle of our Republic, because the citizen who refuses to offer $1 to this fund publicly indicates his political preference as a political dissident who does not support either of the government financed and controlled political parties, and the citizen thereby becomes subject to audit by the Internal Revenue Service, as plaintiff was selected for audit solely for said reason. Thus the 1040 form, which is in violation of the principle of secrecy of the ballot, cannot legally be sent through the mail.

In further support of said Injunction, plaintiff cites Title 26, United States Code, Section 7426 (b) (1) and Title 26, Section 2613, Note 28.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Motion for Injunction should be granted.

Included in some 38 motions filed during this lawsuit were five Motions for Injunction to halt the collection of income tax, one of which is as follows:


Comes now plaintiff, as attorney pro se in this action, and moves the Court to issue an Injunction against Department of the Treasury/Internal Revenue Service Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to halt collection of monies by force and/ or intimidation from citizens of the assembled States of the Republic of the United States of America if any portion of such monies are designated to be paid as tribute to foreign princes and alien potentates, for the reason that plaintiff cites in paragraphs 5 and 13 of his Motion for Judgment, the subversion of the Internal Revenue Service by aliens and collaborators and the ensuing harassment of plaintiff and other American patriots and patriotic organizations who have publicly opposed the subversion of the legal government of the United States by said collaborators who are in violation of Chapter Eleven of the United States Code, and that cited activities of defendants are in violation of Chapter 105 of the United States Code, "Sabotage," and that defendants may be held under the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Sections 811, 813 and 825, and that this injunction shall remain in effect until such times as the defendants are no longer in violation of said Sections of the United States Code and said violations are corrected.

In support of this Injunction, plaintiff cites Title 26, United States Code, Section 7426 (b) (1). "Injunction. If a levy or sale would irreparably injure rights in property which the court determines to be superior to the rights of the United States in such property, the court may grant an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of such levy or to prohibit such sale."

Plaintiff further cites Title 26, United States Code, Section 2613, Note 28. "Apart from this motion permitting injunction restraining making of assessment or levy where taxpayer has not received proper notice, suits to restrain assessment or collection of tax may be maintained despite Section 7421 of this title prohibiting maintenance of suit to restrain assessment or collection of a tax."

Thus, plaintiffs Motion for Injunction should be granted.

I also filed a Petition for Remand for Jury Trial:


Eustace Clarence Mullins, Defendant, as attorney pro se, respectfully petitions the Court to remand this cause for a jury hearing, for the following reasons:

1. The Virginia Bill of Rights provides (8) . . jury of his vicinage . . ."

2. The English Act of 1309, restraining chancery jurisdiction without jury. 3 Ed II.

3. An impartial jury, being fundamental to a fair hearing in a fair tribunal, is a basic requirement of constitutional due process. Durham v. Cox, 328 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.Va. 1971).

4. Magna Carta (1215) Cap 35, "the writ called praecipe shall not in future be issued so as to cause a freeman to lose his court."

5. Magna Carta (1215) Cap 39. "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anyways destroyed; nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."

6. "THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES," by Frederic Jesup Stimson, The Boston Book Co., Boston, Mass. 1908, p. 11. "The Right to Law. The law required by this general right, furthermore, must be the Common Law of the English people. That is to say, in origin, the body of their free customs and usage, made by themselves, not by a king, and also, in earliest days, enforced by themselves; and furthermore, it must be the Common Law, not the Roman or Civil Law, nor the Canon or Church Law, nor any supposed Administrative Law, or orders of decrees of the king, or king in Council. Even chancery jurisdiction, which rests originally on the royal power as wielded by the king's chancellor (whence the writs of injunction, mandamus, prohibition etc. are called Prerogative writs) is hardly an exception. For many centuries we find statutes restraining or limiting chancery jurisdiction, p. 12. In early English trials, therefore, what was tried was rarely whether the man did the deed (it was usually admitted or known) but whether he was right in doing it; that is to say, was he in his law? Was he acting upon a state of facts whereon the unwritten law gave the right of reparation or vengeance into his own hands? If not, he was out of law, outlaw; that is, he had lost his right to law as against anyone molesting him in person or property, p. 24. The common law sounds in damages. . . Thus, the earliest codes of statutes merely fix a scale of penalties.

The notion of compelling a freeman to do something or to abstain from doing something was foreign to Anglo-Saxon ideas of liberty. Like the doctrine of free will carried to its extreme, a freeman was lord of his own acts; only liable for the consequences of same, to the person injured; later, only to the Crown if a criminal act, and to the individual injured if a private wrong. Even when the judgment of the court went against him, the defendant was never compelled to do a thing, or even, in ordinary cases, to make restitution, as in the Oriental system of rendering justice. This principle must never be lost sight of, for it explains many things noted in local history and in popular prejudice. Probably the power of the chancellor to issue injunction writs went as far towards prejudicing our ancestors against the courts of chancery and the Star Chamber (which was merely its criminal side) as the absence of the jury and the local county court. Repeated attempts to limit or do away with this jurisdiction are found in the States of the Realm, and the general prejudice against chancery courts came to our ancestors by direct inheritance. As is known, some States, notably Massachusetts, for some time withheld chancery jurisdiction entirely, and when adopted it was in a limited and tentative way. . .

Bearing in mind firmly the principle that the English law sounds only in damages, and that the notion of ordering or even forbidding any act (except under a criminal statute) is utterly foreign to its system; and the cardinal principle that no fact can be found without the intervention of the petit jury ; we shall be able to understand both the historical reason and the present meaning of the objection of the American people to the injunctive powers of chancery and ex parte sentences for contempt made by the judge who issued the injunction and upon the facts found by him showing the infringement of the same. . . Many further authorities can be cited to sustain this position; but these are sufficient to establish the general principle that the injunction process and contempt in chancery procedure, as well as chancery jurisdiction itself, is looked on with a logical jealousy in Anglo-Saxon countries as being in derogation of the common law."

7. In "THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AS IT PROTECTS PRIVATE RIGHTS" by Frederic Jesup Stimson, Scribner's, New York, 1923, p. 22.:

The Anglo-Saxon people have a genius for ruling themselves. Their laws are the most ancient of modem law, they extend in unbroken line from Ethelbert, the first Christian king of Kent. p. 59. Chancery jurisdiction rested originally on the royal powers as wielded by the King through his Chancellor (in civil matters) or Justiciar (in criminal). These high officials were usually clerics, hence familiar with canon or Roman law rather than the Anglo-Saxon common law, which they probably despised. The common law knew only one remedial process, punishment for doing wrong; it could not, as a priest might do, order a litigant to do right. . . From the Chancellor grew his court of chancery and all our courts of equity. Mitigating or supplementing the somewhat clumsy and uncompromising common law was well and good; but the Chancellor also shared this extraordinary, un-English, Norman and tyrannical power of ordering a free citizen to do something that he did not wish to do. . . For what we may call the Continental notion, derived from the Roman, is that all law rests on the order of a sovereign to his subject, couple with a threat of punishment if he does not obey; to make a man do something or not do something. This is still more the Oriental notion. . . But this notion had absolutely no place in the common law of England. An Englishman was a freeman, responsible for his acts; he could be punished for them by the state, or made to pay damages for them by the individual; but he could not be ordered to do anything else. In the earliest days of all, when in Saxon tribes each man executed his own law, the 'courts,' i.e. the assembly of his neighbors, only tried the question whether he was in his right in so doing, and if not, he paid a regular fine, at first fixed by custom, later, and most elaborately, by the earliest written laws we have preserved in England. . . so no one was ever ordered to do anything by court process."

WHEREFORE, defendant claims the right to a jury hearing of this action.

The federal judge finally dismissed my suit without argument, on the incredible grounds that

"It appears that the plaintiff attempted to claim a deduction for business losses on the ground that the annual inflation rate exceeded his 7% return on investments. Accrued interest, of course, should have been reported as gross income on the plaintiffs income tax return, USC 26 sec 61, and the failure to do so constituted a legitimate basis for IRS review."

The judge's opinion proved his total incompetence. I had fully reported all interest income on my tax return (it was interest on a savings account of $2100, and amounted to less than $200); the judge, or his clerk, became confused by the fact that I had filed a Motion for an Injunction to Halt the Collection of Income Tax on Savings Interest Income. He apparently thought that this meant I had refused to report it, although my suit had stipulated that I had filed and reported all sources of income. The judicial error was so flagrant that I had no doubt, on appealing it to the notorious "Rocket Docket," the leftwing U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, that they would find in my favor. In my appeal, I explained in detail the error of the judge. On April 3, 1981, the appellate court stated "Mullins maintains he fully reported his interest income. Even if Mullins' statement is correct, the district court did not err in granting the government's motion for summary judgment."

Note the brilliant legal scholarship flaunted in the observation "Even if Mullins' statement is correct." This is a bold admission that the appellate court did not even bother to ascertain whether I had told the truth about reporting the interest income. Such sloppy judicial work, showing a callous disregard for the appellate rights of the citizen, leads one to wonder what sort of actual judicial work would be done if I were appealing a death sentence.

On Nov. 20, 1987, I was advised to send Certified to the Department of Justice a brief record of the circumstances leading to the denial of income from my writings. I sent the following notarized statement, which was also sent to the Internal Revenue Service. There was no response.


I, the undersigned, Eustace C. Mullins, residing at 126 Madison PI. Staunton Va. 24401 hereby swear and affirm the following facts:

On or about 15 June, 1953, I was being driven from my Manhattan apartment by Charles Smith (Smetonius) to his office in Union, N.J., where he managed Common Sense, an anti-Communist paper. During this drive, Smith informed me that his employers (he was a double agent working for the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith) were upset by my articles circulating widely. They authorized Smith to make this offer: I would continue to write whatever I wished, but all articles would be submitted to Smith and his employers prior to publication. In return, I would be paid handsomely. If I refused this offer, Smith's employers would see to it that I never received any further income from my writing. I declined the offer, because I wished to be independent, and I could not believe any group had power to deny me all income from my work. Smith then issued 100,000 copies of my book, The Federal Reserve Conspiracy, without payment of royalties. Other publishers also began to issue large printings of my books, which continues to the present. I filed two suits with the U.S. Court of Claims, because federal agents were active in these printings, but these suits were never argued in court. I complained to federal agencies continually since 1953 and in every case was rebuffed. I filed suits in federal courts but the judges refused to uphold Title 17 USC, copyright law, even though I held valid copyrights. In thirty-four years, I have suffered approximately $25,000,000.00 loss of income from my books because of a criminal conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States, and a criminal conspiracy to violate my civil rights by a private government which regards itself as being beyond the reach of due process, composed of the above-named groups, and in which federal agents and federal agencies have played an active role to deny me all income from my writings. You are duly notified.